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                    A FOLLOW-UP TO THE AHDR
This report is a result of and follow-up to the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR), which appeared in 2004 and 
had been conducted under the auspices of the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). The 
AHDR marked processes of maturation within the Arctic Council and beyond. On the one hand, the AHDR represented 
the first social science-driven report prepared for the Arctic Council, indicating that various stakeholders, from politicians 
to Arctic residents, understood the importance of the “human dimension” for sustainable development in the Arctic. On 
the other hand, the processes leading to the AHDR marked new developments in the relationship between Arctic govern-
ance and scholarship, including coordinated support for the report from the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of 
the Arctic Region (SCPAR).
The AHDR was largely met with approval and enthusiasm, signaling that human development in the Arctic had become 
a matter of widespread concern and interest. In the years since, Arctic human development has become even more critical 
for stakeholders in the Arctic and beyond. One of the reasons is certainly the impact of global climate change on Arctic 
environments and communities (see, among many other reports, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) of 2004). 
As the Arctic has become an “early warning” site for climate-induced changes to come (the figurative “canary in the coal 
mine” for much of the rest of the world), the effects of these changes on arctic residents have become a matter of general 
concern. Thus, tracking Arctic human development through a small set of indicators becomes a matter of significant 
practical and theoretical relevance in times of (climate) change.
While the first thoughts regarding an Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) project reach back to the years 2004 and 2005, the 
majority of work for the initiative was produced during the years 2006-2009. Thus, the ASI activities largely coincided with 
the research initiatives of the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007-2008, which officially lasted from March 2007 to March 
2009. Actually, ASI was recognized as an IPY activity by the International IPY programme office. Given that the IPY 2007-
2208 differed radically from its predecessors – by its inclusion of the social sciences and of arctic residents -, the co-occur-
rence of IPY and ASI was more than pure coincidence. It was indicative of increased research activities in the Arctic (and 
Antarctic), as well as of increased input from Arctic residents who consider the study of human development as critical as 
the study of changing sea ice conditions.
Preface
Similar to the AHDR, ASI set itself the task of combining state-of-the-art arctic social science research with applied con-
cerns of arctic countries and communities and of arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations, the so-called permanent partic-
ipants of the Arctic Council. While the applicability (and usefulness) of Arctic research to northern communities is the 
ultimate test of research that considers itself appropriate within the context of the Arctic Council’s SDWG, this relevance 
cannot be achieved without the input from a broad spectrum of scholars and practitioners, representing the best in their 
fields. We hope that this report will nourish the growing recognition that the study and tracking of human development is 
necessary for understanding the Arctic, as well as necessary for increasing well-being in the circumpolar North.
This first ASI report is, by design, focused on the development of a small set of social indicators in the Arctic and 
cannot provide the implementation of these indicators. Data challenges, as outlined in the final chapter of this report, need 
to be overcome in order to implement the set of social indicators proposed in this report. Thus, as we are now launching 
this first ASI report, preparations are under way for a follow-up focused on the implementation of what is being suggested 
here. While we hope to have your undivided attention for ASI-I, we want to communicate that our task at hand will be 
incomplete if there were not an ASI-II report in due time.
        Joan Nymand Larsen and Peter Schweitzer
        Project Leaders, ASI
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1.0 Introduction 
Rapid change, both physical and social, chal-
lenges Arctic communities. While climate 
change is perhaps the most obvious and widely 
acknowledged influence on the future of 
circumpolar societies, other factors play a more 
immediate role in the lives of Arctic residents in 
many areas. Globalization, economic and 
political transformations, changing cultural 
landscapes, often driven from afar but expe-
rienced in the North, are all requiring adapta-
tions. In the first years of the twenty-first cen-
tury, in recognition of these social challenges, 
the Arctic Council supported the documenta-
tion of Arctic residents’ well-being around the 
Circumpolar North. It commissioned the Arctic 
Human Development Report (AHDR), in 2002, 
as a priority project during Iceland’s chairman-
ship of the Arctic Council, to provide “a com-
prehensive knowledge base for the Arctic Coun-
cil’s Sustainable Development Program”, which 
could “serve as a point of departure for assess-
ing progress in the future” (AHDR 2004:15). 
The report was also to highlight “dimensions of 
human well-being that are not prominent in 
mainstream discussions of this topic” (AHDR 
2004:15).
The resulting Arctic Human Development 
Report, published in 2004, offers a comprehen-
sive overview of the state of human develop-
ment in the Arctic at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. As such, it constitutes a 
unique and indispensable resource. It addresses 
Arctic demography, political, economic and 
legal systems, and key issues in the North such 
as resource governance, community viability, 
human health and well-being, education, 
gender issues, and circumpolar international 
relations and geopolitics.
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The village of Alluitsup 
Paa, South Greenland, 
a settlement based on 
fisheries and hunting 
activities with 319 
inhabitants (2009). 
Photo: Sigrid Rasmussen.
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The AHDR emphasized the need to develop 
a system for tracking trends in human develop-
ment in the Arctic over time, through the iden-
tification of a set of indicators (AHDR 2004:11). 
The AHDR itself mostly offers a snapshot of the 
region at a particular point in time, and thus a 
baseline or a starting point from which to meas-
ure changes over time in the circumpolar world. 
While its purpose was not to provide a well-
developed longitudinal perspective on human 
development in the Arctic, the AHDR pro-
posed that the development of some means of 
monitoring such trends would be extremely 
helpful from the perspective of those involved 
in the policy process. 
A critical outcome of the AHDR was the con-
ceptualization of dimensions of human devel-
opment in the Arctic. The report contended 
that measuring human development in the 
Arctic would require a distinct set of indicators. 
Simply using the UN Human Development 
Index to measure human development in the 
Arctic would result in a distorted picture. The 
dilemmas in doing so were apparent to those 
spending any significant time in the Arctic: 
groups who had minimal articulation with the 
state in which they were encapsulated, who 
controlled their daily lives, depended on local 
resources, and enjoyed a vibrant cultural life 
might consider their well-being as better than 
compatriots whose access to material means 
(e.g. permanent housing, imported foodstuffs) 
was higher. Access to a waged job and its ben-
efits was frequently less valued than was time to 
spend on the land, harvesting country foods 
and materials, even when wages would cover 
more commodities. Considering such dilem-
mas, and listening to the concerns and assess-
ments of arctic residents regarding definitions 
of well-being, the authors of the AHDR identi-
fied a number of key domains as determinants 
of well-being in the Arctic that have not been 
systematically considered: 
• Fate control – guiding one’s destiny
• Cultural integrity – belonging to a viable 
local culture; and
• Contact with nature – interacting closely 
with the natural world (AHDR 2004:11) 
The Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) project re-
sponded to the AHDR, in aiming to develop a 
set of indicators to track changes in human 
development in the Arctic, for domains that 
reflect prominent aspects of human develop-
ment in the Arctic. Initiated by the Stefansson 
Arctic Institute, Akureyri, Iceland, the ASI 
project in its first phase (2006-2009) was an 
International Polar Year project and was en-
dorsed by the Arctic Council. It grew organi-
cally from the AHDR. 
As described below in greater detail, the ASI 
project chose six domains in which to develop 
indicators for monitoring human development 
– the three domains identified by the AHDR 
noted above, and the three domains constitut-
ing the UN Human Development Index (life 
expectancy, literacy and standard of living), 
adapted for the Arctic context (to health/
population, education and material well-being). 
This suite of domains provides an approach 
that is broad and inclusive while remaining 
manageable. The rationale for each of these 
domains is described in the specific chapter on 
the respective domain. The challenge was then 
to find an indicator or concise set of indicators 
that could practicably depict trends of develop-
ment (positive or negative) for the domain in an 
intelligible manner.
This chapter provides an introduction to the 
ASI project. A short history of the AHDR and 
its relation to the ASI project, is provided, writ-
ten by one of the co-chairs of the AHDR Report 
Steering Committee, Oran Young. The chapter 
then briefly summarizes what social indicators 
are and what they are used for.  The process fol-
lowed by the project’s participants for develop-
ing Arctic social indicators is then described. 
Two Nenets girls from 
Yarsalinski Sovkhoz play 
with a toy chum near 
Bovanenkovo gas field on 
the Yamal Peninsula, West 
Siberia, Russia. 
Photo by B.C. Forbes
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We explain the criteria used for selecting these 
indicators, and then preview the contents of the 
rest of this volume.
Like the AHDR, this report on Arctic social 
indicators is directed at a broad audience, 
including the science community, inhabitants 
of the Arctic, students, policymakers at 
all levels, and the Arctic Council and its 
Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG).
1.1  Overview of Human Development 
 in the Arctic
As the Arctic Human Development Report notes, 
“the Arctic has emerged as a distinct region in 
public policy discussions” (AHDR 2004:18). 
The ASI project adopted the definition of the 
Arctic from AHDR. In this section we review 
some of the findings of the AHDR, especially 
those relevant to the six domains chosen for 
indicator construction.
The Arctic includes about four million in-
habitants. Its demography is diverse, with 
different areas characterized by varying shares 
of indigenous, settler and transient populations, 
varying levels of urbanization, and different 
rates of population growth or contraction. The 
Arctic population does in general tend to be 
younger than that of the national average. Some 
areas are characterized by high levels of out-
migration, which tends to involve a larger 
number of females than males. Disparities in 
health are observed across both regions and 
ethnic groups, with the health status of north-
erners in each Arctic state being considerably 
worse, on average, than that state’s national 
average.
The formal economy of the Arctic is largely 
based on natural resource extraction. Many of 
these resources are of critical geopolitical im-
portance both nationally and globally. However, 
resource rents largely flow out of the Arctic, 
and Arctic communities are often highly de-
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Two large cruise ships, 
Costa Magica and 
Queen Victoria, in 
Akureyri habour, 
Northern Iceland. 
2009. 
Photo: Jón Haukur 
Ingimundarson
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pendent on state subsidies. Primary (extrac-
tion) and tertiary (service) sectors predominate 
in Arctic economies, with little development of 
secondary activities (manufacturing). At the 
same time informal economic activities are of 
great importance in many areas of the Arctic: 
a combination of subsistence activities with 
wages or transfer payments is a common strat-
egy for pursuing well-being among Arctic resi-
dents (AHDR 2004: 70-74).
Education in the Arctic has evolved from a 
more experiential-based knowledge transfer 
and training system, stewarded by one’s elders, 
to more formalized, state-directed systems, 
which have prioritized ‘Western’ values. The 
introduction of compulsory formal education 
has been challenged by the vast, thinly popul-
ated spaces of the Arctic, which have been man-
aged by residential schooling. Very uneven dis-
Smelting of nickel ore 
in Monchegorsk, 
Kola Peninsula, Russia. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen
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tribution of higher educational opportunities 
has resulted in low utilization by Arctic 
residents, especially by males. More recently, a 
move to see education as a distributed resource 
is addressing issues of access, as is the greater 
inclusion of content that speaks to local needs 
and conditions (AHDR 2004: Chapter 10).
The Arctic has been affected by both global 
environmental change and globalization. 
Climate change has received much attention, 
with its impact on the land-, ice- and water-
scapes of the North, on the distribution of 
faunal and floral resources, on movement across 
the landscape, on settlement patterns, and on a 
host of other systems and activities. The Arctic’s 
populations have experienced notable shifts in 
climate in the relatively recent past (e.g. the 
Little Ice Age of the 15th-18th centuries), the 
anthropogenically forced warming is unprece-
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Traditional Gold 
Dredger, Dawson 
City, Yukon, Canada. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen
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dented in both magnitude and scale. However, 
it is globalization that has been the more weighty 
force in the past century, for the many Arctic 
groups that had experienced relatively little 
contact with other populations prior to this 
period (though none were fully isolated, and 
some enjoyed long-term and far-reaching ties to 
parts of the North and the world). Accelerated 
articulation, including through electronic 
media and travel, has brought on rapid social 
change, requiring extensive adaptations.
As Arctic groups adapt, they have indicated 
that the viability of their communities relies on, 
or at least is much enhanced by, having control 
over their own fate, sustaining contact with 
nature, and retaining their cultural identity 
(AHDR 2004:240). Loss of cultural identity can 
lead to social alienation, which in turn can pre-
cipitate destructive behaviors toward oneself, 
other persons or things. Cultures continually 
transform; it is when the transformations are 
forced from outside at rates challenging en-
demic adaptations that communities and socie-
ties are more likely imperiled. Arctic residents 
frequently express worries about loss of indig-
enous language and traditional knowledge, two 
key components of culture, though in some 
instances revolutionary new methods for per-
petuating and transmitting cultural institutions 
are being explored.
More broadly, those who feel they are unable 
to control their own destiny, whether political, 
economic or along other axes, also may feel 
anomie. Those feeling empowered to control 
their fate are more likely to take actions needed 
to better their situation. Arctic individuals and 
communities have often experienced colonial 
and neocolonial relations that have eroded their 
sense of fate control; numerous new arrange-
ments for increased local governance (often 
Kids enjoying a nice 
spring Sunday by playing 
on trampoline in Tasiilaq, 
East Greenland. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen
Sámi University College. 
Photo: Johan Mathis Gaup
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shared) over land and resources are starting to 
address such imbalances, if in a nascent fash-
ion.
The connection to land is often asserted as a 
key element of well-being in the Arctic. This 
well-being includes both the physical dimen-
sion of harvesting country food and recreation-
al activities, and the more cultural and spiritual 
elements of communing with nature while 
pursuing such activities. 
The individual chapters on these domains, 
and the three that offer adaptations of the UN 
HDI domains, describe in greater detail each 
domain and its importance to human well-
being in the Arctic. As is immediately clear, the 
domains are to a degree interlinked: a higher 
attainment in one domain may very well influ-
ence success in another. Yet each describes a 
fundamental sphere of well-being that merits 
measurement and monitoring, in order to ascer-
tain changing trends and to suggest policy that 
will encourage developments in positive direc-
tions.
2.0   From AHDR to ASI 
          By Oran R. Young1
The rationale for the Arctic Social Indicators 
(ASI) project rests squarely on the desirability 
of tracking trends in key elements of human de-
velopment identified in the Arctic Human 
Development Report (AHDR 2004). The 
AHDR came into being as a mandate from the 
2002 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting calling 
on Iceland (the council chair during the bien-
nium 2002-2004) to launch the AHDR as a 
“priority project” to provide “… a comprehen-
sive knowledge base for the Arctic Council’s 
Sustainable Development Programme” (Inari 
Declaration 2002). Work on the AHDR ended 
with Iceland’s delivery of the completed report 
to the 4th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in 
2004 and the decision on the part of the minis-
ters to “… accept with appreciation the Arctic 
Human Development Report and recommend 
that the Sustainable Development Working 
Group make full use of the report as a compre-
hensive knowledge base for the development of 
the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development 
Programme and direct Member States and the 
relevant working groups of the Arctic Council 
to consider appropriate follow up actions” 
(emphasis in original) (Reykjavik Declaration 
2004). 
This section provides a brief account of the 
origins of the AHDR, the analytic framework 
the Report Steering Committee developed as a 
template for the preparation of individual chap-
1 Oran Young, a professor of environmental institutions and 
governance at the Bern School of Environmental Science 
and Management at the University of California (Santa Bar-
bara), was co-chair of the Report Steering Committee for 
the AHDR and member of the editorial team for the report.
ters of the report, the principal substantive 
findings of the report, and the rationale for the 
ASI project as a logical outgrowth of the 
AHDR.
The Origins of the AHDR
We can trace the origins of the AHDR directly 
to the 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Es-
tablishment of the Arctic Council (AC), and 
even further back indirectly to the 1991 
Rovaniemi Declaration on the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment that set up the council’s 
predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Pro-
tection Strategy (AEPS). Initial proposals for 
the creation of the AEPS called for a dual focus 
on environmental protection and sustainable 
development as twin pillars of this new coop-
erative mechanism (Young 1998). But the 1991 
Rovaniemi Declaration said nothing about 
sustainable development, casting the role of the 
AEPS almost exclusively in terms of environ-
mental protection and focusing on the estab-
lishment of four Working Groups - the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP), the Working Group on the Conserva-
tion of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the 
Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME), and the Working 
Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, 
and Response (EPPR).
Still, issues framed in terms of sustainable 
development or social welfare persisted. Already 
in 1994-1995, the AEPS began the process of 
creating an ad hoc task force on sustainable 
development. The transition from the AEPS to 
the AC during 1996-1997 led to further change. 
The Ottawa Declaration joined the four AEPS 
working groups together to form an Environ-
C
h
ap
ter 1
Introduction:  Human Development in the Arctic And Arctic Social Indicators
18 Arctic Social Indicators
mental Protection Programme and called for 
the development of a parallel Sustainable De-
velopment Programme (understanding the two 
programs would intersect at many points). The 
establishment of the Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG) represented a break-
through for those concerned with the welfare of 
the Arctic’s human population.
The challenges involved in integrating sus-
tainable development into a coherent program 
of regional cooperation in the Arctic persisted. 
In the early days, AC members had difficulty 
even agreeing on rules of procedure for the 
SDWG. Part of the problem stemmed from the 
inherent fuzziness of the concept of sustainable 
development itself. Concerns of various stake-
holders (including non-state actors like the 
Indigenous Peoples Organizations) also com-
plicated matters, as did the absence of clear 
boundaries regarding the agenda of the SDWG, 
which made it possible for some parties to in-
troduce broadly normative concerns (e.g. ques-
tions of land ownership or harvesting rights) 
into the deliberations of this body. By the turn 
of the century, the increased emphasis on sus-
tainable development in the Ottawa Declaration 
had yet to bear fruit in the work of the Arctic 
Council. Given this slow start, it is not surpris-
ing that the issue of how to address the sustain-
able development agenda emerged as a key 
topic by the beginning of the Finnish Chair-
manship (Fall 2000).
Finland’s receptivity to institutional innova-
tion in the AC opened the door for new efforts 
to clarify the council’s role regarding sustaina-
ble development. At this stage, the Standing 
Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region (SCPAR) stepped in and called for an 
assessment of the state of human welfare in the 
Arctic and a clarification of the major issues fac-
ing the residents of the Arctic in their efforts to 
achieve a healthy and satisfying lifestyle. At its 
fifth conference, held in Greenland shortly be-
fore the October 2002 AC Ministerial Meeting, 
the SCPAR issued a clear call for the adoption 
of the AHDR as a priority project and provided 
unambiguous evidence of support for this 
project on the part of the community of policy-
makers. The ministers then decided to include 
the initiation of the project as an action item in 
the Inari Declaration.
One factor did complicate discussion regard-
ing the remit of the AHDR. Some participants 
thought the AHDR would compete with the 
Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic 
(SLiCA), a large-scale research project intended 
to gather extensive new data regarding major 
aspects of the living conditions of indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic. As the discussion pro-
gressed, however, it became increasingly clear 
that these projects were largely complementary. 
The AHDR would be an effort to assemble, 
evaluate, and integrate current knowledge relat-
ing to human development in the circumpolar 
Arctic. As other cases (AMAP 1997; ACIA 
2004) made clear, the conduct of such assess-
ments has emerged as highly effective tool at the 
disposal of the Arctic Council. As an extended 
effort to generate new knowledge, results stem-
ming from SLiCA could provide data for those 
working on the AHDR. This realization paved 
the way to the final language of the Inari 
Declaration mandating the AHDR as a “prior-
ity project” of the Arctic Council.
Human Development in the Arctic
In designing the AHDR, we chose deliberately 
to focus on the idea of “human development” 
rather than “sustainable development.” Our 
goals were to highlight the quality of life of the 
Arctic’s permanent residents and to celebrate 
many features of life in the Arctic, without 
ignoring or obscuring the more painful aspects 
of human activities in this region during mod-
ern times. Given the well-developed activities 
of the working groups belonging to the Arctic 
Council’s Environmental Protection Pro-
gramme, it seemed natural to direct attention to 
human development in endeavoring to devise a 
roadmap to guide the work of the AC’s Sustaina-
ble Development Programme.
Though relatively easy to grasp conceptually, 
the idea of human development poses problems 
when it comes to empirical applications. To 
meet the challenge of devising usable measures 
of human development, we turned first to the 
UN’s Human Development Index (UNHDI). 
Created during the early 1990s by the UN 
Development Programme, the UNHDI is based 
on the premise that human development is a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. Calculated on 
an annual basis for all members of the United 
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Nations, the UNHDI has achieved considera-
ble influence as a measure of trends in human 
welfare over time at the level of individual 
countries. It is a composite index with three 
components: life expectancy at birth, education 
(represented by a combination of adult literacy 
and school enrolments), and GDP per capita. 
Although controversial in some quarters, the 
UNHDI has made an important contribution to 
thinking about human development and social 
welfare more generally. This measure of human 
development diverges from most measures of 
material welfare (e.g. GDP per capita) beyond 
comparatively low levels; this divergence 
increases as a country becomes increasingly 
affluent. Thus, GDP per capita alone is not a 
good indicator of human development or social 
welfare for advanced industrial countries.
In our effort to understand human develop-
ment in the Arctic, we took the UNHDI as a 
point of departure. This effort soon revealed an 
anomaly that was to become one of the central 
issues in the preparation of the AHDR. Many 
areas of the Arctic and especially the more 
remote areas with substantial indigenous popu-
lations would not achieve high scores on the 
UNHDI. The reasons for this are clear. Many 
Arctic communities do not rank high in terms 
of life expectancy, particularly among indi-
genous peoples where suicide rates and acci-
dental-death rates are high as well as in the 
Russian North where the effects of the post-
Soviet collapse are still substantial. Most Arctic 
residents today are literate. But school enrol-
ments, especially at the secondary and tertiary 
levels, are comparatively low in the Far North. 
GDP per capita is often deceptive as a measure 
of well-being in the Arctic. If we include in-
come derived from hydrocarbons and minerals 
extracted from northern locations, GDP per 
capita can seem impressive. But most of the in-
come associated with these extractive industries 
flows out of the Arctic and into the income 
streams of large multinational corporations. 
GDP per capita at the community level is com-
paratively low in many parts of the Arctic, 
especially if we leave out transfer payments and 
do not have a workable method for integrating 
the informal or subsistence economy into the 
calculus.
But here is the puzzle. While the Arctic’s 
permanent residents do not rank high on a 
measure like the UNHDI, many individuals in 
this region exhibit a strong sense of well-being. 
What accounts for this anomaly? The effort to 
answer this question and, in the process, to 
identify Arctic success stories became a focal 
point in the preparation of the AHDR. We did 
not discard the UNHDI. But the Report Steering 
Committee concluded at an early stage that 
there must be more going on with regard to 
human development in the Arctic than what the 
UNHDI is able to capture. Eventually, we reac-
hed consensus on a strategy of supplementing 
the three elements of the UNHDI with three 
additional elements that the AHDR character-
izes as fate control, cultural integrity, and con-
tact with nature.
Fate control is a matter of being in charge of 
one’s own destiny. We heard again and again 
from Arctic residents that fate control is a 
matter of profound importance to them. This is 
true not only of the region’s indigenous peoples 
but also of many settlers who have made a 
conscious choice to reside in the Arctic per-
ceived as a frontier area in which the individual 
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can escape many of the restrictions or con-
straints associated with life in the mainstreams 
of modern societies.
Cultural integrity is another value of great 
importance to many of the Arctic’s residents 
and particularly to indigenous peoples, even 
under conditions of rapid social change that 
have eroded aboriginal languages and brought 
technologies (e.g. television and various other 
forms of IT) to the region that make it easy for 
residents of remote areas to compare their life-
styles with those prevalent in other parts of the 
world. Cultural integrity is a matter of being 
surrounded by and able to interact regularly 
with others who share belief systems, norms, 
and a common history. The advent of highly 
mobile societies has made us increasingly aware 
of the costs of post-modern lifestyles in terms 
of the loss of cultural integrity. While there is 
evidence of cultural erosion in the Arctic, we 
heard repeatedly from residents of the region 
that cultural integrity is a key element in their 
thinking about the quality of life.
Contact with nature or the opportunity to in-
teract on a regular basis with the natural world 
constitutes the third supplementary dimension 
of human development that emerged from our 
work on the AHDR. The residents of the Arctic 
are clear in their thinking about contact with 
nature as an element in the quality of life. In an 
era in which most members of mainstream 
societies have limited contact with nature, many 
Arctic residents come into contact with nature 
on a day-to-day basis as they go about their 
routine activities. They value this aspect of life 
in the Arctic.
In preparing the AHDR, we were limited 
largely to qualitative evidence and narrative 
accounts regarding fate control, cultural integ-
rity, and contact with nature. We had neither 
the time nor the resources to devise quantitative 
indicators of these elements of human develop-
ment. Yet, the more we probed the issue of 
human development in the Arctic, the more we 
became convinced of the importance of these 
factors to any effort to assess human develop-
ment in the Far North. 
The AHDR’s Principal Findings
The AHDR delivered a snapshot of human 
development in the Arctic as of the time of its 
compilation during the opening years of the 21st 
century. The report lends support to some of 
the geographically limited and often anecdotal 
insights of those who have observed the disrup-
tive effects of rapid social change in the Arctic 
during the last 50 years. The evidence also leads 
to a number of conclusions regarding the resil-
ience of individuals and their communities, 
despite the impacts of rapid social change. The 
AHDR reported a variety of success stories that 
help to resolve the puzzle described in the pre-
ceding section regarding the existence of a 
strong sense of well-being even among groups 
of people in the Arctic who do not rank high in 
terms of the UNHDI.
The AHDR observes that ”[h]uman societies 
in the circumpolar North are highly resilient; 
they have faced severe challenges before and 
adapted successfully to changing conditions” 
(AHDR 2004:230). This encouraging finding is 
not meant to mask the challenges to cultural in-
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tegrity arising from a variety of forces, including 
the erosion of indigenous languages, relocations 
of communities for political as well as social and 
environmental reasons, the introduction of un-
familiar systems of land tenure, and environ-
mental changes affecting the availability of sub-
sistence resources. Many observers have docu-
mented the historical role of adaptiveness 
among Arctic residents as a source of resilience 
in Arctic communities. Although circumstances 
have changed in many of these communities in 
ways that increase their vulnerability, it would 
be a mistake to overlook the capacity of Arctic 
peoples to adapt to a range of emerging stresses 
arising from the effects of globalization and 
biophysical developments like climate change. 
Still, Arctic communities today are subject to 
social, cultural, economic, and environmental 
forces that have given rise to a suite of interac-
tive stresses affecting the cultural integrity 
dimension of human development.
Economic conditions in the Arctic present a 
paradox that has important implications for 
human development. In terms of GDP per 
capita, the Arctic has experienced considerable 
growth in recent decades. Yet Arctic economies 
are narrowly based and subject to great fluctua-
tions driven largely by outside forces. In much 
of the Arctic, there is a dual economy in which 
one component is heavily based on extractive 
industries generating income and rents that 
tend to flow out of the Arctic and the other 
component primarily features a combination of 
subsistence activities and transfer payments 
from higher levels of government. The resultant 
dependence of Arctic communities makes it 
hard for individuals to sustain a sense of control 
over their own destinies. Increasing numbers of 
Arctic residents have come to depend on rela-
tively low level jobs in volatile extractive indus-
tries and on transfer payments provided by out-
siders who can reverse current policies without 
consulting the beneficiaries. 
Political and legal changes often add compli-
cations to this situation regarding feelings of 
fate control on the part of Arctic residents. A 
striking and generally positive development is 
the trend toward the devolution of authority to 
regional public governments in the Arctic (e.g. 
the Greenland Home Rule, the territory of 
Nunavut in Canada, and the North Slope 
Borough in Alaska). But these governments are 
heavily dependent upon subsidies from central 
governments or revenues derived from extrac-
tive industries that will not last indefinitely. The 
trend toward devolution of authority is also 
subject to reversal as a result of shifting policies 
at the national level (e.g. the reassertion of 
Moscow’s control over regional governments in 
the Russian North). An additional complication 
arises in cases where indigenous or aboriginal 
political systems vie for influence with public 
governments. 
A similarly complex story arises in connection 
with subsistence activities that play a key role in 
maintaining contact with nature for many Arctic 
residents. Arctic organizations have managed 
both to counter efforts to terminate subsistence 
harvests (e.g. the harvest of bowhead whales in 
Alaska) and to become prominent players in a 
variety of co-management arrangements de-
signed to share decision-making between re-
gional or national governments on the one hand 
and user groups on the other. Yet environmen-
tal changes that produce unfamiliar biophysical 
conditions and unanticipated changes in the 
abundance or condition of subsistence resourc-
es are producing powerful counter effects in 
many areas. The number of cases in which 
whale hunters are stranded as a result of unfore-
seen changes in the behavior of sea ice has 
increased; caribou herds are experiencing 
fluctuations that subsistence hunters find hard 
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3.0  Social Indicators: Explanation
 and Utility
Indicators are a tool to put more information 
into the hands of more people, information 
that can inspire action and lead to better deci-
sion-making. (Gahine et al. 2003: 665)
Groups such as governments and non-gov-
ernmental organizations are increasingly using 
indicators − social, environmental, economic − 
to monitor trends in human development. 
Indicators, as simple measurements of key 
phenomena in complex human systems, enable 
us to track the direction and rate of change, and 
thus performance in various domains, and 
progress toward specified goals. Indicators are 
useful aids for planning, for informing policy, for 
guiding decisions and actions. They are valuable 
simply in building awareness of current condi-
tions and trends over time. Indicators are used 
by some groups to predict change, while other 
groups use them to promote change.
Human development is extraordinarily com-
plex. To document all its facets would be im-
possibly complicated, time-consuming, and 
costly. Even a single domain (or category for the 
construction of indicators), such as education 
or health, has countless aspects that could be 
measured. A pragmatic approach is to choose a 
to understand and difficult to cope with effec-
tively. While such changes have not reduced the 
importance of contact with nature as a source 
of human development in the Arctic, their 
anticipated increase is worrisome with regard to 
this dimension of human development that is 
prized among many settlers as well as most 
indigenous peoples in the Arctic.
From AHDR to ASI 
The AHDR has become an important reference 
work for those taking part in the activities of the 
SDWG; it is a standard reference for those 
seeking to improve the coherence of the 
SDWG’s work program. Treated as a snapshot 
of conditions prevailing in the Arctic in the 
early years of the 21st century, the picture that 
the AHDR presents is clear and generally per-
suasive. But the question of trends looms large. 
How can we go about measuring trends in 
Arctic human development? The value of 
following up on the AHDR by developing 
quantitative indicators of human development 
and using these indicators to track trends over 
time is evident. The Arctic Social Indicators 
project is a natural outgrowth of this chain of 
reasoning.
Developing social indicators that are both an-
alytically satisfactory and empirically tractable 
is a challenging task. The ongoing work of the 
ASI makes this abundantly clear. To take a 
single example, the team working on material 
well-being concludes that we “… face a genuine 
dilemma suggesting an indicator for well-being 
in the Arctic” (see chapter 3). Direct measures 
of per capita or household income are rela-
tively tractable. But they leave out important 
elements of material well-being, including sub-
sistence activities and transfer payments which 
are important in the Arctic. Composite indices, 
which could integrate measures of informal 
activities and transfer payments, on the other 
hand, run into problems in terms of data acqui-
sition and weighing individual components. 
And this is a relatively easy case in comparison 
with measures of factors like fate control and 
contact with nature. Still, the effort to make 
progress in this realm is essential.
Any indicator captures some features of com-
plex realities and omits or deemphasizes others. 
A little reflection on familiar and widely used 
measures, such as economic indicators like 
GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and 
interest rates, will suffice to demonstrate that 
the creation of indicators is a slow and labor-
intensive process. There is no doubt that refin-
ing suitable indicators of human development 
in the Arctic will take time and involve a step-
wise process in which initial proposals are 
vetted empirically and refined or replaced over 
time as our ability to capture the essential fea-
tures of human development under the specific 
conditions arising in the Arctic grows. Viewed 
in this light, the ASI project constitutes a major 
step forward in moving us toward an ability to 
track trends in key elements of human develop-
ment in the Arctic and, as a result, guiding 
discussions regarding critical questions in the 
SDWG and in the Arctic Council more gener-
ally.
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small, representative set of indicators for key 
domains, to track over time and across space. 
Such indicators condense real-life complexity 
into a manageable amount of meaningful infor-
mation. They are proxy measures, used to infer 
the condition and, over time, the trends in a 
system.
Such indicators may be quantitative or qual-
itative measurements. Often a statistic is used as 
a simple measurement of what is happening in 
a system. Indicators should be clearly defined, 
reproducible, unambiguous, understandable 
and practical. They should be relatively easy to 
measure in an accepted manner, stable, and 
suitable for use in longitudinal analyses. Harmut 
Bossell paraphrases a famous Einstein quote in 
observing that indicators should be “as simple 
as possible but not too simple” (Bossell 1999:11). 
They must also reflect the interests and views of 
different stakeholders.
Efforts to develop a set of indicators to meas-
ure human development require striking a bal-
ance between the analytic attractions of relying 
on a single indicator and the temptation to in-
troduce a large number of indicators in the 
interests of developing a more accurate picture 
of complex and multi-dimensional phenomena. 
The development of the United Nations Human 
Development Index, comprised of measures of 
GDP, literacy and life expectancy, addressed 
the previous overly simplistic dependence on 
GDP alone as a measure of human develop-
ment (Ibid.). 
3.1 Developing a Set of Arctic Social Indica-
tors: Process
To realize a key recommendation of the AHDR 
to devise ”a small number of tractable indica-
tors to be used in tracking changes in key ele-
ments of human development in the Arctic over 
time” (AHDR 2004:242), an ad hoc meeting 
was held in Copenhagen on Nov 12th, 2005, in 
conjunction with the International Conference 
on Arctic Research Planning. At this meeting, 
participants brainstormed about the concept, 
objectives, and feasibility of establishing such a 
set of Arctic social indicators and the practica-
bility of establishing a working group to address 
the recommendation. The session included 
broad representation from the Arctic social sci-
ence community, including several participants 
who have been involved in the production of 
the AHDR, as well as other social scientists, 
knowledgeable about the Arctic who have a 
good understanding of the nature and uses 
of social indicators. Representatives from the 
policy and Arctic communities (indigenous and 
non-indigenous) also participated. The out-
come of this meeting was the unanimous and 
enthusiastic support for the importance and 
feasibility of an Arctic Social Indicator working 
group.
Under the leadership of Drs. Joan Nymand 
Larsen and Peter Schweitzer, funds were se-
cured to pursue this initiative, and a working 
group of approximately 50 members was con-
stituted, with representation from a broad range 
of disciplines, including Anthropology, Demo-
graphy, Economics, Education, Geography, 
Linguistics, Political Science, and Sociology. 
While social scientists predominated, natural 
sciences were also represented. Indigenous 
participants were actively solicited. Geographic 
and gender balance were also considered in 
composing the group. The majority of mem-
bers remained active over the course of the 
project. 
The first ASI workshop convened in Akureyri, 
Iceland, in September 2006. It was attended by 
25 members of the ASI Working Group, repre-
senting all eight Arctic states. Its objectives 
were to consider the three domains identified in 
the AHDR, as well as other domains critical to 
measuring human development in the Arctic; to 
establish criteria for indicator selection; to dis-
cuss and select potential indicators within each 
domain; and to engage in preliminary concep-
tual testing of the viability of the candidate 
indicators, using mainly anecdotal evidence. 
The group was also tasked with determining the 
steps necessary for proper testing and valida-
tion of the selected indicators.
Starting with these guidelines the working 
group adopted a pragmatic, bi-directional 
approach (Michalos et al. 2009), which em-
ployed a conceptual, ‘top-down’ approach to 
constructing a set of indicators based on our 
understanding of the key elements and deter-
minants of arctic human development, com-
bined with a ‘bottom-up’, empirical approach 
that considered currently available data that 
might be used as measures of the domains.
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The working group confirmed the three 
domains suggested by the AHDR: 
1. fate control,
2. cultural integrity, and
3. contact with nature
The group also resolved that the three domains 
represented in the UN Human Development 
Index were important
4. material wellbeing, 
5. education, and
6. health/demography,
but that specific indicators relevant to the Arctic 
would be developed for these three domains.
Members of the ASI Working Group self-se-
lected into domain teams, with five to eight per-
sons in each team. Each team was led by two to 
three members, with one person designated to 
act as a central coordinator. After initial brain-
storming about indicators, the members recon-
vened to develop a common list of key criteria 
for the selection of indicators. Criteria chosen 
were data availability, data affordability, ease 
of measurement, robustness, scalability and in-
clusiveness (see below for further discussion).
The domain teams adopted the selection 
criteria as a set of principles to guide indicator 
selection, recognizing that the criteria them-
selves were not precisely defined, and that 
trade-offs in their application had to be consid-
ered. For instance measures that might be 
easily available may be relatively less robust 
than others that are less accessible. Thus, crit-
eria were applied not to rule out candidate in-
dicators, but to consider the challenges each in-
dicator might pose across several conditions, 
were it to be selected. Teams were also tasked 
to aim for a single indicator, or a very small set 
of indicators, for their domain. 
As an outcome of this first workshop, each of 
the teams arrived at a list of preliminary indicat-
ors. However, it was recognized that such a 
process hazards an ad hoc selection of indicat-
ors, with results being unpredictable and shap-
ed by spur-of-the-moment insights. Indicator 
lists produced this way typically have large gaps 
in some important areas and are overly dense in 
others. The larger membership of the ASI 
Working Group provided a first review of the 
indicators, in order to ensure all significant 
aspects of Arctic human development were 
considered. Later in the process, local and 
northern stakeholders had the opportunity to 
critique and improve the indicator set.
A second ASI workshop took place in the 
summer of 2007, in Roskilde, Denmark. It was 
attended by 32 members of the working group, 
again representing all eight Arctic states. Among 
the workshop participants were seven indi-
genous participants as well as three young 
researches (Russian, Alaskan, and Norwegian 
Ph.D. students). At this workshop, work pro-
ceeded on the testing of indicators, ensuing 
reduction of the candidate list of indicators, 
and discussion of the structure and format of 
the final report. Each of the six domain teams 
arrived at a pared-down set of indicators, con-
tinued the discussion of test procedure, and 
began the task of outlining draft chapters. The 
teams were then tasked with further testing of 
the indicators, using the identified set of criteria 
with a goal of selecting one or a few indicators 
per domain.
The 8th Conference of the International 
Society for Quality-of-Life Studies (ISQOLS 
San Diego, California, December 2007) provid-
ed an opportunity for members of the ASI 
working group to present their narrowed list of 
Arctic social indicators for discussion and crit-
ique to an audience highly knowledgeable and 
practiced in indicators formulation. A work-
shop of domain team leaders was then con-
vened in February 2008, to refine the indicator 
Drying fish on racks. 
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selection based on feedback from the ISQOLS 
conference and to finalize report structure. 
The International Congress for Arctic Social 
Sciences (Nuuk, Greenland, August 2008) then 
offered a venue for review of the indicators by 
a larger audience; each domain team presented 
its indicators one more time, and received feed-
back from a group of Arctic specialists. Final 
revisions to the sets and related report chapters 
were then completed in Fall 2008, with a subset 
of the ASI team leaders holding a writers’ meet-
ing in Nanaimo, British Columbia to finalize the 
report’s format.
3.2 Criteria Used in Selecting Arctic 
 Social  Indicators
In creating a tractable set of social indicators for 
the Arctic, we were faced with choosing, from 
a large number of possible indicators, a small, 
manageable subset that were academically 
robust, user-friendly and straightforward to 
interpret (Ibrahim & Alkire 2007). While sev-
eral criteria were initially considered against 
which to evaluate candidate indicators, six cri-
teria were ultimately chosen for this purpose: 
data availability, data affordability, ease of 
measurement, robustness, scalability and in-
clusiveness. In Chapters Two through Seven of 
this report, the indicator or indicators selected 
for the domain are rated in terms of these 
criteria.
Data availability concerns whether the data 
that an indicator will use as a measure exists, 
and whether it is retrievable. A number of the 
indicators we considered could draw on data 
collected by national agencies. Other consid-
erations in terms of availability included wheth-
er nationally collected data is comparable across 
countries, and whether the data is accessible in 
hard copy or electronic format from the collect-
ing agency, or whether data could be compiled 
by researchers from other existing information. 
A further element of availability is the periodic-
ity with which regularly collected data are gath-
ered: to monitor human development in the 
rapidly changing socio-economic and environ-
mental context of the Arctic, data collected on 
at least a five-year frequency was preferred.
We rated data availability as falling into 
three ‘tiers’. Tier 1 indicates that the indicator 
is based on existing, regularly published data; 
‘Tier 2’ designates that the indicator is based on 
data that would be produced by special tabula-
tion from existing, unpublished data; and Tier 
3 denotes indicators that would require primary 
data collection.
The criterion of data affordability considers 
the on-going costs of data collection and moni-
toring. Can the indicator (continue to) be meas-
ured at a reasonable cost? Indicators that can 
be garnered from data sets that are regularly 
collected, for example during government cen-
suses, are more affordable than those requiring 
special tabulation or primary data collection. 
If new data collection is necessary, could the 
data be collected using no more than ten min-
utes of interview time? This criterion was used 
to rate indicators simply as affordable (3) or 
not, though in the future it might be desirable 
to move beyond a bi-modal rating. 
Ease of measurement takes into account how 
simple and straightforward the data is to meas-
ure in a broadly accepted manner. Here issues 
of whether the indicator measure is quantitative 
or qualitative, nominal, ordinal, interval or 
ratio, etc. are considered. For this criterion a 
subjective assessment of ‘high’, ‘medium’ or 
‘low’ was made. 
Robustness considers aspects of the temporal 
stability of the indicator over time. Will the in-
dicator track changes over time? Will it remain 
stable, and relevant over time (for instance, not 
lose its significance)? This criterion also consid-
ers the sensitivity of the indicator – how re-
sponsive is it to change? Will it measure change 
over time? As with the data affordability crit-
erion, we chose to rate an indicator as robust or 
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not robust. However, this is perhaps the crit-
erion most requiring validation itself. As testing 
of the indicators is carried out, we will better 
understand the robustness of the various indi-
cators we have chosen in the Arctic context. 
Radical political developments, extreme envi-
ronmental changes, or severe economic trans-
formations, for instance, could render some of 
our chosen indicators ‘non-robust’ in ways we 
have not anticipated.
Scalability is concerned with the extent to 
which the data used to measure the chosen 
indicator can be collected at different geograph-
ical scales. For instance, can the data be collect-
ed at the individual, household and community 
level? Can it be collected at the regional and 
national level? Language retention, for instance, 
can be measured at the individual level and 
aggregated up the different scales, where as per 
capita GDP or net migration cannot be meas-
ured below the community level. For each of 
five scales we indicated an ordinal ranking 
(1= scalable to individual, 2= scalable to house-
hold, 3 = to community level, 4 = to regional 
level, 5= to level of entire country). Scalability 
of course combines with availability – data may 
be able to be collected at lower scales, but is 
only collected, or only easily accessible at high-
er scales, due to cost, confidentiality issues, and 
other concerns.
Finally, we also considered the criterion of 
inclusiveness when selecting our indicators: in 
the case of Arctic social indicators, is the indi-
cator inclusive of all sectors of the arctic popul-
ation − male and female, indigenous and non-
indigenous, rural and urban, etc. While a few of 
the indicators we chose focused on the indi-
genous Arctic population, we ensured that our 
indicators as a group addressed human devel-
opment for the whole Arctic population.
Numerous other criteria have been applied in 
selecting social indicators, such as policy rele-
vance, public resonance, lack of political bias, 
and so forth. Desiring a simple, limited list, we 
chose the six criteria noted above against which 
to review our indicators. Indicators were not 
eliminated if their rankings for the different cri-
teria were not all optimal (e.g. ‘Tier 1’ for Data 
Availability, ‘3’ for Data Affordability, Robust-
ness and Inclusiveness, ‘High’ for Ease of 
Measurement), and meeting all levels of 
Scalability – ‘1-5’). The criteria rather provided 
a means by which to assess the indicators’ 
general tractability.
3.3 Structure of the Report
The body of this report comprises the six fol-
lowing chapters, which address the six domains 
identified for measuring and monitoring Arctic 
human development. The first three chapters, 
on Health and Population (Chapter 2), Material 
Well-Being (Chapter 3) and Education (Chapter 
4) offer indicators for the three domains the 
ASI Working Group adopted and revised from 
the UN Human Development Index. The chap-
ters explain why and how the domains them-
selves, as well as the indicators chosen, are 
appropriate adaptations of UN HDI domains 
and indicators. These chapters are followed by 
three chapters focused on the domains identi-
fied in the Arctic Human Development Report 
as particularly relevant and critical to well-
being in the Arctic: Cultural Well-being 
(Chapter 5); Contact with Nature (Chapter 6), 
and Fate Control (Chapter 7).
Each of the six domain chapters provides a 
short introduction, defining and discussing the 
concept of the domain in general terms. Each 
then gives a quick overview of the domain in the 
Arctic context. The chapters provide a discus-
sion of a larger candidate set of indicators that 
the domain team considered, then describe the 
selected indicators for that domain. A matrix is 
provided showing how the chosen indicators 
meet the set of criteria described above, 
followed by concluding comments. When more 
than one indicator was offered or an index pro-
posed by a domain team, the authors were 
asked to identify what they consider the single 
best indicator.
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), the proposed 
indicators for each domain are collated. Data 
challenges for the chosen indicators are dis-
cussed, and potential abuses of indicators 
briefly identified, in the hopes that these will be 
shunned. The Arctic Social Indicators report 
then provides a set of six recommendations on 
the next steps for testing and validating the 
indicators and developing an Arctic monitor-
ing system for social indicators. These recom-
mendations intend to optimize the use of 
existing sources of data and data collection 
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efforts, encourage cooperation and collabora-
tion among the Arctic states, and articulate 
efforts to test, validate, refine and then monitor 
the indicators with extant and impending 
projects.
As the Arctic is undergoing rapid social, eco-
nomic and environmental change, monitor-
ing Arctic human development is critical to 
planning and policy development and recalibra-
tion. We hope that the indicators provide a 
small set of tractable measures for this monitor-
ing. The work of the ASI constitutes a signi-
ficant step forward in moving us toward 
an ability to track trends in key elements of 
human development in the Arctic and, as a 
result, guiding discussions regarding questions 
of policy.
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1.0 Introduction
Health and population are both important 
dimensions on the “minimum list“ of indicators 
that United Nations experts have proposed for 
the statistical monitoring of broad areas of 
social concern (UN, 1996; also see UN, 1975 
and UN, 1989). Indeed, most governments 
record health and population measures, which 
are important gauges for policy discussions. 
Health has obvious relevance both as an aspect 
of well-being and as an indicator of how suc-
cessfully society is functioning to serve the 
needs of its people. Population may seem less 
obvious as an indicator of well-being, but it is 
such a fundamental dimension of human settle-
ments in the North as elsewhere that few other 
indicators can be understood without it. 
Population size, rates of change, the contribu-
tions of births, deaths and migration, and other 
characteristics that result from these factors 
(age structure, sex ratio, and cultural composi-
tion) convey a wealth of information about a 
community‘s current conditions and needs, 
along with its potential and path toward the 
future.
As the United Nations and countless other 
reports have demonstrated, many health and 
population statistics meet the practical criteria 
desired for Arctic social indicators. They are 
widely available from government statistical 
agencies, more so than for almost any other type 
of indicator. Further, because health and pop-
ulation statistics can be monitored over time at 
a reasonable cost in terms of labor and material 
resources, time series often already exist for 
them, providing crucial data for Arctic applica-
tions in particular. 
Although the prospects for separating health 
and population measures for indigenous and 
non-indigenous populations vary from place to 
place and from time to time (as do definitions 
of “indigenous“), many indicators tend to be 
relatively general and stable and are measured 
in a broadly accepted manner. Consequently, 
they support longitudinal analysis. Therefore, 
in thinking about indicators specifically for the 
Arctic, we can take advantage of decades of ex-
perience and research using similar measures 
elsewhere. 
Two chapters in the Arctic Human Devel-
opment Report (AHDR), “Arctic Demography“ 
and “Human Health and Well-Being,“ capably 
surveyed conditions and broad trends across 
nine sub-national regions: Alaska, Greenland, 
Iceland, Faroe Islands, and the Arctic regions 
of Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
Russia (AHDR, 2004). The report revealed that 
there exist many social contrasts between these 
regions, or between them and larger societies to 
the south. But stark contrasts can also be found 
within each region. While these regions contain 
industrial/post-industrial cities such as Anchor-
age, Alaska; Reykjavík, Iceland; and Murmansk, 
Russia, which dominate the statistical picture, 
they also contain rural areas such as western 
Alaska, Iceland‘s Westfjords, and Russia‘s 
Chukotka. Many rural areas, in turn, contain 
communities ranging from regional hubs with 
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several thousand people and service-oriented 
economies to widely dispersed small villages of 
just a few hundred (or fewer) people with mixed 
cash-subsistence economies.
This chapter takes a step beyond the AHDR, 
examining issues related to scale that arise as we 
consider how to disaggregate health and popu-
lation indicators for Arctic societies. The focus 
is on two dimensions of scale: human geo-
graphy and time. This focus is critical because 
indicators that might function well enough to 
describe populations of hundreds of thousands 
and places where change is relatively gradual 
behave differently when applied to small and 
rapidly changing Arctic places. Even where the 
definitions of indicators remain the same, using 
them requires extra care in the Arctic.
Some prime social indicators for comparing 
nations or major sub-national units, such as life 
expectancy and fertility rates (or in other 
domains indicators such as literacy and gross 
domestic product), tend to be unavailable for 
smaller populations. Compromises, therefore, 
are necessary in developing a practical set of 
indicators for Arctic places. Indicators need to 
be “good enough“ and obtainable, rather than 
ideal but unobtainable.
Issues of scale can also force compromises. 
Statistical properties constrain how small a 
population any indicator can reasonably de-
scribe. Having indicators at the level of individ-
ual communities might seem attractive in prin-
ciple, but these often prove too erratic to be 
usable in practice. Similarly, we need longer 
time series rather than single measurements in 
order to draw conclusions from indicators that 
change substantially from one year to the next. 
This chapter explores the compromises of indi-
cator definitions and scale for the Arctic.
1.1 The Concept of Health and Population 
The concept of individual health includes both 
physical and mental conditions. From the stand-
point of social indicators, some of the most trac-
table manifestations are reports of physical ill 
health such as incident counts (re-expressed as 
rates) for specific kinds of illness, injury, or 
death. For each of these factors, a good-health 
mirror indicator theoretically could be defined, 
such as the proportion of people not ill or in-
Children playing in the 
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jured − but that cheerful idea contains no 
additional information and would cost us in 
clarity and comparability.
Mental health is more difficult to assess 
directly than physical health, even at the indi-
vidual level, but some behaviors provide 
observable proxies. For example, rates of 
suicide, teenage births, substance abuse, and 
even crime (especially violence and domestic 
abuse) have widely been interpreted as indi-
cators of mental or social health. Rates of 
obesity also reflect both physical and mental 
health. Divorce rates and school completion 
rates might be considered as well, although 
their meaning as indicators can be ambiguous.
Most health indicators cross into the domain 
of population, if for no other reason than their 
definitions as rates require a population num-
ber in the denominator. But what number 
defines “population“ when considering health 
indicators? The answer is derived from demo-
graphic data: sometimes it is the total popula-
tion, but often it is a more distinct number 
drawn from detailed population data that con-
sider breakdowns by age, sex, or ethnicity. Vital 
statistics, notably the number of births and 
deaths, are essential for health indicators such 
as birth or mortality rates. Further, some health 
statistics such as life expectancy are defined di-
rectly from population data. Population char-
acteristics such as sex ratios, age structure, 
in- or outmigration, and rates of growth or de-
cline reflect on community health rather than 
individual health, although they certainly have 
an impact on individuals. These same char-
acteristics become even more informative when 
applied to ethnic, cultural, or linguistic sub-
groups within a population.
Population data are also generally required to 
interpret health indicators because most of 
them exhibit different rates across age and gen-
der subgroups. A declining rate of crime or sui-
cide, for example, may reflect improving social 
conditions. Alternatively, such a decline may 
simply be the result of an aging population due 
to the outmigration of youth (e.g., Hamilton 
and Butler, 2001).
The availability of health services within a 
population provides a different kind of metric. 
The number of physicians per capita and the 
availability of routine or advanced medical care, 
vaccinations, health cost coverage, transporta-
tion to hospitals, and so forth reflect not health 
per se, but the scope of infrastructure promot-
ing good health.
1.2 Overview of Health and Population 
in the Arctic
Several surveys and reports have sought 
detailed information on individual health, 
including self-reported or self-assessed health 
(for a meta-analysis of findings see DeSalvo et 
al., 2006). The SLiCA project has made the 
most geographically extensive application of 
survey research in the North, focusing on indig-
enous communities (Poppel et al., 2007; Kruse 
et al., 2008). Periodic national surveys conduct-
ed within most circumpolar countries offer 
detailed health information representing entire 
regional populations, not just indigenous 
peoples, although the national surveys generally 
are not designed for broad comparisons across 
nations. Among national surveys that include 
northern regions are the Canadian Community 
Health Survey (Statistics Canada, 2003; in-
cludes Yukon, Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut), the Survey of Living Conditions 
(Statistics Sweden, 2006; includes Norrbotten 
and Västerbotten), the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (CDC, 2007; includes 
Alaska), and Health Behavior and Health 
Among Finnish Adults (Helakorpi et al., 2003; 
includes combined Oulun lääni and Lapin 
lääni).
One recent publication, Health Transitions in 
Arctic Populations (Young and Bjerregaard, 
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2008), achieves a circumpolar synthesis of indi-
cators from national studies covering health 
and demographic conditions by region (Alaska, 
northern Canada, Greenland, northern Fenn-
oscandinavia, and northern Russia) and by 
selected indigenous groups (Inuit, Dene, and 
Saami). A report by Young (2008), derived 
from this book, provides tables, graphs, and 
maps and other information (including defini-
tions, sources, and some risk factors) about 
circumpolar health indicators.
Most health studies focus on a particular 
region of interest, such as Greenland (e.g., 
Bjerregaard, 2003). Comparative pan-Arctic 
studies take a broader view, but in doing so 
must define their geographical scope of study, 
and there is no consensus on where the bound-
aries of the Arctic lie. 
The Arctic Circle defines a light zone (south-
ern extremity of the polar day and polar night) 
that ill suits the substantive interests of most 
research. For their purposes, hydrological sci-
entists have defined instead a pan-Arctic region 
comprising all lands that drain into the Arctic 
Ocean and its adjacent seas (Arctic RIMS, 
2008). This pan-Arctic watershed extends as far 
south as Kazakhstan in Asia, but excludes most 
of Finland and all of Sweden. Social scientists 
writing the AHDR chose instead a geography 
defined by political boundaries marking off 
Arctic regions within the eight Arctic nations 
(or nine regions, counting Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands separately). The circumpolar 
health reports by Young (2008) and Young and 
Bjerregaard (2008) encompassed a geography 
similar to the AHDR. The SLiCA surveys took 
a different path again, focusing on selected and 
predominantly indigenous areas within north-
ern Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Scandinavia, 
and Russia (Andersen and Poppel, 2002). Thus, 
the AHDR and Young and Bjerregaard consid-
ered Anchorage, Reykjavík, and Murmansk, for 
example, but SLiCA did not. Other studies 
have adopted definitions of their own.
It is clear that any definition of the Arctic is 
contingent on the observer‘s perspective and 
purpose, and in each definition there are places 
where the border may appear arbitrary. One 
way to address the dilemma of definition is to 
allow shades of gray: some places might be 
“more Arctic“ (by any particular criteria) than 
others, but their differences are best viewed as 
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matters of degree, not of kind. We might ask, 
for example, not simply how Arctic places 
differ from non-Arctic places with respect to 
infant mortality, but how infant mortality rates 
vary together with other social indicators − and 
then test hypotheses about why this occurs. A 
less aggregated approach seeking indicators at 
smaller geographical scales within the AHDR‘s 
nine regions provides one possible way to eval-
uate competing explanations and to work real-
istically with the heterogeneity, gradations, and 
indistinct boundaries of Arctic societies.
2.0 Possible Health and Population 
Indicators  in the Arctic
In theory, it seems desirable to collect positive 
health or well-being indicators. Despite wide-
spread advocacy for positive indicators, how-
ever, there has been less evidence that they pro-
vide interpretable comparative measures in 
practice and few instances where they form 
long-running time series. For these reasons, our 
health indicators focus on rates of negative out-
comes, as do those of most other studies (e.g., 
articles in Young and Bjerregaard, 2008 and 
in the International Journal of Circumpolar 
Health).
Mortality statistics are routinely collected and 
are among the most important of indicators. 
Overall death rates, and death rates within an 
age group (such as infant mortality, defined as 
deaths per 1,000 live births among infants less 
than one year old, or child mortality, covering 
children under five) have proven particularly 
valuable. Mortality rates by main cause of death, 
including suicide, accident, homicide, infec-
tious disease, neoplasm, and other natural caus-
es, could have broad applications on the evalu-
ation of social or health policies.
Disease rates, such as the prevalence of tuber-
culosis, seem like obvious choices for health 
indicators, but diagnoses depend heavily on the 
quality of health care systems. For example, 
reported rates might be higher in one place 
because more people see physicians, despite 
objectively lower prevalence of the disease. 
Indicators for the quality of health care systems 
raise other challenges of comparison. We might 
want to know, for instance, what proportion of 
people live within one hour of free health care. 
Such indicators would require careful develop-
ment, however, as the true cost and quality of 
health care would be variable and difficult to 
define.
Self-rated health data can be collected along 
with other individual data on a survey without 
need for medical records. Such data provide a 
widely used and seemingly robust measure that 
has been validated as a predictor for life expec-
tancy (DeSalvo et al., 2006). Tables 2.1 to 2.3, 
based on SLiCA data, illustrate how self-rated 
health can be analyzed together with other 
survey variables. It is difficult to know how 
people in different places distinguish between 
“excellent“ and “very good“ health, or between 
“fair“ and “poor“ health, but the tables show 
marked contrasts in responses by region or 
population groups (Poppel et al., 2007).
Survey data, unlike aggregated data on rates, 
permit testing hypotheses about multiple, indi-
vidual-level predictors of health and other out-
comes. This quality and the predictive efficacy 
of self-rated health make a good argument for 
expansion and routine replication of survey 
data collection. One drawback of subjective 
health reports is that they involve the respon-
dent‘s comparison between his or her experi-
enced and expected states of health. Thus, 
interpretation tends to be more straightforward 
across individuals at one particular place and 
time, but less so across nations or different 
periods of time. 
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Among the behavioral indicators, diet and 
alcohol/drug use are too difficult to measure 
and interpret to make them broadly useful. 
Violence is an important health-related issue, 
reported to some degree in crime and mortal-
ity statistics, but differences in reporting 
and classification systems make comparisons 
problematic. Obesity and smoking, on the 
other hand, can be more simply defined and 
should make good indicators. Obesity must be 
measured at the individual level, whereas im-
port statistics for tobacco could be a crude 
proxy for individual smoking behavior.
Health cannot meaningfully be measured 
with a single variable at all times. For example, 
throughout the 20th century, infant mortality 
was a useful overall indicator of health with 
special relevance for diseases related to nutri-
tion, housing conditions, economic welfare and 
health care − the classical public health factors. 
Along with the epidemiological transition, 
infectious diseases lost importance and infant 
mortality continued to decline in most Arctic 
indigenous populations. Mental health became 
an issue, illustrated by the extremely high youth 
suicide rates from the 1960s until the present 
Source: Poppel et al., 2007. Survey responses „fair“ and „poor“ are grouped to make the Canadian data comparable with other 
regions.
Table 2.2: Self-rated health, by subregion (SLiCA)
                                Nunavik             Labrador            Inuvialuit             Nunavut          Sydgrønland      Midtgrønland
Excellent  32%  22%  29%  21%  19%  21%
Very good  25%  38%  30%  27%  52%  58%
Good  33%  29%  29%  39%  26%  17%
Fair or Poor  10%  11%  12%  13%  4%  4%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
                             Diskobugten      Nordgrønland      Østgrønland           Anadyr               Central                Eastern
Excellent  14%  17%  18%  2%  5%  5%
Very good  62%  67%  62%  0%  30%  16%
Good  17%  13%  18%  85%  42%  44%
Fair or Poor  6%  3%  2%  13%  23%  35%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
                                Western           North Slope            NANA            Bering Straits            Total
Excellent  4%  21%  13%  12%  18%
Very good  2%  29%  29%  35%  39%
Good  18%  29%  35%  27%  26%
Fair or Poor  75%  21%  23%  26%  17%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Source: Poppel et al., 2007.
Table 2.1: Self-rated health, by region (SLiCA)
                                 Canada            Greenland            Chukotka             Alaska                 Total
Excellent  28%  19%  5%  15%  18%
Very good  27%  59%  10%  32%  38%
Good  33%  18%  34%  30%  26%
Fair  9%  4%  29%  20%  13%
Poor  2%  1%  23%  4%  6%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Source: Poppel et al.,2007.
Table 2.3: Self-rated health, by gender (SLiCA)
                                   Male                Female                  Total
Excellent  20%  18%  19%
Very good  45%  38%  42%
Good  25%  30%  27%
Fair  8%  9%  8%
Poor  2%  4%  3%
 100%  100%  100%
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day. Later still, lifestyle factors such as diet, 
physical activity, smoking, drinking, and drug 
abuse became evident as causes of chronic 
disease. In the 21st century, obesity and associ-
ated chronic diseases (cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes) are expected to become leading causes 
of death in the Arctic due to reduced physical 
activity and shifting dietary habits (Young and 
Bjerregaard, 2008).
Population statistics, even more than health, 
are widely collected by government agencies. 
Register statistics in Nordic countries, or census 
and between-census estimates of population in 
Alaska, provide time series of total population 
at spatial resolution down to the individual 
community level. Canada and Russia report 
population at coarser but still usable temporal/
spatial resolution. Time series of vital statistics 
(births and deaths) and of population age/sex 
structure, or age/sex/ethnicity, generally exist 
at coarse resolution. Each nation treats ethnic 
or cultural identity in different ways statisti-
cally, and even within nations both official and 
self-definitions shift over time, complicating the 
prospects for defining comparable ethnicity-
specific indicators.
Where population statistics do exist we can 
derive other measures such as birth and death 
rates, including two important indicators: teen-
age birth rates and infant mortality. (As noted 
earlier, infant mortality is defined as deaths of 
infants under one year old, per 1,000 live births. 
Teenage birth rates are defined for particular 
age groups; e.g., the number of births to moth-
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Figure 2.1: 
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) and 
teenage birth rate (births per 1,000 females age 15-19 
years) for Iceland, 1951-2006. 
Source: Statistics Iceland.
Figure 2.2: 
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) and 
teenage birth rate (births per 1,000 females age 15-19 
years) for Greenland, 1973-2005.
Source: Statistics Greenland.
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ers age 15 to 19, per 1,000 females in that age 
group). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide illustrations 
of these indicators in Iceland and Greenland. 
Figure 2.1 shows a clear downward trend in 
both series, indicating marked improvement in 
health and social conditions. Similarly, Figure 
2.2 shows a decline in Greenland, but due to 
the smaller population base (around 50,000 to 
57,000 in Greenland compared with about 
150,000 to 300,000 in Iceland), the indicators 
fluctuate more dramatically from year to year. 
With these fluctuations and a window of less 
than three decades, the birth rate decline for 
Greenland appears less clear-cut than it does 
for Iceland. In fact, the upper trend line in 
Figure 2.2 is not statistically significant, mean-
ing that these data are not sufficient to establish 
that any trend exists. The contrast between 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrates the challenge of 
looking at smaller scales of population and 
time. Indicators with a local focus, such as 
people in one Greenland municipality, or short-
er time series, such as just a few years, require 
even more care when interpreting them.
Rates of population growth or decline, sex 
ratios, and the fraction of population age 65 and 
older (or under 20) can be calculated as well. 
(For a look at some interconnections between 
these indicators and social change, see Hamilton, 
forthcoming.) Where in- and outmigration are 
not measured directly, net migration can be 
estimated crudely as the difference between 
population change and natural increase 
(number of births minus deaths). In the Arctic 
to a greater degree than elsewhere, net migra-
tion often dominates population structure and 
change. Life expectancy and fertility rates, 
widely used for international comparisons, are 
difficult to calculate at regional or subregional 
scales. Mortality and birth rates provide the 
most practical alternatives.
Ideally, the health and population indicators 
described here should be available on a sub-
regional scale across most, if not all, of the plac-
es we might consider to be Arctic. Viewed with 
appropriate caution, subregional and even com-
munity-scale indicators could prove most im-
portant for seeing impacts of resource or envi-
Children playing on a 
sunny spring day in 
Tasiilaq, East Greenland. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen
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ronmental change, which tend to manifest on 
local scales. Studies of northern fishing towns, 
for example, have noted substantial demo-
graphic effects following marine ecosystem 
change (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2003, 2004a-c, 
2006).
Because so many Arctic places have experi-
enced rapid change, annual time series are most 
helpful − particularly when the series extends 
far enough back to distinguish variability from 
trends. Breakdowns of indicators by age and 
gender would add much to our ability to read 
them. In many Arctic regions it is also desirable 
to draw ethnic or cultural distinctions, such as 
those between indigenous peoples and others. 
Defining indigenous status in a way that is both 
locally meaningful and widely comparable 
across nations presents a much greater chal-
lenge than defining age or gender, as the variety 
of ethnic, linguistic, place of birth, or ancestry-
based approaches found in statistical records of 
different countries make clear.
Most indicators, such as infant mortality or 
teenage birth rates, require two numbers: a 
numerator (such as number of births) and a de-
nominator (such as number of teenage females). 
In order to obtain rates for subgroups, group 
membership must be defined consistently in 
both the numerator and denominator. We 
would have to know, for example, the number 
of births to Alaska Native mothers, and also the 
total number of Alaska Native females in a 
particular age group, applying exactly the same 
definition of who is or is not Alaska Native in 
both cases. Moreover, the definitions should be 
stable over time. Similarly, to compare migra-
tion, mortality, accident, illness, or other rates 
across ethnic subgroups, we would need to 
know the ethnic identity (defined the same way 
as for population statistics, and the same way 
each year) of each person who moved, died, ex-
perienced an accident or illness of a particular 
type, and so forth. Precise data of this sort 
generally do not exist and are difficult to esti-
mate reliably. Place of birth provides a useful, 
though far from perfect, proxy for indigenous 
identity in Greenland, but no similar proxy 
exists for indigenous peoples of Scandinavia or 
Russia. The US and Canadian censuses ask 
respondents to identify their own ethnicity, but 
these identifications do not necessarily carry 
over to health records or other kinds of stati-
stics. Moreover, a pattern called “ethnic mobil-
ity“ has been observed in US and Canadian 
censuses, where individuals describe their own 
ethnicity differently at different times. A lack of 
comparable data limits how specific we can be 
when applying any particular indicator to small-
er Arctic places or subgroups. Some demo-
graphic indicators scale down more smoothly 
than health indicators do.
In the next section we organize these thoughts 
into more compact lists of key indicators, along 
with their general definitions and possible 
sources.
3.0 Selected Indicators of Health 
and Population for the Arctic
A useful, general-purpose set of health indi-
cators would include those listed below. At 
least one indicator within each of the three 
domains is needed in order to give a meaning-
ful description of health.
3.1 Health Indicators
Classical indicators of public health and health 
care
Infant mortality: deaths of infants less than 
one year old, per 1,000 live births. Source: 
government vital statistics.
Child mortality: deaths of children less than 
five years old, per 1,000 live births. Source: 
government vital statistics.
Access to health care: percentage of popula-
tion within one hour of transportation to 
health care, and with insurance or government 
arrangements to pay. Source: None available.
Mental health
Suicide rate: number of suicides per 100,000 
people. Source: government vital statistics.
Self-assessed health: averages or percentages 
based on self-reports of the general state of 
health or existence of specific health problems. 
Source: population surveys.
Chronic disease
Obesity rate: percentage of population ex-
ceeding a clinical threshold for obesity, such as 
a body mass index (BMI) of 30 or higher 
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Figure 2.5: 
Infant mortality rates for the northwest Arctic compared 
with all Alaska, showing 95% confidence interval 
for northwest Arctic rates.
Source: Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics and Alaska Depart-
ment of Labour and Workforce Development; see 
Hamilton and Mitiguy (2008, 2009) for more 
examples and discussion of these graphs.
Figure 2.4:
 Infant mortality rates (infant deaths per 1,000 live births) 
for two northern Alaska regions and the whole state. 
Rates shown are five-year averages.
Source: Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics and Alaska Depart-
ment of Labour and Workforce Development; see 
Hamilton and Mitiguy (2008, 2009) for more 
examples and discussion of these graphs.
Figure 2.3: 
Trends in obesity (BMI 30) rates among men (left) and 
women (right) in towns and villages (settlements) 
of Greenland according to 1993, 1999, and 2006 
population surveys.
Source: National Institute of Public Health, 
Copenhagen
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(BMI = weight in kilograms/(height in met-
ers)2). Source: population surveys.
Smoking rate: percentage of population cur-
rently smoking cigarettes or other forms of 
tobacco. Source: population surveys, or crudely 
approximated by tobacco product sales.
Each indicator would be particularly in-
formative if it were broken down further 
according to age, gender, and ethnicity. With 
survey data such analyses are straightforward, 
and this is one of the main attractions of survey 
research methods. With other data sources, 
ethnic breakdowns in particular are difficult. 
Privacy and publication constraints are also at 
issue. Government vital statistics are collected 
initially with individual-level detail, but released 
to the public in aggregated forms that do not 
always permit subregional or subgroup ana-
lysis.
Figures 2.3 to 2.5 illustrate how several of 
these health indicators might be used compara-
tively; they also show what happens as we look 
at smaller places. Figure 2.3 depicts the rising 
prevalence of obesity among Greenland adults, 
based on survey data. This graph allows three 
comparisons: 1) obesity rates have been rising 
steeply; 2) rates among women have risen faster 
than rates among men; and 3) except for wom-
en in the most recent survey, obesity has been 
more prevalent in towns than in small settle-
ments.
Figure 2.4 draws some comparisons of infant 
mortality, a key indicator of health. Infant 
mortality rates for all Alaska and for two pre-
dominantly Inupiat regions in northern Alaska 
(the Northwest Arctic and North Slope 
Boroughs), are graphed from 1992 through 
2003. These are not annual data but rather five-
year averages, which smooth out wild but 
statistically meaningless year-to-year fluctua-
tions in the two northern boroughs. A down-
ward trend in infant mortality appears clear for 
all Alaska, but less so for the North Slope 
(where two years are missing because there 
were too few deaths to calculate rates) and 
Northwest Arctic (which seems to go up, down, 
up, and down again). Overall, the infant mortal-
ity rates look higher in the two northern 
boroughs, but their trends and individual con-
trasts are uncertain.
Some of the numbers behind Figure 2.4 are 
small. For example, over the five years 2001 
through 2005, there were only 10 infant deaths 
reported in the entire Northwest Arctic out of 
852 live births to women living there. This 
yields a five-year infant mortality rate of 1,000 
x 10/852 = 11.7, the value graphed for year 
2003. But just two more deaths over these five 
years would have boosted the rate to 14.1, mak-
ing the final trend appear definitely up. Two 
fewer deaths, on the other hand, would have 
dropped the rate to 9.4, an apparently steep 
decline.
Figure 2.5 graphs the all-Alaska and north-
west Arctic rates again, but this time with shad-
ing to suggest the statistical uncertainty (calcu-
lated as binomial confidence intervals) of indi-
vidual rates based on the Northwest Arctic 
data. The wide gray band in Figure 2.5 could 
equally well encompass a downward trend, an 
upward trend, or no trend. In most years it 
overlaps with the all-Alaska rates as well. Con-
fidence intervals to express uncertainty are 
well-known tools for data analysis and add an 
essential perspective when interpreting social 
indicators from sparsely populated northern 
regions. In this instance, the statistical uncer-
tainties should temper whatever conclusions 
we might draw from the simple rates of Fig-
ure 2.4.
3.2 Population Indicators
A similarly general set of population indicators 
would include the following (note that several 
key health indicators require population data 
for their definitions):
Total population: population living in a place 
at a selected time in one year. Source: popula-
tion register, census, or statistical-agency esti-
mate.
Number of births: number of live births in one 
year. Source: vital statistics records.
Number of deaths: number of deaths in one 
year. Source: vital statistics records.
Net migration: population change due to 
the balance of in- and outmigration. Source: 
population register, census, or survey.
All of these indicators are best in the form 
of time series covering many years and, where 
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Figure 2.8: 
Population and components of change for Koyuk, Alaska, 
1990-2006. Upper lines show total population and esti-
mated net migration, as in Figure 2.7. Lower bars track 
the number of births and deaths.
Source: Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics and Alaska Depart-
ment of Labor and Workforce Development.
Figure 2.7: 
Population and components of change for Wales, 
Alaska, 1990-2006. Upper lines show total population and 
estimated net migration-red segment above the main 
curve indicates net outmigration, below the main curve 
indicates net in-migration. Lower bars track the number of 
births and deaths.
Source: Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics and Alaska Depart-
ment of Labor and Workforce Development.
Figure 2.6: 
Net migration for seven rural regions of Iceland, 
1986-2006. Negative values indicate 
net outmigration.
Source: Statistics Iceland.
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possible, broken down by age, sex, or ethnicity. 
Secondary indicators derived from population 
numbers include birth rates, teenage birth rates, 
mortality rates, infant or child mortality rates, 
population growth or decline rates and projec-
tions, and age/sex/ethnicity composition of the 
population, including age and sex ratios. Each 
of these indicators has relevance to sustainabil-
ity and socioeconomic development. For exam-
ple, Saami leaders in Scandinavia have noted 
the need for better data to characterize specifi-
cally Saami populations (Nystø, 2007). Time 
series of population indicators compared across 
different places provide windows on the im-
pact of major events such as a policy change or 
resource decline (e.g., Hamilton and Butler, 
2001; Hamilton, 2007).
To advance beyond the AHDR, we seek indi-
cators that can be compared for geographies 
more specific than the nine general regions. The 
term “place“, as used above, is deliberately 
vague, but for each indicator there are practical 
constraints on how small the geography can be. 
One obvious limitation is data availability. 
Statistical agencies do not provide breakdowns 
below certain minimum thresholds of popula-
tion counts. Although specific thresholds vary 
from country to country, they sometimes (as 
typically is the situation in Canada) preclude 
the release of accurate data on small Arctic 
communities, or make the released data a patch-
work of true and artificially rounded or sup-
pressed numbers. Communities with popula-
tions of a few hundred or a few thousand 
people can be of great interest to social science 
and policy makers, but social indicators on this 
scale must be interpreted with care.
Besides data availability, another size con-
straint arises from the statistical variability 
associated with small samples. Percentages 
based on a random sample survey of 100 
people, for example, will have confidence inter-
vals − what opinion polls call the “margin of 
error“ − on the order of 10%. Thus, if a health 
survey determined that 20% of the adults inter-
viewed in one place were obese, we could con-
clude with confidence only that the true pro-
portion was somewhere between 10% and 
30%, making the detection of differences 
between places or over time unlikely. Certain 
health indicators such as mortality rates must 
employ even smaller numbers because the 
yearly deaths among small populations are 
few, and fewer still if we look at age or other 
subgroups.
For region-wide or Arctic-wide coverage, it 
appears that the smallest practical scale for 
most indicators requires populations of at least 
several thousand and administrative boundaries 
that have remained stable over the last decade 
or more. Alaska, for example, can be subdivid-
ed into 27 “county-equivalent entities“ such as 
boroughs, census areas, and municipalities. Any 
further subdivision into individual communi-
ties creates trouble with data availability, stat-
istical reliability, and boundary issues. Similarly, 
it works reasonably well to subdivide northern 
Canada into census divisions, Greenland into 
municipalities, Iceland into regions, Norway 
into counties, Sweden into regions, Finland into 
regions, and Russia into oblasts and other 
administrative subdivisions. More problems 
arise if we attempt further division toward
local scales, while maintaining Arctic-wide 
coverage.
Population indicators at small scales such as 
individual communities cannot achieve Arctic-
wide coverage, but they remain valuable for 
comparing results from one in-depth case study 
with others, or with known larger-scale pat-
terns. Figures 2.6 to 2.8 show examples of key 
population indicators applied at subregional 
and community levels.
Net migration has particular importance for 
Arctic places, where the arrival of newcomers 
or departures of local young adults can quickly 
reshape community life. Figure 2.6 graphs net 
migration from 1986 to 2006 for each of 
Iceland‘s seven rural regions (excluding only 
the capital area around Reykjavík). Each small 
plot shows its own pattern of year-to-year 
fluctuations, somewhat correlated across regi-
ons. No general up or down trend appears, but 
all seven plots show more years with negative 
values − indicating more people leaving than 
moving in. Given the total populations of 7,000 
to 29,000 in each region, it is not surprising to 
see large fluctuations year to year, often going 
from negative to positive and back again. These 
fluctuations underline why we should not read 
too much into values from a single year, or from 
just a few years.
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With such cautions in mind, population indi-
cators might remain usable at smaller scales 
than most health indicators because they are 
defined from larger numbers. Figures 2.7 and 
2.8 visualize several key population indicators 
for Wales and Koyuk, two predominantly 
Native villages in Alaska‘s Nome census area. 
The graphs depict total population, estimated 
net migration, births, and deaths. The popula-
tion of Wales peaked in the mid-1990s, but 
then fell so that by 2006 it was 13% below its 
1990 level. Koyuk, in contrast, grew by 59% 
over this same 17-year period. 
The two graphs also reveal something about 
how these changes happened. In both places, 
births exceed deaths, which by itself should 
drive population upward. In Wales, however, 
relatively large net migrations were the main 
control on year-to-year change. Net migration 
was most often negative, more than offsetting 
the excess of births over deaths. In Koyuk, on 
the other hand, migration played a weaker role. 
Without net outmigration, the steady excess 
of births over deaths drove the total popula-
tion upward, from 231 in 1990 to 368 in 
2006. In some places a rising population would 
signal economic growth, but that is not 
necessarily the case in rural Alaska. The caus-
es and implications of such different social con-
ditions in two villages within the region raise 
questions for future research. Figures 2.7 and 
2.8 visualize several key population indicators 
for Wales and Koyuk, two predominantly 
Native villages in Alaska‘s Nome census area 
(for more discussion of the graphing methods 
and other examples, see Hamilton and Mitiguy, 
2008, 2009).
4.0 Concluding Comments
Quality of life is not one dimensional. Even us-
ing the simple summaries of social indicators, 
we get a much better picture looking at multiple 
indicators, comparing them across places and 
times. If we nevertheless had to select just one 
indicator for health, infant mortality seems the 
best choice as this measure relates directly to 
quality of life and people‘s sense of well-being. 
It integrates a wide range of health-relevant 
conditions including health infrastructure, 
sanitation, nutrition, behavior, social problems, 
and disease. As well, international comparisons 
have established its broad validity as a proxy for 
societal development and its influence on other 
dimensions such as fertility and women‘s work. 
Finally, infant mortality rates are clearly de-
fined, comparable, widely available, and in-
clude data for time series and subregional 
scales.
One drawback to using infant mortality rates 
is that they are based on small numbers. This 
drawback is shared by other health indicators, 
however. It constrains the possibilities for 
applying health indicators at subregional or 
community levels, or with time series, because 
any statistics become less stable as sample 
sizes decrease. Confidence intervals help to 
describe the range of uncertainty surrounding a 
given indicator value.
Choosing a single indicator regarding popula-
tion or demography is also difficult. Population 
size, rates and components of change, and com-
position all are significant. One demographic 
indicator of particular importance to Arctic 
communities has been net migration. Outmigra-
tion by young adults can make places economi-
Mountainbikers resting in 
the harbour of Sisimiut. 
Photo: Birger Poppel
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cally and culturally less viable. Conversely, pro-
portionately large in-migration may signal eco-
nomic strength, but it also places pressure on 
traditional ways of life. Both in- and outmigra-
tion reflect the current local sum of various 
push and pull factors, although we often need 
local knowledge to understand how. Like infant 
mortality, net migration thus integrates differ-
ent forces and tells us something basic about 
where one place is heading or how it compares 
with others.
Interpretation of migration rates depends on 
their broader context. For example, many 
Arctic places have experienced in-migration of 
workers for mining or other resource develop-
ment. Positive and increasing net migration in 
those instances signals industrial development 
and potential economic prosperity. Net migra-
tion could signify other things in a different 
context, however. Young adults often leave 
small Arctic communities to get an education, 
thereby contributing to net outmigration. This 
might signal a trend toward stagnation and 
depopulation, but it is also possible that 
those who leave for education and later return 
could ultimately enrich home communities. 
Conversely, a lack of outmigration could indi-
cate that conditions are good in the home com-
munity or, alternatively, that residents feel 
unprepared or unable to move away. Thus, net 
migration is by no means a self-contained social 
indicator, and it must be interpreted carefully 
before drawing any policy conclusions. Time 
series following changes through many years, 
together with other kinds of statistical and qual-
itative information, would give a clearer picture 
of migration‘s real meaning.
With such cautions in mind, migration and 
other demographic indicators remain usable at 
smaller population scales than most health indi-
cators insofar as they are calculated from a larg-
er fraction of those populations. Demographic 
time series at subregional and community levels 
are widely available and provide a picture of 
human dimensions and dynamics that prove 
helpful in an understanding of many other 
social phenomena. Other components of popu-
lation change (births and deaths), as well as 
population composition (age, sex, and ethnic-
ity) add critical details to the demographic 
picture. The demographic background is 
often essential for interpreting other indicator 
domains and weighing policy options.
Although these are good indicators, they re-
main far from perfect, and their application is 
not trouble-free. Inevitably, the reported values 
contain errors from various sources, and they 
differ across time and places in completeness. 
For many purposes, the register-based informa-
tion systems of Nordic countries seem most 
complete, but they do not describe ethnic sub-
groups well. Statistics for Alaska are sensitive to 
ethnic identity but also tend to be estimated 
with more error and have limited resolution in 
time and space. The Canadian government 
collects detailed statistics for its own purpos-
es, but is much more restrictive than other 
countries about publishing their data or 
permitting others to synthesize Canadian infor-
mation into new datasets. The varied owner-
ship and organization of Russian statistics, 
along with discontinuities through post-Soviet 
history, present challenges to research as well. 
Surveys have the attraction of being self-con-
tained in that they ask for all the needed infor-
mation at once, but their generalizability and 
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validity can be problematic. Despite such chal-
lenges, however, the health and population 
measures outlined in this chapter are among 
the most available and comparable of all social 
indicators. (Table 2.4 provides an overview 
of how key indicators fare against selection 
criteria.)
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1.0 Introduction
Material well-being of a place can be defined as 
a measure of local residents’ command over 
goods and services. In constructing its Human 
Development Index (HDI), the United Nations 
uses gross domestic product (GDP) – a mone-
tary value of all goods and services produced in 
a given year – as an indicator of material well-
being. But while GDP is an accepted measure 
in countries throughout the world, its useful-
ness in the Arctic is questionable.
The Arctic Human Development Report 
(ADHR) describes three main sectors of the 
Arctic economy: formal, transfer, and subsist-
ence (AHDR, 2004). The size and importance 
of the transfer and subsistence sectors are criti-
cal parts of what distinguishes the economy of 
the Arctic region from other economies. 
Throughout this chapter we use the terms “in-
formal,” “subsistence,” and “traditional” inter-
changeably to refer to the same sector of the 
economy. While GDP may correctly assess the 
production of a region’s market sector, ignoring 
the important transfer and traditional compo-
nents of the Arctic economy will give a false pic-
ture of the material well-being of an Arctic 
region. For the Arctic we need an alternative to 
GDP as a measure of material well-being: a 
social indicator that reflects all three sectors of 
the Arctic economy. To meet the challenge of 
devising a valid indicator, we need to account 
for all of the three main sources of real income 
that contribute to the region’s material well-
being.
The objective of this chapter is to construct a 
measure of material well-being that captures 
and more accurately reflects the special nature 
of the Arctic economy. The chapter begins with 
a discussion of the concept of material well-
being. This is followed by a description of the 
organization and structure of the Arctic econ-
omy, and then a definition of material well-
being within the context of the Arctic region. 
Based on this definition, a set of indicators is 
constructed and evaluated in terms of various 
criteria for assessing their strengths and weak-
nesses. 
1.1 The Concept of Material  Well-being
Material well-being is just one aspect of overall 
well-being and is not the same as happiness or 
well-being in general. Indeed, a brief look at 
happiness and well-being provides a useful 
point of departure in the discussion of the con-
cept of material well-being.
There is some general agreement among re-
searchers about what constitutes the key ele-
ments of overall well-being, namely physical 
well-being, material well-being, social well-
being, development and activity, and emotional 
well-being. These elements may also be referred 
to as physical health, income and wealth, rela-
tionships, meaningful work and leisure, and 
personal stability (McAllister, 2005). Easterlin 
(2001) takes the terms “happiness, utility, well-
being, life satisfaction, and welfare to be inter-
changeable,” and according to McAllister (in 
Venn, 2007), the many different definitions of 
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well-being can be summarized as something 
that “…comprises objective descriptors and 
subjective evaluations of physical, material, 
social and emotional well-being, together with 
the extent of personal development and pur-
poseful activity, all weighted by a set of 
values.” 
At a more theoretical level, the question of 
well-being is also considered in welfare eco-
nomics and is measured in terms of what eco-
nomists refer to as a social welfare function. In 
their technical language economists character-
ize each individual’s choices by the respective 
utilities of the options available to them. Social 
welfare is judged as an aggregate function of the 
levels of utility across society, where utility in 
basic terms refers to the satisfaction we obtain 
from goods, services, and leisure time. In 
theory, the determinants of utility may be quite 
general, reflecting a range of material and non-
material influences, while in practice we tend to 
assume that the level of income or consumption 
is the most important determinant. At an aggre-
gate level, and as we discuss later, measures of 
total income or GDP are often used as a proxy 
for social welfare, extending beyond a mere 
consideration of material well-being. This often 
misplaced application of GDP has only added 
to the general criticism of its use. 
International evidence casts some doubt on 
the relationship between material production 
and happiness. One of the most widely quoted 
papers in research on happiness and human 
well-being is probably the article “Does eco-
nomic growth improve the human lot? Some 
empirical evidence” by Easterlin (1974), which 
suggests that individual happiness appears to be 
the same across poor countries and rich count-
ries, and that economic growth does not seem 
to raise well-being. Easterlin proposes that we 
think of people as getting utility from a com-
parison of themselves with others close to them 
(Venn, 2007). Over time, happiness appears to 
be relatively unrelated to income, and Layard 
(2005) argues that relative income − income 
relative to other inhabitants of a region or com-
munity − is more important in explaining well-
being than absolute wealth because as individ-
uals and societies grow wealthier, they adapt to 
new and higher living standards and adjust ex-
pectations upward.
The finding that human well-being appears to 
be relatively unrelated to income is an import-
ant aspect of the critique that led to the con-
 Town of Akureyri, summer 
2009. Stream of foreign 
tourists heading back to 
cruise ship in the habour. 
Photo: Jón Haukur 
Ingimundarson
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struction of the HDI by the United Nations. 
This point was also brought forward in the 
AHDR (2004), although that publication did 
not attempt to construct an HDI for the Arctic. 
It is widely accepted that analyses of economic 
development or progress that only take income 
into account neglect other important determi-
nants of well-being. Objective measures of well-
being have been summarized by McAllister 
(2005) as measures that relate to material and 
social circumstances that may foster or detract 
from well-being, such as housing standards, in-
come and employment, educational attainment, 
and poverty. (Later in this chapter we discuss 
material well-being with reference not only to 
income but also to housing standard, subsist-
ence harvest, migration, and more.)
We define material well-being in the Arctic 
region as some measure of local residents’ com-
mand over goods and services. That is, material 
well-being is not happiness or general well-
being, but in its strict sense “material.” It is a 
measure of what is consumed, not what is pro-
duced. It should also reflect both the quantity 
and the quality of goods and services residents 
of a region consume. Possible indicators for 
these basic necessities can be defined in terms 
of basic housing, food security, and health 
care.
But material well-being is not only derived 
from the things that people buy; in the Arctic 
region material well-being comes from employ-
ment income as well as public services and tra-
ditional activities. It may also reflect residents’ 
prospects for the future. Indicators for such
future prospects could be thought of in terms 
of 1) access to opportunities and 2) the future 
of the region’s productive capacity. In Arctic 
regions, access to opportunities includes both 
labor market and subsistence or traditional 
activities. Future productive prospects might 
be measured by availability of human capital, as 
well as the structure and control of economic 
activity and instability of production. 
1.2 Overview of Material Well-being in the 
Arctic: The Market and Subsistence-based 
Arctic Economy
The Arctic presents a special case when con-
structing and measuring material well-being. In 
the Arctic, material well-being is derived from 
market and non-market activity as well as trans-
fers from higher levels of government. The im-
portance of the traditional and transfer sector 
to material well-being is what makes the Arctic 
economy unique. 
It is important to keep in mind that not only 
is the Arctic economy unique when compared 
with more industrialized regions, the Arctic as 
a whole is not a homogenous economic region. 
“Brædtet” – the local 
marketplace for hunting 
and fishing products in 
the village of Alluitsup 
Paa, South Greenland, 
a village with 319 
inhabitants (2009). 
Photo: Sigrid Rasmussen
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While regions throughout the North share 
characteristics that distinguish their economies 
from non-northern regions, they also vary signi-
ficantly: by the type, quality, and quantity of in-
dustrial resources produced; by the importance 
of the indigenous population and the local 
economy; and by the different national eco-
nomic and political systems. 
These variations in regional economies com-
plicate the task of devising appropriate indi-
cators of material well-being for the Arctic. 
Here we briefly examine the main characteris-
tics and the unique structure of the Arctic eco-
nomy, which provide the context for construct-
ing a valid indicator of material well-being.
As described in the AHDR, the economy of 
the Arctic is divided into essentially three major 
parts: the formal economy (industrial sector), 
the non-market informal economy (traditional 
or subsistence sector), and the transfer sector. 
The importance of each of these parts varies 
throughout the Arctic region. 
1.2.1 Formal Sector
The formal and industrial segment of much of 
the Arctic economy is characterized by a nar-
row resource base, the extraction primarily of 
non-renewable resources, and production that 
is often highly capital intensive and thus fre-
quently requiring the import of capital from 
outside the region. Some areas of the Arctic, 
however, are more diverse than others. In the 
Fennoscandinavian Arctic, for example, formal 
economies are more diversified with a greater 
share of manufacturing production. 
A significant share of the wealth created 
through large-scale resource extraction often 
does not remain in the Arctic or benefit the 
residents of the region. Rather, large-scale ex-
ploitation activities are frequently carried out to 
supply markets outside the Arctic using labor 
and capital inputs from outside the region 
(AHDR, 2004). A significant share of GDP is 
generated in the form of resource rents and re-
turn to capital and may leave the area when 
capital ownership is located outside the region. 
So while Arctic GDP is high throughout much 
of the North, it may not accurately reflect what 
is actually available for consumption and invest-
ment in the region. As a consequence, these 
resource flows in and out of the region limit 
the use of GDP as a measure of material well-
being. 
Also, the narrow resource-based economy is 
The town of Honningsvåg, 
on the island Magerøya in 
Finnmark, Norway, 2009. 
Photo: Jón Haukur 
Ingimundarson
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a major source of economic vulnerability and 
instability in the region (Larsen, 2004). Signi-
ficant fluctuations in earnings may result if pro-
duction is concentrated in one or a small number 
of products and if exports are geared only to a 
few external markets, as is often the case in the 
North. These fluctuations make any one-year 
estimate of GDP a poor indicator of long-term 
well-being of the residents of the region. Not all 
Arctic regions depend on large-scale extraction 
of natural resources and external trade of 
course, but for those that do, material well-
being will be affected by the nature and size of 
these activities, and the true effect may not be 
well reflected in the size of per capita GDP. 
1.2.2 Informal Sector
While large-scale resource extraction is a cen-
tral characteristic of the Arctic formal economy, 
subsistence in the form of customary harvesting 
continues to play an important role. The extent 
of this informal activity varies between and 
within regions of the Arctic. 
Subsistence activity can be described as local 
production for local consumption. A significant 
number of indigenous people throughout the 
Arctic continue to depend largely on harvesting 
and the use of living terrestrial, marine, and 
freshwater resources. Many of these resources 
are used as food and for clothing and other 
products. They also figure prominently in the 
cash economy of local households and com-
munities.
Outside of the urban areas indigenous people 
often mix activities of the formal sector (e.g., 
commercial fish harvesting, oil and mineral 
resource extraction, forestry, and tourism) with 
traditional or subsistence activities, which in-
clude harvesting a variety of natural renewable 
resources to provide for human consumption. 
The indigenous share of the overall Arctic 
population was estimated in the AHDR as 
approximately 10% for the region as a whole: 
16% of the Alaskan population, 50% of the 
Canadian Arctic population, 88% of Greenland’s 
population, and less than 5% of Russia’s and 
northern Scandinavia’s population (AHDR, 
2004). These population statistics, combined 
with survey statistics on participation in the in-
formal sector, show the importance of subsist-
ence activities. For example, the SLiCA survey, 
covering Greenland, Chukotka, Alaska, and 
Canada, has shown that subsistence harvest is 
important to a large segment of the indigenous 
Smelting of nickel ore in 
Monchegorsk, Kola 
Peninsula, Russia. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole
Rasmussen
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population. Half the households in the SLiCA 
survey reported, they harvested half or more of 
their family’s meat consumption, and that for 
two-thirds of the households traditional food 
accounted for half or more of their household’s 
consumption. (The continued importance of 
sharing subsistence foods accounts for the dif-
ference in these proportions.) The importance 
of subsistence harvest in the Arctic emphasizes 
the need to include this aspect of the Arctic 
economy in a measure of material well-being. 
Even when the traditional activity is less impor-
tant in providing real income, traditional pur-
suits maintain cultural significance. 
New threats and challenges to indigenous 
social and cultural sustainability have appeared, 
most of them fuelled by an increasingly rapid 
pace of externally forced, disruptive social 
change such as globalization and urbanization 
(AHDR, 2004; ICARP II 2005). Climate change, 
particularly global warming, will likely increas-
ingly impinge on both subsistence and commer-
cial wildlife harvesting and fishing, with serious 
implications for local and regional economies, 
traditional diet, and cultural identity (ACIA, 
2005). It is projected that there will be signi-
ficant impacts on the availability of key subsist-
ence marine and terrestrial species as climate 
continues to change, and the ability to maintain 
one’s material well-being may be affected and 
may necessitate adjustments in hunting and har-
vest strategies as well as reallocations of labour 
and other resources. 
While data do not exist on the impact of 
change on material well-being, the SLiCA 
survey has shown that in the case of Greenland 
the majority of survey respondents had a very 
easy or fairly easy time making ends meet, while 
the majority of respondents in Chukotka 
answered that they had some or great difficulty 
making ends meet. In Alaska about half of the 
SLiCA respondents found it very easy or fairly 
easy, and the other half found it difficult (SLiCA, 
2007). 
Overall, global change impacts in the Arctic 
pose the question of whether a robust indicator 
Bringing home the new 
Skidoo on dog sledge, 
Kulusuk, East Greenland. 
Photo: Johanna Roto
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that captures these changes both in the 
formal as well as informal sectors can be con-
structed.
1.2.3 Public Sector and Government 
   Transfers
Lastly, the Arctic economy is also characterized 
by a large service sector, with the public sector 
accounting for a significant share. The tertiary 
sector accounts for between one-half and three-
quarters of the total economic production in 
the Arctic, and dominating this sector is public 
administration (AHDR, 2004). In the case of 
Greenland and Nunavut, for example, annual 
block grant payments from Denmark and 
Canada make up a major share of revenue and 
help finance a large public sector with a signi-
ficant public administration. Such government 
transfers impact local material well-being in a 
number of ways. Transfers create jobs in the 
public sector as well as the local non-profit or 
social economy. Transfers also subsidize the 
cost of providing local services such as utilities, 
education, and housing. Transfer payments are 
an important source of material well-being.
– – –
In summary, the Arctic economy provides the 
basis for the material well-being of Arctic resi-
dents. While the economic base varies through-
out the North, Arctic economies share four im-
portant characteristics that are different from 
non-northern economies that must be captured 
by any measure of material well-being. First, 
residents of the North gain command over 
goods and services through market work, work 
in traditional activities, and government trans-
fers. Second, the relative importance of each of 
these sectors varies throughout the North. 
Third, because of the capital and skill-intensive 
nature of industrial resource production, much 
of the value produced in this sector becomes 
payment to people outside of the region. Finally, 
climate change and globalization are likely to 
increasingly affect Arctic economies.
2.0 Possible Indicators of Material 
Well-being in the Arctic
What would make a good indicator of material 
well-being? The perfect indicator would tell us 
exactly the level of consumption from all sourc-
es for the average citizen of an Arctic region. It 
would allow us to measure both the distribution 
of this consumption and the history of change, 
and it would allow us to compare across regions 
and over time. Unfortunately, the perfect indi-
cator may be too costly to construct. In select-
ing the appropriate indicator we need to bal-
ance or trade off the information it provides 
with the cost of constructing it. 
Several of the indicators we suggest here have 
weaknesses related to availability of data, af-
fordability, and scalability and applicability to 
both indigenous and non-indigenous inhabit-
ants of the Arctic. An indicator should be the 
most accurate statistic for measuring both the 
level and extent of change in the social outcome 
of interest. It should adequately reflect what it 
is intended to measure, and ideally there should 
be wide support for the indicators chosen so 
they will not be changed regularly. It is critical 
that the chosen indicators be consistent over 
time and across places, as the usefulness of in-
dicators is related directly to the ability to track 
trends over time and compare the well-being of 
regions. 
Data need to be collected and reported reg-
ularly and frequently to ensure they provide 
timely information. Any differences in data pro-
tocol in the Arctic will complicate the task of 
making comparisons across the region. But 
practically, we know that we will need to con-
sider a number of possible trade-offs when 
selecting the best indicator among a set of 
possible indicators. The best measures may not 
be collected frequently to allow yearly com-
parisons. Our desire for longer time series rath-
er than single measurements may be compro-
mised if the measure changes substantially from 
one year to the next. Also, if the measure is 
collected by survey, the sample size may be too 
small, making a chosen indicator less reliable 
and with some data being unavailable for small-
er regions. All this means that we may need to 
make compromises if we want to achieve good 
indicators that are obtainable at a reasonable 
cost in terms of time and resources. Such com-
promises may come at the cost of constructing 
an ideal, yet probably unattainable, indicator. 
The chosen indicators should do well in terms 
of selection criteria such as data availability, af-
fordability, ease of measurement, internal valid-
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ity, robustness, scalability (household, local, 
regional), and inclusiveness of indigenous and 
non-indigenous populations. In the following 
sections a number of indicators are proposed 
and analyzed using the criteria for selection—
from the most commonly accepted standard 
measure of material well-being, namely GDP, 
to several alternative standard measures that 
may prove to be more appropriate for the 
Arctic.
2.1 GDP as a Standard Measure of Material 
Well-being
The most common measure of the size of the 
formal economy is GDP, which is the monetary 
value of all goods and services produced in a 
given year. GDP has been widely used and is 
commonly accepted as a measure of material 
well-being throughout the world. The real GDP 
per capita is generally used as the core indicator 
in judging the position of the economy of a 
country over time or relative to that of other 
countries. Real GDP accounts for differences in 
price level between two points of comparison, 
time periods or places.
However, GDP has well-known drawbacks 
as a measure of well-being when it is intended 
simply as a measure of an economy’s output. 
GDP was never intended as a measure of social 
welfare, but in the strict sense is simply the total 
value of recorded goods and services that are 
produced in a given year. This is true for all 
economies including those in the Arctic. 
For many decades, the implicit and explicit 
interpretation of GDP as a proxy of social wel-
fare has received much criticism, from Galbraith 
(1958) to Dasgupta (2001) and many others in 
between. In response to this general criticism, 
the United Nations HDI has become a widely 
accepted alternative to GDP as a measure of so-
cial welfare and standard of living in countries 
throughout the world. 
Beyond this general criticism, the Arctic pos-
es additional questions about using GDP since 
material well-being there is derived from more 
than just formal and recorded economic activ-
ity. In fact, the AHDR discusses the limitations 
of using the GDP in the setting of the Arctic: 
Calculations of the HDI over a number of 
years have shown how a broader measure 
of human development diverges signi-
ficantly from GDP per capita beyond a 
relatively modest income level. This is a 
finding of obvious importance. In an era 
in which escalating levels of material con-
sumption constitute a major source of 
large-scale environmental problems, the 
realization that human well-being does 
not correlate with GDP per capita beyond 
a certain point is both critical and encour-
aging…Many Arctic residents – especially 
those who are indigenous to the region or 
long-term residents – associate a good life 
with maintenance of traditional hunting, 
gathering, and herding practices. Yet it is 
the difficult to use indicators like GDP 
per capita to measure the health of sub-
sistence systems or mixed economies more 
generally. For many, well-being is to be 
found in a way of life that minimizes the 
need for the sorts of material goods and 
services included in calculations of GDP 
per capita (AHDR, 2004). 
When applied to the Arctic context, there are 
several problems with a standard measure of 
material well-being such as GDP per capita. 
These problems are related to the region’s small 
scale, its resource dependence, the importance 
of subsistence, and the significant outflows of 
resource rents and inflows of transfers.
First, the GDP measure simply covers activi-
ties and transactions that have a market price 
and excludes non-market activities and house-
hold production. This drawback has long been 
recognized and emphasized as a limitation in 
using GDP as a measure of social welfare. While 
non-market activity is present in all eco-
nomies – not just the Arctic – it tends to be 
relatively small and generally very scattered, 
and attempts to measure its size are complicat-
ed by the time and resources that this task 
would require. As highlighted earlier, subsist-
ence is widespread and important to a signi-
ficant share of the Arctic population, with par-
ticipation in subsistence activities being a prom-
inent part of daily living in some regions and 
directly affecting material well-being of a large 
number of Arctic residents. Yet, this non-mark-
et activity is not counted in GDP. We could 
ignore the traditional economy in a measure of 
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material well-being only if it was similar every-
where and was not likely to change. But the size 
of the informal economy relative to that of the 
formal economy may change considerably over 
time, fuelled by climate change, globalization, 
and other socioeconomic forces. A reduction in 
subsistence harvest would reduce material well-
being for many indigenous communities, as-
suming that wage employment and transfers are 
unchanged. This, however, would not be cap-
tured by GDP calculations, and hence, exclud-
ing subsistence harvest will underestimate 
material well-being for many, resulting in an 
invalid measure. 
A second problem is that GDP does not dis-
count for flow of resource rents and payment to 
non-resident workers or flow of income to resi-
dents from outside the region. Nor does GDP 
account for transfers and taxes in and out of the 
region. Since a large part of GDP in the Arctic 
comprises returns to fixed capital and resource 
rents that can be taken out of the region as in-
come to owners situated elsewhere, it is hard to 
know what part of GDP is available for con-
sumption and investments and, in turn, what 
the impact is on material well-being. GDP tends 
to overestimate material well-being when it in-
cludes profits and rents that are not retained 
within the region and underestimate it by ignor-
ing transfers from outside the region.
Third, GDP ignores the distribution of in-
come, which Sen (1976, 1979), for one, consid-
ers as the main objection to using it. An unequal 
distribution implies unequal opportunities for 
personal development and well-being, and us-
ing GDP per capita as a measure of welfare 
means ignoring information on distribution of 
income and hence inequality. This is clearly an 
important drawback in the construction of in-
dicators designed to help track human develop-
ment and well-being in the Arctic. While GDP 
per capita may be high, it does not reflect well 
the actual size of income remaining in the 
Arctic, nor does it show how that income is dis-
tributed. Income is often highly unequally dis-
tributed, with personal income being consider-
ably lower in smaller, more remote and margin-
alized communities compared with urban cen-
tres or larger local communities with more 
availability of employment and economic op-
portunities. 
Fourth, a correction of GDP for inflation 
must be made in order to make estimates com-
parable over time or between regions. National 
inflation indices are based on an average con-
sumption basket that is regarded as representa-
tive for the entire population. Such an estimate 
may not reflect well the cost of living for indig-
enous peoples or residents in small and remote 
communities. The more skewed the income dis-
tribution, or the more heterogeneous in terms 
of consumption behavior of the population, the 
more inaccurate and thus less representative 
this procedure will be. Thus, while a GDP 
deflator or a consumer price index can be com-
puted for each of the Arctic nations, it may not 
be a valid reflection of the cost of living for in-
digenous peoples. While consumption patterns 
may be quite homogenous in a country such as 
Iceland, in Russia and Alaska significant differ-
ences exist in consumption across local regions 
and indigenous and non-indigenous communi-
ties. This is a general difficulty in the construc-
tion of a material well-being indicator and it 
complicates the task of arriving at valid, unbi-
ased comparisons across regions and time 
scale.
Fifth, regional comparisons of material well-
being based on GDP calculations will be highly 
sensitive to the year chosen for analysis. Small 
economic size and a narrow resource base may 
lead to frequent swings in economic variables as 
prices or supply of a narrow range of resources 
change. This volatility complicates circum-
Arctic comparisons and raises the risk of arriv-
ing at biased or invalid comparisons (Larsen, 
2007). The observed economic volatility cap-
tured in GDP complicates regional compari-
sons of material well-being based on single year 
analysis and GDP data. 
Finally, GDP has been criticized for not 
taking into account the environmental damage 
and depletion of resources that may result from 
increased economic activity. More production 
simply means a higher GDP regardless of what 
is being produced. But the presence of negative 
externalities, such as pollution, means GDP is 
an unreliable indicator of long-term material 
well-being. As well, the depreciation associated 
with environmental changes and depletion of 
resource supplies is missing from the GDP cal-
culation, a crucial limitation in the Arctic where 
56 Arctic Social Indicators
natural resources form the basis for the vast 
majority of formal economic activity. Environ-
mental damage and resource depletion may 
have a direct impact on traditional activities 
in the Arctic economy. Both damage to import-
ant subsistence resources and conflict over the 
use of resources may limit the traditional econ-
omy while the industrial economy expands.
2.2 Other Standard Indicators of Material 
Well-being
There are several indicators employed by 
economists that may prove to be more appro-
priate for the Arctic context than GDP. Here 
we examine a number of such indicators with 
reference to a range of basic selection criteria. 
Six groups of indicators are briefly considered: 
income indicators, economic participation indi-
cators, indicators of basic necessities and hous-
ing, poverty indicators, subsistence harvest in-
dicators, and indicators of net migration. While 
some represent an improvement over GDP, 
these indicators also have certain weaknesses 
when applied to the Arctic. 
2.2.1 Income 
Personal income per capita, household income 
per capita, and disposable income per capita 
are all measures of the ability of a region’s resi-
dents to acquire goods and services through the 
market, and as such they provide an indicator 
of the market component of material quality of 
life. Income measures overcome some of the 
listed drawbacks of GDP. They reference local 
income of residents, and hence exclude in their 
calculation the resource rents that flow out of 
the regions. Income also includes transfer in-
come from higher levels of government that in-
crease the direct income of residents, such as 
retirement benefits. Additionally, income indi-
cators can be measured at the household and 
individual level, and for indigenous and non-
indigenous residents alike. Most regions regul-
arly gather data on personal and household 
income through official surveys and censuses, 
and this helps facilitate comparisons between 
regions and over time.
However, while income indicators have cer-
tain strengths in terms of robustness and their 
validity for cross regional comparisons, they 
still have important weaknesses. For example, 
The town of Monche-
gorsk, Kola Peninsula, 
Russia, and the impact on 
the environment from the 
large Nickel smelters 
dominating the town. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen
Nome Gold Dredge. 
Alaska Photo Library of 
the Alaska Department of 
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and Economic Develop-
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while personal and household income are good 
measures of the command over market goods 
and services, they, like GDP, do not take into 
account material well-being generated from 
participation in the informal economy. Therefore 
these indicators underestimate the material 
well-being for regions where subsistence is 
significant, in particular those regions with a 
significant share of indigenous households. On 
balance, however, income indicators do a better 
job than GDP at measuring material well-being 
in the Arctic. 
A research challenge in using per capita 
household income as a measure of material 
well-being is to make this measure comparable 
over time and place. For economists this in-
volves adjusting for differences in the price 
level or estimating real per capita household in-
come. An essential part of the process of esti-
mating real income is the development of price 
indexes that compare the cost of buying goods 
in two time periods or two different places. 
These are available in many countries but most-
ly on a regional scale. This is an important re-
search problem since changes in the prices of 
goods and services will affect the material well-
being produced by any given level of income. 
2.2.2 Economic Participation 
The opportunity for work provides income and, 
therefore, command over market goods and 
services. We can, therefore, consider indicators 
such as rates of employment, unemployment, 
and labor force participation as indirect meas-
ures of regional residents’ command over goods 
and services. While economic participation in-
dicators are broadly accepted, they do have a 
number of limitations when applied to the 
Arctic context.
As a representative indicator of economic 
participation we can take a closer look at unem-
ployment. Unemployment is one of the main 
reasons for poverty in rich and medium-income 
countries and among persons with high educa-
tion in low-income countries. The effect on 
material well-being of unemployment will de-
pend on a number of factors, including access 
to unemployment insurance, social assistance, 
and other insurance and income assistance pro-
grams. Unemployment reduces income genera-
tion and hence the command over goods and 
services and material well-being in turn. It is not 
uncommon, however, to find people working 
full-time but remaining poor (the “working 
poor”) due to the particular social conditions 
and type of industrial relations prevalent in 
their country or region, industry, or occupation. 
Reduced unemployment by itself will not 
guarantee a high level of material well-being. 
Compared with income indicators, economic 
participation indicators may be less appropri-
ate, particularly for local and indigenous com-
munities. For households significantly involved 
in the traditional economy, limited participa-
tion in the market economy may mean greater 
production of traditional goods, which contri-
butes to greater material well-being. 
Another drawback relates to the statistical 
challenge presented by the number of “discour-
aged workers.” Northern regions may go 
through periods of high economic instability, 
experience boom and bust cycles in industry, 
structural and seasonal unemployment, and the 
use of imported labor. In regions with long and 
widespread unemployment some people give 
up looking for work, and they become discour-
aged workers. These people are not reflected in 
the official unemployment statistics, which 
means true unemployment in some northern 
communities may be significantly underestimat-
ed. Additionally, due to limited economic and 
employment opportunities, the problem of un-
deremployment in the North and in local com-
munities can be significant. In some regions of 
the Arctic the unemployed are well supported 
via government transfers and social assistance, 
while in other regions this is not the case. 
On balance, the unemployment indicator has 
weaknesses that make it less appropriate for the 
Arctic region as an indicator of residents’ com-
mand over goods and services. The problems of 
accurately calculating true unemployment num-
bers, along with accounting for structural or 
seasonal fluctuations because of the nature of 
industry, resource dependency, and degree of 
external ownership and control, complicates 
some of the key criteria for indicator construc-
tion and selection such as robustness and com-
parability over time and across regions. For 
these reasons, economic participation indi-
cators can be problematic in local and indige-
nous communities in particular. 
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2.2.3 Basic Necessities and Housing 
Material well-being can be measured by exam-
ining whether residents of a region consume 
basic necessities of life, which include afforda-
ble housing with adequate space; sufficient 
food, personal goods, and services; and a satis-
factory physical environment. Indicators of 
basic necessities say something about whether 
consumption or access to a basic necessity is 
sufficient – with “sufficient” being some prede-
termined level. Such a measure would compare 
whether a minimum standard of material well-
being is being met across regions and commu-
nities or across time. However, what constitutes 
“sufficient” may vary between regions, local 
communities, and cultures, and between indig-
enous and non-indigenous households. Further-
more, what is “sufficient” may be determined 
in part by the availability of other financial sup-
ports, community services, and infrastructure, 
all of which vary considerably across and within 
regions. 
These measures – arrived at based on some 
regional standard or measured relative to some 
minimum standard – are indicators of whether 
residents of a region maintain a satisfactory 
minimum of goods and services. They do not 
measure the actual level of material well-being 
and therefore fall short of capturing the degree 
of command over goods and services. This ap-
proach therefore complicates the task of mak-
ing valid comparisons and performing monitor-
ing across scales and time. These indicators may 
also fail the selection criteria for affordability 
and ease of measurement with the risk of a large 
margin of error in measurement. As well, they 
would not necessarily be robust through time, 
as the concept of what constitutes “sufficient” 
may change with the multitude of other chang-
es occurring in the Arctic.
One way to reduce the complexity of the 
basic needs approach would be to focus on a 
limited number of goods. For example, housing 
may be an appropriate single good indicator of 
basic need. Shelter is an important part of mat-
erial well-being and housing expenditure is us-
ually the largest share of a household’s budget. 
The impact of housing on the overall material 
standard of living will be large. Housing afford-
ability, which measures the proportion of the 
population spending more than a certain pro-
portion of their income on housing, is one way 
to measure the impact of housing on well-being. 
An alternative indicator may be “household 
crowding,” measured by the number of rooms 
or square feet of housing per person. To truly 
examine the effect of housing on well-being, 
both measures would be useful, since together 
they tell us both the quality of housing being 
purchased and how housing affects the house-
hold’s ability to buy other goods and services.
2.2.4 Poverty 
Measures of absolute poverty, relative poverty, 
the proportion of a population with low in-
comes, and income inequality provide another 
way of looking at that portion of material well-
being that is satisfied in the market economy. 
These measures help describe the segment of 
the population that do not have the resources 
to adequately provide access to market goods 
and services. 
The concept of poverty refers to a long-last-
ing situation of inadequate access to sufficient 
goods and services. In contrast, and as noted 
earlier, the number of unemployed can change 
very fast, especially in smaller and more remote 
northern communities where local labor mark-
ets may be characterized by one or just a few 
employers, as for example in the case of a north-
ern mining town. Closures of northern mines or 
sudden changes in value or volume of natural 
Summer storing of 
skidoos at the children’s 
playground and surround-
ed by different types of 
housing in Tuktoyaktuk, 
NWT, Canada. Photo: 
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resources, seasonal variability in availability of 
work, and other short-term circumstances in 
the North influence the level of unemployment. 
Since they measure longer term conditions, 
poverty indicators may have certain strengths 
that are not present in indicators of economic 
participation.
Poverty can be measured using a “poverty 
line,” a measure of the level of income needed 
to be able to subsist in a society. Poverty lines 
are not uniform, of course, but vary from one 
place to the next and from time to time along 
with changes in cost of living and people’s 
expectations. The choice of a poverty line is 
largely arbitrary, and in order to arrive at a pov-
erty line accepted by society it must conform to 
some accepted norm of what constitutes a min-
imum standard of living.
Poverty can be measured in absolute or rela-
tive terms. Absolute poverty refers to a situation 
where people are unable to command sufficient 
resources to satisfy basic needs. An absolute 
poverty line is one that is fixed in terms of the 
living standard indicator being used, usually 
consumption or nutrition. The number of 
people living in absolute poverty is calculated 
as those living below the specified minimum 
level of real income. The poverty line may vary, 
but only so as to measure the differences in the 
cost of a given level of welfare. The most com-
mon approach to establishing a poverty line is 
to estimate the cost, in each region or at each 
date, of a certain bundle of goods necessary to 
attain basic consumption needs.
A possible drawback to using absolute pov-
erty as an Arctic social indicator of material 
well-being is the complication of defining a 
poverty line that is valid for both indigenous 
and non-indigenous residents as well as region-
al and local communities across different eco-
nomic structures. The process of agreeing upon 
a single measure of absolute income poverty 
across the circumpolar region significantly com-
plicates the task of determining what is “neces-
sary” and what is “minimum.” 
While absolute poverty refers to the set of 
resources a person must acquire in order to 
maintain a minimum standard of living, relative 
poverty is concerned with how well off an indi-
vidual is compared with others in the same 
society. An absolute poverty line is a measure 
that could, adjusting for price fluctuations, re-
main stable over time, whereas a relative pov-
erty line is one that could be expected to shift 
with the overall standard of living in a given so-
ciety. But there is a possible pitfall in using 
relative poverty as an indicator, just as there is 
with absolute poverty. When the relative pov-
erty line is fixed as a proportion of the national 
mean, and if all incomes increase by the same 
proportion, there would be no change in rela-
tive inequalities, and the poverty line would 
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houses (along the beach), 
concrete apartment hous-
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West Greenland, 15105 
inhabitants (2009). 
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simply increase by the same proportion; that is, 
the poverty measure will not change although 
material well-being may have changed. This 
scenario can make such poverty lines deceptive 
for some purposes, such as assessing whether 
poor people are better or worse off as econo-
mies undergo development. In such a case, this 
indicator is less powerful in monitoring and 
tracking human development across regions 
and over time.
A measure of the proportion of a population 
with low incomes is a possible alternative to 
absolute and relative poverty measures. This in-
dicator provides information about how equita-
bly resources are distributed and how many 
people are likely to have an income that does 
not allow them to participate fully in society 
or have adequate command over goods and 
services. Income inequality is also measured by 
comparing the incomes of the top 20% of 
households with the incomes of the bottom 
20%, for example. High levels of inequality are 
associated with lower levels of social cohesion 
and personal well-being, and this indicator pro-
vides important information to help support 
the analysis of the level of material well-being. 
In conjunction with a per capita income indi-
cator, data on income inequality provide impor-
tant information about the level of material 
well-being. While this type of indicator would 
not by itself provide sufficient information 
about material well-being, it does provide use-
ful information that GDP overlooks. It is not 
straightforward to measure, however, and data 
collection for a measure of income inequality 
may be costly in terms of time and other re-
sources and thus fail based on indicator selec-
tion criteria. 
For comparisons over time, the poverty line 
must be stable and consistent. A critical draw-
back is that poverty indicators, as in the case of 
other indicators discussed here, do not account 
for the contribution made to material well-be-
ing by subsistence and traditional activities in 
the North. Low incomes may be a matter of 
choice if households are making a trade-off 
between time spent working and time spent 
hunting or fishing. A household may be made 
better off if it sacrifices money income for sub-
sistence production. In general, poverty rates 
on their own without some measure of sub-
sistence activity may easily underestimate 
the actual level of material well-being in the 
Arctic.
2.2.5 Subsistence Harvest 
As discussed in the previous sections, the sub-
sistence sector figures prominently in the Arctic 
economy. For this reason the inclusion of meas-
ures of production in this sector are necessary 
to arrive at a more complete picture of material 
well-being. Ignoring subsistence would be a 
particularly serious flaw in measurement when 
analyzing local and indigenous communities. 
The contribution made by subsistence can in 
principle be gauged by looking at either subsist-
ence outcome or input, where harvest per 
person provides a measure of outcome while 
degree of involvement in subsistence activities 
provides a measure of input.
Recognizing the role of traditional activities 
in the North means that an indicator of mate-
rial well-being must also recognize that in some 
parts of the Arctic subsistence activities are 
more important than in other parts (e.g., Chuk-
otka versus Iceland). We could ignore the 
traditional economy in a measure of material 
well-being only if it was similar everywhere and 
was not likely to change. But the size of the in-
formal economy relative to the formal economy 
may change considerably over time, fuelled by 
climate change, globalization, and other socio-
economic forces. Ignoring subsistence is more 
significant for the indigenous part of the popu-
lation than the non-indigenous population. 
It would be a relatively costly undertaking to 
construct an indicator of subsistence harvest, 
however. The range of types of subsistence food 
vary considerably throughout the Arctic and, 
thus, obtaining a measure of this indicator that 
enables comparison across space and time, per-
haps based on the weight of subsistence, would 
not be straightforward. Data do not exist or are 
not readily available from official statistics in 
many places. Subsistence data may have to be 
developed through surveys, although the SLiCA 
survey does provide some data on indigenous 
households for the regions of Canada, Chuk-
otka, Alaska, and Greenland. These data are 
available for the survey year only. 
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2.2.6 Net Migration 
Migration is a significant demographic force in 
the North. Across the Arctic nations, the North 
is primarily a sending region; that is, more 
people leave northern regions than move there. 
Migration affects the number of people living 
in a region. It also influences the demographic 
structure of a place, since the propensity to 
migrate differs across demographic groups 
(Hamilton and Seyfrit, 1994). The pattern of 
migration can provide indirect information 
about the relative well-being that a place pro-
vides. 
Generally, people move so that they are 
better off (Sjaastad, 1962). Sometimes a move is 
for a short period of time to secure training or 
education; this human capital investment allows 
the migrant to return home to improved job 
prospects. Most long-term moves are likely 
because the move provides a higher level of 
well-being through improved job opportunities 
and/or higher wages. Well-being might also 
be improved if the move offers an increase 
in quality of life, better schools, less crime, or 
better weather (Roback, 1982). As well, the 
relative productivity of traditional activity in 
different places will affect the pattern of migra-
tion. 
Net migration is the difference between the 
number of people moving into a place and the 
number moving out. The net migration rate of 
a particular place is calculated by dividing net 
migration by the population of the place at the 
beginning of the period. Comparing the rate of 
net migration between different places allows a 
rough estimate of relative well-being. Migration 
also has a time dimension however; movement 
needs to be measured over some period of 
years. Places with relatively higher rates of net 
migration can be thought to offer greater op-
portunities to improve well-being. 
There are three limitations to the use of net 
migration rates as a measure of relative well-
being. First, migration will be influenced by 
more than relative opportunities; past migra-
tion will affect the pattern of migration. For ex-
ample, places with historic high out migration 
may have relatively higher return migration. 
Migration will also be affected by the costs of 
moving, which include both monetary and 
social costs. For example, it may be difficult for 
a person to move out of a poor region if he or 
she does not have the resources to finance the 
move. In such a case, out migration from places 
with little economic opportunity may be limit-
ed. These factors may limit the direct relation 
between migration and place well-being. 
The second limitation is the quality of the 
data. A common problem with measures of 
relative well-being starts with the collection of 
data, which varies from country to country 
(Lucas, 1997; Lall et al., 2006). Migration infor-
mation may be available only for broad regions 
limiting the geographic scale, which can be 
assessed. Regional data can mask important in-
traregional movement; not all communities in a 
region are alike. Migration information may 
also be collected at different points in time, and 
time is important if we want to distinguish per-
manent moves from shorter term commuting. 
The final limitation to using net migration as 
a measure of relative well-being is the difference 
in migration propensity across demographic 
groups. For example, younger people and more 
educated people are more likely to move to take 
advantage of greater opportunities. In other 
words, because of the difference in propensity, 
a high net migration may simply reflect a young-
er demography, rather than what we would like 
it to reflect (that higher net migration reflects 
higher material well-being). If everything else is 
the same, there are likely to be higher rates of 
out-migration in places with a relatively young-
er population. 
Despite these limitations, net migration offers 
one possible method of assessing well-being 
across the Arctic. It does not have to be meas-
ured directly; it can be estimated whenever 
there are good records of births, deaths, and 
total population, and most countries keep ade-
quate records of these statistics. Any changes in 
population after the effects of natural increase 
(i.e., births and deaths) have been accounted 
for are a result of net migration. By using net 
migration rates, we can standardize compari-
sons of regions of different sizes. Standardizing 
the time periods examined will also be an im-
portant step in using net migration as a measure 
of well-being. Given these caveats, places with 
relatively higher rates of net migration can be 
thought to offer greater opportunities to im-
prove well-being.
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3.0 Selected indicators of Material 
Well-being for the Arctic
All traditional indicators of material well-being 
suffer when facing the demands for use in the 
Arctic. Consequently, we suggest a series of in-
dicators that can be compared across time and 
place. The goal of this comparison is to deter-
mine if simpler and easier measures, such as 
per capita household income, provide a useful 
picture of the Arctic across time and region. A 
good and more holistic set of material well-
being indicators would include attention to the 
three sectors of the Arctic economy: formal, in-
formal, and transfer. We propose three indi-
cators of material well-being that we argue hold 
particular promise for the Arctic, plus a com-
posite indicator that accounts for all three sect-
ors. Each of the three indicators (per capita 
household income, net migration, and subsist-
ence harvest per person) would leave us with an 
incomplete picture of material well-being in the 
North. The composite indicator provides an 
alternative solution to the dilemma of pinpoint-
ing only one indicator of material well-being. 
3.1 Per Capita Household Income 
An indicator of per capital household income 
performs well based on a range of selection cri-
teria, including affordability in terms of time 
and resources and data availability. However, 
one important limitation with this income indi-
cator is that it ignores both direct services pur-
chased with public transfers and production in 
the traditional economy. As we have discussed, 
any measure that ignores these factors leaves 
us with an indicator of minimum material 
well-being. On the other hand, one particular 
strength of this indicator is that it provides a 
more accurate estimate of income in the North 
than does the standard measure of GDP. (Note 
that per capita household income is a tier 1 
indicator; an indicator that can be measured 
using existing data – see Table 3.1).
3.2 Net Migration
Although the net migration indicator has sev-
eral weaknesses, it scores high on selection cri-
teria and would be reasonably easy to measure 
– an important criterion to meet. It is robust 
and makes for easy comparison across scales, 
Notes:  Tier 1: based on existing published data
 Tier 2: data that would be produced by special tabulations from existing unpublished data
 Tier 3: would require primary data collection
Table 3.1: Matrix for Material Well-being
Indicator  Data  Data  Ease of  Internal  Robustness            Scalability             Inclusiv-
 Availability  Cost  measurement  Validity    eness
Per Capita Gross Domestic  Tier 2  Medium  High  Low  High Region  No
Product
Per Capita Household Income  Tier 1  Low  High  High  High  Household  No
      through Region
Unemployment Rate  Tier 1  Low  High  Low  Medium  Household  No
      through Region
Poverty Rate  Tier 1  Low  High  Low  Medium  Household  No
      through Region
Subsistence Harvest (weight)  Tier 3  High  High  High  High  Household  No 
      through Region
Net-migration Rate  Tier 1 or 2 Low  High  Medium  Medium  Community  Yes
      and Region
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time, and regions. As long as we assume the cost 
of moving is similar for all people, it is appli-
cable to both indigenous and non-indigenous 
inhabitants. While this is a broad assumption 
to make, this indicator still has attraction. 
On balance it fares better than several more 
standard measures of material well-being and 
can therefore be considered as a possible alter-
native indicator. (This is a tier 1 or tier 2 indi-
cator – see Table 3.1.)
3.3 Subsistence Harvest per Person
The value of subsistence harvest consumed is 
an indicator that we recognize as critical to 
the economy of the Arctic. At the same time, we 
argue it cannot stand alone as an indicator of 
material well-being, and that serious data and 
measuring issues need to be addressed before 
such an indicator can be relied on for an accept-
able proxy. (This is a tier 3 indicator, one that 
would require primary data collection, and 
hence cannot be measured until primary data 
becomes available – see Table 3.1.)
3.4 A Composite Index
The Arctic economy affects well-being through 
the formal sector, the informal sector, and the 
transfer sector. Personal or household income 
addresses many of the special considerations of 
the Arctic economy. It includes only income 
received by residents of the region. Returns to 
capital, payments to higher levels of govern-
ment, and earnings of workers from outside the 
region are not included in household or person-
al income. Personal or household income has 
the benefit of including that portion of the 
transfer economy that goes directly to individ-
uals through wages on government jobs or 
income support payments. 
A composite indicator could add a measure 
of subsistence or traditional harvest to incorpo-
rate the real income earned in that sector. A 
household’s material well-being in the North is 
affected both by what it earns and what it har-
vests for consumption or sharing. There is cur-
rently no good universal measure of harvest that 
is regularly available. If one could be developed 
through survey or some other means, it could 
be added to the household or personal money 
income for an estimate of real income. The pri-
mary theoretical challenge for constructing 
such a composite would be how to weigh the 
two components of the index. One approach 
would be to put the subsistence harvest in 
money terms with a “price of subsistence 
foods.” If subsistence harvest were perfect sub-
stitutes for store-bought food, an average meat 
price in the region might be used. In some 
regions subsistence harvests are sold, which 
would provide an accurate price for weight-
Producing tents for 
summer camps in Fort 
McPherson, NWT, 
Canada. 
Photo: Rasmus Ole 
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ing the marginal harvest. The choice of a 
weight should be based on serious analytical 
effort.
One element left out of this composite is the 
indirect effects of the transfer economy on 
material well-being. In many parts of the Arctic, 
government provides goods and services at low-
er than the actual cost. These government goods 
and services are part of the indirect portion of 
the transfer economy. Government subsidies 
for housing or utilities or transportation fit into 
this part of the transfer sector. Constructing an 
indicator for this part of the transfer sector, 
which is relevant across the wide variety of 
social systems found in the Arctic, will be dif-
ficult. Per capita spending by higher levels of 
government may be one way to capture the in-
direct effects of the transfer economy. However, 
this will double count some spending since jobs 
and income support payments would also be 
included. 
Further research is necessary to determine 
the best approach to measuring this component 
of local material well-being. A composite indi-
cator will be needed to fully capture all of the 
factors that affect material well-being in the 
Arctic, and such a composite would require the 
collection of primary data for subsistence har-
vest and likely reformulation of government 
data to measure the indirect component of 
transfers.
Table 3.1 provides a brief summary of how 
key indicators fare against selection criteria, and 
it illustrates the genuine dilemma of suggesting 
an indicator for material well-being in the 
Arctic. The most efficient, consistent, and ro-
bust measure of material well-being is a direct 
measure of local income, such as per capita or 
household income. But such a measure ignores 
the transfer and traditional economies − signi-
ficant components of the Arctic economy and 
that contribute to material well-being. Com-
posite indices, which might reflect the contribu-
tions of these sectors, also have problems, 
including challenges with obtaining data and 
the choice of appropriate representative com-
ponents and weights. 
Ideally, the indicator of choice should be 
available on a variety of scales and across the 
circumpolar region, and should enable cross-
Honningsvåg harbour, 
on the island Magerøya in 
Finnmark, Norway, 2009. 
Photo: Jón Haukur 
Ingimundarson
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regional comparisons and ongoing monitoring 
of human development. Unfortunately, the per-
fect indicator may be too costly to construct. In 
selecting the appropriate indicator we need to 
balance the information it provides with the 
cost of constructing it. As in the case of other 
indicators of human development in the Arctic, 
we face important trade-offs in devising the 
material well-being indicators. Compromises 
will need to be made to achieve good indicators 
that are obtainable at a reasonable cost in terms 
of time and resources, and these may be made 
at the cost of constructing an ideal yet probably 
unattainable indicator. 
Based on selection criteria, including data 
availability and affordability in terms of time 
and resources, we recommend two indicators of 
material well-being: one that cannot be meas-
ured and implemented until primary data col-
lection becomes available (a tier 3 indicator), 
and one that can be readily applied now using 
existing data (a tier 1 indicator).
Setting aside for a moment some challenging 
data issues, a fair and reasonable measure of 
material well-being in the Arctic must consider 
all three aspects of the Arctic economy: formal, 
informal, and transfer. This can be achieved by 
creating a composite index that accounts for all 
three sectors as proposed. For those who seek 
only a single indicator of material well-being, 
the composite indicator provides an option, 
albeit as a tier 3 indicator (i.e., one that requires 
primary data collection, and hence cannot be 
measured until such data become available). 
The composite indicator is attractive because it 
includes three individual indicators, each repre-
senting one of the three main sectors of the 
Arctic economy. On the other hand, it is cur-
rently too costly to measure, and the definitions 
of representative components are yet to be 
worked out. 
Based on affordability and existing data 
availability, the recommended indicator is per 
capita household income. In recommending 
this indicator we have had to accept an import-
ant trade-off: while the indicator is already 
broadly accepted as a standard measure of well-
being (which we have argued has certain 
strengths over GDP), and it is affordable in 
terms of time and resources and unambiguous 
and robust over space and time, it comes at the 
high cost of excluding the contribution made to 
material well-being by the subsistence and 
transfer sectors of the Arctic economy. The 
primary challenge in the use of per capita 
household income will be developing a means 
of adjusting this indicator for price differ-
ences between time periods and across reg-
ions.
4.0 Concluding Comments
The Arctic economy can be divided into essen-
tially three parts: the formal economy, the infor-
mal economy, and the transfer sector. The for-
mal economy is characterized by the dominance 
of the primary sector in the industrial economy, 
with significant large-scale natural resource ex-
ploitation activities. In some cases the transfer 
sector is sizeable; some northern local govern-
ments are highly dependent on the annual trans-
fers from central governments. Most northern 
residents also rely on the traditional or subsist-
ence-based sector to provide for some of their 
material well-being. 
GDP is a widely used indicator of material 
well-being. GDP, however, has a number of 
weaknesses. The exclusion of the informal eco-
nomy is a major weakness considering the im-
portance of informal activities in many parts of 
the Arctic. In constructing indicators on mat-
erial well-being, we have sought indicators that 
not only perform well against a set of chosen 
criteria, but that also address this shortcoming 
of the tendency to exclude the contribution of 
the informal economy in measures of material 
well-being.
If we had to choose one indicator,  a compos-
ite indicator that includes representative indi-
cators reflecting all three main parts of the 
Arctic economy holds promise. This indicator, 
however, has significant challenges: the details 
of its construction, the difficulties of measuring 
the contribution made by subsistence and trans-
fers, and the difficulty of obtaining accurate and 
regular data on subsistence harvest. An indi-
cator of per capita household income over-
comes some of the difficulties plaguing the 
composite indicator, but its failure to include 
the subsistence and transfer sectors must be 
recognized. A compromise to consider in future 
research is to construct a composite indicator 
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that accounts for only household income and 
subsistence.
All traditional indicators of material well-
being suffer when facing the demands for use 
in the Arctic. Until more data become available, 
including new approaches to primary data col-
lection, any attempt to measure and track mat-
erial well-being in the Arctic is incomplete. 
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1.0 Introduction
Education is often emphasized as a key field of 
concern when unfolding the concept of devel-
opment in connection with the identification of 
key social relations of ongoing changes in the 
Arctic. For many the question of access to edu-
cation is perceived as a key indicator of human 
development as it contributes to the accumula-
tion of human capital. Equally important, how-
ever, is the content of education, including how 
well it fulfills different levels of needs − local, 
regional, national, and global − and thereby 
contributes to the role that the social capital 
may have in a specific setting. 
1.1 The Concept of Education 
Education is not a neutral enterprise. Embedded 
in the educational process is the promotion of 
skills, values, history, languages, and ways 
of thinking and behaving (AHDR, 2004). It 
is most apparent in its institutional form as 
schools, described as a formalized process 
whereby nations perpetuate their values and 
beliefs from one generation to the next, includ-
ing science, art, sport, and other facets of cul-
ture. In this context, local and regional human 
capital needs are involved in the broader con-
text of national needs and globalizing factors, 
where each of the circumpolar states has a vest-
ed interest in education. 
It is often emphasized how many Arctic resi-
dents have a highly sophisticated grasp of 
matters important to their well-being, but that 
their knowledge often does not translate into 
high scores in terms of adult literacy and gross 
school enrollments (AHDR, 2004). Further, 
when looking into goals and methods, it be-
comes clear that neither state and regional 
authorities nor Arctic residents share equally 
the authority for education policies. As a con-
sequence, the present characteristics of the 
formal educational systems in the North reflect 
differences in approaches to the status of, and 
changes in, the societal and cultural goals 
(Darnell and Hoëm,  1996). A challenge, there-
fore, is to develop an indicator that is able to 
transcend these differences and still maintain its 
validity.
1.2 Education for Whom?
It is generally emphasized how education has a 
leading role to play in economic and social 
development. For instance, Oxaal (1997) notes 
the ways in which development leads to the 
reduction of poverty, thereby generating the
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social surplus needed for communities to take 
charge in the development process. Both 
human capital and correspondence theories 
imply that an effective anti-poverty strategy 
should incorporate the enhancement of edu-
cation and skills among households, as there 
seems to be significant linkages between pov-
erty and education. At the macro level, enroll-
ment correlates with the Gross National Pro-
duct; at the micro level, poor children, particul-
arly girls, are traditionally less likely to enroll. 
Poverty is both a barrier to education and an 
outcome of the lack of education. Further, pov-
erty alleviation and gender equality strategies 
focusing on investment in education greatly de-
pend on government action, first and foremost 
in relation to financing (Checchi, 2003). 
Psacharopoulos (1988) stresses that the link 
between education and development is com-
plex, arguing the need to distinguish between 
“external efficiency of education“ (direct link 
between school participation and occupational 
attainment) and “internal efficiency of educa-
tion“ (linkages between family background, 
schooling, and learning outcomes). There is 
clearly a variety of effects of education in im-
proving individual productivity, not only in the 
marketplace, but also in the household. In 
simple economic terms there seems to be a 
trade-off between low immediate earnings and 
higher future earnings following additional 
education. 
Government spending on upper secondary 
and higher levels of education very often favors 
well-off populations, while public spending on 
primary and lower levels of education largely 
benefits the poor (Demery, 1996). Rural areas, 
and especially minority areas, are generally ex-
posed to lower input in relation to education, 
which may lead to policy that is biased toward 
urban life as background for education. 
Compared with the level of social expenditure 
in cities, rural areas generally receive far less 
attention and allocation of resources. 
The experience in northern Canada, where 
there are concerns for minority development, 
particularly in relation to the fields of social 
justice and economic equity, highlights this 
point. Over the years Canadian minority groups 
have faced a number of problems related to the 
modernization/urbanization process, including 
an increased risk of assimilation in urban areas 
and the loss of community vitality (Cao and 
Dehoorne, 2002; Cao, Chouinard, Dehoorne, 
2005). In response, Canada has been imple-
menting a political, legal, and social system in 
which minority interests and socioeconomic 
needs, such as those of francophone, Acadian, 
and Aboriginal populations, have been repre-
sented. This has met with some success, al-
though there is some debate about whether the 
efforts have been sufficient. 
Better socioeconomic and political accom-
modation for minority groups, nevertheless, has 
contributed to the overall well-being of society 
and the sustainability of economic growth. 
Parallels to the Canadian model are found in 
other parts of the Arctic (Seyfrit et al., 1997; 
Friedel, 1999; Language and Culture, 1985), but 
do not necessarily encompass the generation 
and gender differences in preferences and per-
spectives in relation to development (Warr-
en et al., 1995; Rasmussen, 2008). In this con-
text, it has been shown how countries − but also 
communities − have different approaches to 
formalized educational systems of states and 
territories/provinces, demonstrating a range of 
positive experiences (AHDR, 2004).
It seems that some Arctic countries follow the 
international trend of increased central control, 
whereas others increasingly recognize the need 
for more local control. A proper indicator, 
therefore, should reflect the tension between 
local and central control across the Arctic and 
how it has affected the direction and quality 
of northern education. As well, it should be 
emphasized that there are marked differences 
in perceptions of what is considered “the good 
life“ and “development perspectives“ among 
youth in the late 20th century compared with 
youth in the beginning of the 21st century 
(Rasmussen, 2008). 
1.3 Education—for What and How? 
Human capital theory states that education pro-
vides the necessary skills for a higher level of 
productivity among people in both the market-
place and the household (Brock and Cammish, 
1991). In support of human capital theory, it 
has been documented that primary education in 
particular increases productivity while simul-
taneously improving people‘s earnings. Whether 
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education enhances personal abilities or simply 
identifies talent − as suggested by the “screen-
ing“ theory − it has been shown that not only is 
each additional year of education associated 
with higher earnings and better opportunities, 
but also that educated women are able to 
manage their lives better (e.g., fertility control) 
and thus have some measure of control over the 
family‘s financial situation (Oxaal, 1997).
Control of one‘s own destiny, cultural con-
tinuity, and contact with nature are elements for 
which one indicator could be the level of indig-
enous languages spoken in schools. And, as 
emphasized by the AHDR, the content of the 
education is a significant tool for maintaining 
and renewing the formal skills that are needed 
in order to be in control. But more is needed, 
as  the outcome of the learning process is influ-
enced by the conditions under which learning 
takes place. School instruction using cultural 
practices in combination with activities outside 
the formal school setting, therefore, needs to be 
included as well and should be pinpointed 
when we characterize the educational system. 
Otherwise the development process may be a 
continuation of the process of “difference blind-
ness“ where ignoring the importance of the 
whole context of the learning environment 
leads to the loss of many rare languages and im-
portant elements of indigenous cultures. This 
understanding fully complies with the general 
recognition that learning is influenced by the 
environment in which the learning is taking 
place, and that knowledge, like other resources, 
is localized.
The mental process of learning is not separa-
ble from the physical process of doing, and as 
the physical process is situated, so also is learn-
ing (Dewey, 1938). This characteristic of knowl-
edge becomes very clear when different knowl-
edge systems are confronted because different 
conditions for acquiring knowledge create 
different ways of both perceiving and knowing. 
The situated characteristic of learning influenc-
es how different knowledge systems interact 
and, to the extent possible, how the local 
agenda is connected to the global agenda, and 
vice versa. The term “situated knowledge“ 
emphasizes that the acquisition of knowledge is 
influenced or determined by the specific condi-
tions characterizing the acquisition process. It 
also stresses that the conditions of knowledge 
acquisition and the level of generalization 
should be considered, whether these are link-
ed to ethnicity, culture, vocation, gender, or 
other specific conditions (Lave, 1988; Lave 
and Wenger, 1995), as well as through the 
foundations of knowledge in everyday life 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966).
In line with this thinking, AHDR (2004) em-
phasizes how researchers have demonstrated 
that student motivation and success increase 
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when teachers make school subjects relevant. A 
significant issue is the balance between local 
and centralized curricula control. The degree of 
autonomy given to each school and the resourc-
es that go along with it vary a great deal. There 
is no clear circumpolar trend on how different 
countries strike the balance between standard-
ized curriculum and locally specific content. 
Education is at times seen as an arena in which 
different social groups struggle for influence, 
often in subtle ways. Instead education should 
be an important indicator for human develop-
ment in the circumpolar region.
A key issue is empowerment. On one hand, 
empowerment of individuals enables a propor-
tion of students to continue past primary school 
to secondary school graduation and, in some 
cases, beyond to technical colleges and post-
secondary institutions. On the other hand, em-
powerment of the communities enables them to 
react to ongoing changes in a manner where 
education serves both the external and internal 
requirements. As emphasized in the Arctic 
Human Development Report, the most critical 
concerns are for control, relevance, and access 
to education. These three concerns are directly 
impacted by the acknowledgment of distribut-
ed knowledge and the need to adapt education 
services to fit local needs and conditions. “This 
requires a shift from viewing knowledge as a 
standardized commodity to seeing it as a dis-
tributed resource with decentralization of con-
trol and decision making, local adaptations of 
curriculum, and increased use of technology to 
access knowledge from any place at any time 
(i.e., University of the Arctic)“ (AHDR, 2004).
It is important, however, to emphasize that 
empowerment is a multi-dimensional concept 
leading to divergent consequences. An indi-
vidual may be empowered to fulfill an import-
ant function in the community, thereby 
enabling him or her to stay. But that person may 
just as well be empowered to leave the com-
munity, looking for adequate challenges and 
opportunities elsewhere. Education can bring 
“the outside into the community,“ but if the 
social system is not able to accommodate this, 
it may as well lead to “bringing the educated to 
the outside.“ 
Similarly, empowering the community may 
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be biased. The present focus on post-colonial 
measures may on one hand strengthen com-
munities, enabling them in the short term to 
resist the pressure from the outside. These 
measures, however, tend to be less responsive 
to the marked differences in both gender and 
generational factors in relation to development, 
which is clearly indicated in contemporary ana-
lysis of ongoing demographic changes (Rasmus-
sen, 2008; Rauhut et al., 2008). Consequently, 
it is important to be aware of these changes in 
order to enable the indicator to be responsive 
to future development trends.
1.4 Framing the Situation
An indicator − or a set of indicators − should 
be able to fulfill two goals. First, it should be 
able to be generated effectively, and second, it 
should reflect the purpose of its use. Some gen-
eral considerations of the concept of reflection 
have been outlined above, but note also that an 
indicator should relate to the present status of 
the communities and their social and edu-
cational status. 
Possible indicators for education are discuss-
ed in the next section, which is accompanied by 
a number of relevant maps (see Figures 4.1 
to 4.8). 
2.0 Possible Indicators 
of Education
To identify possible education indicators some 
of the key demographic characteristics of Arctic 
communities must be outlined so that we can 
consider the dynamics that will affect the basis 
of education in the future. Three issues to 
reflect on are changes occurring in age struct-
ure, the ratio of females to males, and the 
indigenous and non-indigenous population 
characteristics. 
2.1 Age Structure 
The proportion of the population in the 0 to 15 
year age group (see Figure 4.1) is an important 
consideration for future demands on both 
education opportunities and on the provision of 
skills and knowledge needed for future deve-
lopment in the North. The demands will be not 
only on offering high-quality skills training, 
but also on quantity of education and training 
required. 
Until recently, the Arctic has generally been 
characterized by a high reproduction rate 
accompanied by a relatively high death rate, re-
flected in a pyramid-shaped population distri-
bution with a large base (i.e., higher proportion 
of children and young persons). This pattern, 
however, has been undergoing marked changes 
during the last decades and especially the last 
10 years. A considerably higher life expectancy 
and a marked reduction in the reproduction 
rate accompanied by a relatively high outmigra-
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tion rate has become visible in the age group 
distribution, opening up the possibility of a 
future shortage in the labor force, especially 
among skilled workers. An important conse-
quence to this change has been a relative reduc-
tion in number of persons in the active working 
age group of 15 to 65 (see Figure 4.2) and a 
marked increase in the dependency ratio (i.e., 
the relationship between number of dependent 
persons − pensioners and children − and num-
ber of persons in the active working age 
range). 
2.2 Ratio of Females to Males 
Comparative research from a number of north-
ern regions (Alaska, Greenland, the Faroe 
Islands, Newfoundland, and Iceland) indicates 
very similar patterns regarding affinity to rural 
community life. Compared with males, more 
females migrate permanently away from their 
home community and region, first to look for 
job opportunities that better fit their qualifica-
tions, and also to provide opportunities outside 
traditional economic activities in these com-
munities (Hamilton, 2003; Hamilton and Butler, 
2001; Hamilton, Haedrich, and Duncan, 2004; 
Hamilton and Otterstad, 1998; Hamilton and 
Seyfrit, 1994; Rasmussen, 2005). A consequence 
of this trend is a distorted female-to-male ratio; 
that is, compared with national averages, there 
Fig 4.1
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are substantially fewer females than males (see 
Figure 4.3). In some regions, the ratio is as low 
as 70 females to 100 males.
This change reflects a general pattern that has 
emerged in the context of the decline of the 
primary sector as an economic base and the 
growth of the service sector and increased 
emphasis on technology − a pattern that funda-
mentally affects women. Under these condi-
tions, women tend to experience negative short-
term and long-term consequences in terms of 
careers, earnings, and pensions, all of which 
have severe consequences for migration pat-
terns. Consequently, there has been a continu-
ing outmigration of young and well-trained per-
sons from regions that are predominantly 
dependent on primary sector activities. 
The decreasing number of women in rural 
Arctic communities negatively affects both the 
social life and the economy of these regions. 
There are fewer opportunities for marriage, it is 
more difficult to maintain family life and family 
structures, and cultural activities are influenced 
(Hamilton and Seyfrit, 1993; Rasmussen, 2005). 
Furthermore, this situation contributes to the 
deterioration of the institutions of social infra-
structure and to the decline of services of public 
interest, eventually leading to a loss of popula-
tion and observable lower fertility rates, thus 
endangering the medium- to long-term deve-
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lopment of these regions. It has been argued 
that the relatively high number of women 
employed in the service sector represent “an 
escape valve“ away from the traditional rural 
structure based on primary sector activities, 
which has become highly mechanized and 
masculine, toward a new, more diversified 
socioeconomic structure in which women 
participate in and receive both a salary and 
social protection (Garcia and Gonzalez, 2004). 
These patterns can be seen as being connect-
ed to a number of gender-related differences in 
aspirations and approaches to change. The first 
of these is the question of work and work-
related activities and how the perception of 
customary male activities related to renewable 
resource exploitation seems to be “sticky.“ It 
appears that males generally have difficulty in 
moving on from what once were key activities, 
but what now constitute only a minuscule per-
centage of the available jobs. In contrast, 
females in their upbringing have been social-
ized into collective activities and are more 
attentive to the needs of others; consequently, 
they are much more open to change (Rasmussen, 
2007; Hansen, 1992; Petersen, 2002; Nathan-
sen, 2004). As a result, females are less limited 
by specific job characteristics, determined by 
what may be considered as being “traditional“ 
and “acceptable“ activities. In other words, 
Fig 4.3
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males seem to be socialized into a path of de-
pendency, creating difficulties in accepting 
changes, while females tend to be socialized 
into situations where adjustment and change 
are required, leaving them prepared to move 
between job categories and job options. Only 
those jobs that are related to new technology 
offer an alternative that provides status for 
males. Consequently, the adaptation to change 
through the educational system fits much better 
with the socialization of women, despite women 
being constantly underrated and underrepre-
sented in high-ranking positions in both aca-
demia and administrative affairs. 
2.3 Indigenous and Non-indigenous Persons 
in Post-secondary and Tertiary Education
The gender differences discussed above in rela-
tion to using the education system as a means 
of adaptation to change is seen among both in-
digenous and non-indigenous inhabitants. But 
between the two groups there are marked dif-
ferences in enrollment in educational activities. 
There are many and various causes to both 
positive and negative outcomes of establishing, 
recruiting for, and fulfilling higher education 
programs. Cause and effect varies within differ-
ent contexts in the Arctic. These differences can 
be explained by entrance variation, by degrees 
of individual academic and social integration, 
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and by the interplay between the institution and 
the surrounding community (Barnhardt and 
Kawagley, 2004; Hoëm, 1978, 2007; Darnell 
and Hoëm, 1996; Høgmo, 1989; Keskitalo, 
1998). 
It is important to emphasize that an increas-
ing drop-out rate is a common problem outside 
the Arctic as well. Within the OECD member 
states, on average one-third of students do not 
complete tertiary type-A programs (OECD, 
2006). Within the Arctic, somewhat higher 
numbers complete, but the issue of dropping 
out must still be considered a challenge.
There are many examples. As early as the 
mid-1960s, educational research in Saami areas 
in Norway showed evidence that primary 
education was dysfunctional for the Saami 
(Hoëm,1965). Further, it has been emphasized 
that Native American students are more likely 
to drop out of college for non-academic reasons 
than for academic deficiencies (Tierney, 1992; 
Reyhner and Dodd, 1995). Similarly, Statistics 
Iceland has examined the drop-out rate of 
students in tertiary education by comparing the 
Statistics Iceland Student Register with the 
Register of Examinations. The results show that 
from autumn 2002 to autumn 2003 a total of 
2,037 students dropped out of school or took a 
temporary leave from their studies, resulting in 
a drop-out rate of 14.7%. The rate was lower 
among students in day courses and distance 
learning and higher among students in evening 
courses. In addition, the drop-out rate was low-
er among students in full-time study and higher 
among students in part-time study. Similarly, 
drop-out was greater among men than women 
and generally increased with the increasing age 
of the students (Hagtíðindi Skólamál, 2004).   
New statistics from Canada show a dramatic 
increase − 45% in 10 years − in those people 
who identify themselves as belonging to an in-
digenous group. The information also reveals 
that 54% of the country‘s indigenous people 
now live in or near cities. Officials at Statistics 
Canada, which carried out the census, say the 
growth and change in demographics can be 
attributed to a soaring birth rate driven by an 
unusually young population and greater pride 
in Aboriginal heritage (Statistics Canada, 2006). 
An increasingly important factor is the varia-
tion between urban and rural communities, 
ranging from large cities to small villages. And 
the most challenging of the variations is the 
dimension of cultural and linguistic diversity, 
just as the degree of socioeconomic adaptation 
is diverse. Consequently, any formal education 
system aimed at equity and success for everyone 
needs to reflect and respect the totality of the 
interests and values reflected in the background 
of the students. 
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As indicated above, among the most challeng-
ing contexts for recruitment to formal school-
ing in the Arctic are where the economic base 
is a traditional economy such as subsistence, or 
a single primary industry, or a mixed small-
scale economy. Indigenous groups face severe 
challenges finding relevant and reliable solu-
tions for their education needs through main-
stream infrastructures where they have been 
historically under-represented in the ranks of 
college and university graduates in Canada and 
the United States (Barnhardt and Kirkness, 
2001). 
Similar understanding has been emphasized 
by other groups that are left in marginalized 
positions, such as rural and remote area in-
habitants, as well as linguistic and cultural 
minorities generally. But most of all the indig-
enous populations are likely to become marg-
inalized if public and institutional policy re-
garding formal education ignores the need for 
a diverse approach to the forms and values re-
flected in education. In extreme situations, even 
suicide is contemplated as an “escape valve“ 
(Johal, 2008).
Any formal education system that aims at 
founding its base on the contextual and cultur-
al base for human development in the North 
will be confronted with basic processes it needs 
to manage. These include cultural, ethnic, eco-
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nomic, and political processes (Darnell and 
Hoëm, 1996). And as post-secondary edu-
cation, together with research, is considered as 
one important vehicle behind the further devel-
opment of viable societies and communities in 
the North, formal education is generally expect-
ed to strengthen the cultural base for the indi-
vidual, the community, and the nation. 
2.4  Post-secondary Education
Regional differences in the percentage of 
people in the North with post-secondary educa-
tion are illustrated in Figure 4.5 (see also Figure 
4.6 for tertiary education). The circumpolar 
North has been characterized by very differ-
ent historical legacies of post-secondary 
education, leading to a situation where the 
Russian north and the Nordic countries have a 
relatively high proportion of the population 
with post-secondary education, while parts of 
northern Canada and Alaska show a relatively 
low level. While post-secondary education has 
been emphasized as an important tool in both 
regional and minority development in Russia 
and in the Nordic countries, a similar trend has 
been missing or been entered into quite recent-
ly in substantial parts of the North American 
continent. 
This historic background is also reflected in 
the ratio of females to males with post-second-
Fig 4.6 
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ary education (see Figure 4.7) where the regions 
with a longer history of developing educational 
opportunities also show a substantially higher 
proportion of women with post-secondary edu-
cation. In general, however, the marked higher 
share of women compared with men pursuing 
and accomplishing a post-secondary education 
has become a general pattern in the Arctic (see 
also Figure 4.8 on the ratio of females to males 
with tertiary education).
The differences in gender response to the 
question of “better opportunities“ discussed 
above has very much to do with the marked 
changes in patterns of education that have 
taken place during the last 10 to 15 years. The 
pattern shows how women are dominating the 
realm of education in most of the Arctic. By the 
late 1990s women had become a majority group 
in relation to higher education in all regions in 
the Arctic. The only exception is some parts of 
Canada where there is a dominance of males in 
relation to post-secondary education, but this is 
likely because many young women leave the 
communities before they pursue their edu-
cational goals. A similar situation occurs in the 
Faroe Islands, where many of the women tend 
to emigrate, predominantly to Denmark, when 
they finalize their education to pursue a career 
in which they are able to take advantage of their 
acquired skills. This has also been the pattern 
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in Greenland due to a limited acceptance of 
women with higher qualifications, although in 
recent years an increasing number of positions 
requiring higher education have been filled by 
women. 
In communities with a generally high level of 
persons with high and higher education (urban 
areas with one or more higher-education in-
stitutions), female dominance is limited to a few 
percentage points. The high level of dominance 
(i.e., 56% women or higher) appears in mun-
icipalities representing small town and urban 
settings. This dominance occurs in spite of the 
fact that it is in these same communities where 
the highest deficit of women appears. 
2.5 Potential Indicators of Educational Status  
and Changes
A number of potential indicators of education-
al well-being in Arctic communities are out-
lined in Table 4.1. Both input indicators (i.e., 
what enables students to enter the education 
system) and output indicators (i.e., what ena-
bles students to accomplish their studies) are 
highlighted. The table concludes with an over-
view of the overlaps and problems that have 
been considered in the process of identifying 
the chosen indicators.
Fig 4.8
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Table 4.1: Potential Indicators of Educational Well-being in Arctic Communities
Availability of early childhood education programs  Adequacy of school funding
Teacher qualification/licensure requirements  Equity of school funding system
Dependence on outside expertise/imported labor 
for school staff Proportion of school budget used for instruction
Teacher/administrator turnover rates  Housing availability for educators
Cultural orientation programs for new staff  Quality of school facilities
Proportion of local teachers  Proximity of school to home
Grow-your-own programs  Extracurricular opportunities for students
Proportion of Native teachers in relation to proportion 
of Native students  Availability of local employment opportunities
Student-teacher ratio  Access to and use of technology
Level of educational attainment of parents  Age distribution of community population
Educational choices available within schools  
(course/program offerings) and between schools 
(public/private/alternative/charter/magnet etc)  Degree of local participation in educational decision-making 
Availability of curriculum resources and support  Extent of teacher visitation to homes of students
 Degree of parent/community involvement in school 
Availability of professional development opportunities programs/activities
 Attention to safety considerations in school
Availability of specialized support for special needs  Degree of elder involvement in school 
students (specialists)
 
Attention to diverse populations (indigenous,  
language, ethnic, low/high achieving, etc.)  Availability of post-secondary education opportunities
Attention to cultural competence of students  Explicit attention to values in school programs and policies
Evidence of attention to local culture in school
curriculum  Availability of library resources to students/parents
Use of alternative teaching strategies/Native ways 
of knowing  Value placed on literacy in home
Input Indicators
Student attendance rates  Indication of positive adult role models for students in school
 Participation of students in extracurricular
Student graduation rates (by cohort/graduating class)  opportunities
Level of educational attainment of students  Pursuit of post-secondary education opportunities
Student academic performance   Success rate in post-secondary education
School satisfaction rate (proportion of students 
who are home-schooled; degree of community 
outmigration to attend better schools Teen pregnancy rate 
Extent that students see themselves in the curriculum  Adolescent suicide rate
Extent that students exhibit sense of identity, efficacy, 
and pride  Substance abuse rate
 Student use of technology/library resources
Output Indicators
Identified Overlaps and Problem Areas
1.  Review the literature. 
2.  Define the domain.
3.  Briefly pare down indicators from brainstorming list to approximately 10.
4.  Apply criteria to 10, resulting in about 5 to test.
5.  Based on assessment, put forward 1 or 2. 
Education
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Based on this broader spectrum of issues in-
dicated in Table 4.1, a set of indicators has been 
developed, focusing on two sets of require-
ments. On one hand, the indicators should be 
simple, available, repeatable, replicable, and 
comparative. On the other hand, a useful indi-
cator should be able to reflect and indicate 
changes in the problems outlined above (e.g., 
identify the tension between local and central 
control across the Arctic, show how it has af-
fected the direction and quality of northern 
education, etc.). 
3.0 Selected Indicators of 
Education for the Arctic
Three indicators have been identified: 1) the 
proportion of students pursuing post-second-
ary education opportunities; 2) the ratio of stu-
dents successfully completing post-secondary 
education; and 3) the proportion of graduates 
who are still in the community 10 years later. 
These indicators, however, are not separate enti-
ties. Rather, they are progressive and evolution-
ary, with the first and most basic indicator lead-
ing to the second, and eventually to the third. 
3.1 Indicator Rationale
Following the review of the efficacy of the 
potential indicators, we determined that formal 
education at the post-secondary level to be the 
single most salient and comprehensive venue 
for documenting the cumulative effect of all 
forms of education on individual and com-
munity well-being. By focusing on the post-
secondary level, we intend to encompass and 
recognize all forms of educational attainment at 
an advanced level, including the development 
of vocational, technical, and subsistence skills 
and expertise as well as the completion of cer-
tificate and degree programs that benefit the in-
dividual and the community. Such an indicator 
also serves as an indirect measure of the overall 
quality of pre-tertiary educational services, since 
without strong educational support from early 
childhood and on through the elementary and 
secondary schools, post-secondary educational 
attainment is likely to be weak. Thus a high 
post-secondary participation and completion 
rate implies a strong foundation of K–12 edu-
cational preparation.
In addition to the post-secondary participa-
tion and completion rates, we also have includ-
ed a measure of the long-term value of the edu-
cational opportunities that are available in a 
community, to the extent that they contribute 
to long-term livelihood and residency in the 
home community.
3.1.1 Rationale for Indicator 1
Rationale: The proportion of students pursuing 
post-secondary education opportunities
As Arctic communities have taken on increas-
ing responsibility for the day-to-day affairs that 
impact people‘s lives and have asserted self-
determination over areas previously governed 
by outside interests, the need for advanced 
levels of education has grown accordingly. This 
situation, in turn, has led to expanding educa-
tional opportunities to ever higher levels of 
knowledge and expertise, as well as efforts to 
extend those opportunities to an increasingly 
local level through the use of technology, dis-
tance education, and even the development of 
new locally controlled post-secondary institu-
tions in the North (e.g., First Nations institutes 
and tribal colleges).
If we are to make a snapshot assessment of 
the contribution of education to the well-being 
of a community, it must include taking a look 
at the highest levels of educational attainment 
that people are pursuing; anything short of that 
would present an incomplete picture. In so do-
ing, we are able to make assumptions about the 
quality of the complete pipeline of educational 
opportunities, whereas looking at indicators at 
the elementary or secondary levels alone would 
be of limited value in assessing the overall con-
tribution of education to long-term community 
well-being. Thus, obtaining data on the propor-
tion of students from each community pursuing 
some form of post-secondary education lends 
itself to making cross-community and cross-
national comparisons with relative ease and 
accuracy.
Such an indicator would also reflect the level 
of interest on the part of young people to 
pursue educational goals as well as the extent to 
which the community promotes education as 
a means to achieve its own aspirations. Disag-
gregation of such data along gender, ethnicity, 
and occupational lines would provide con-
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siderable additional insights into the role edu-
cation plays in the lives of people and comm-
unities. It would also be useful to determine the 
range of post-secondary educational opportuni-
ties that are available in a community and the 
extent to which people are taking advantage of 
those opportunities. It is possible, for example, 
for extensive opportunities to be available in a 
community but few people taking advantage 
of them because they are poorly matched to 
people‘s needs and aspirations. It is also 
possible that programs are designed and 
offered in such a way that they are attractive to 
outside transient members of the community 
but not to local long-term residents, and thus 
contribute little to long-term community or 
cultural well-being.
Besides having high quality, this indicator has 
other advantages. The data are available for 
limited cost as they are collected at the admin-
istrative level as part of regular registration pro-
cedures in the circumpolar North. While the 
educational structures are quite similar among 
Arctic countries, there are minor differences in 
the national regulations regarding a precise age 
level in determining the shift from secondary to 
post-secondary education activities. These dif-
ferences, however, do not have an impact on a 
comparison of entry level because it is the proc-
ess of movement from one level of the educa-
tional structure to another (not the proportion 
or age level) that is the decisive factor and which 
makes the indicator robust. An important qual-
ity of the proposed indicator is that it includes 
both formalized and non-formalized programs. 
On the other hand, this characteristic also 
creates its only really weak spot as it remains a 
challenge to ensure that programs that are not 
presently formalized and approved be includ-
ed, even if there are only a few involving a 
limited number of participants. 
3.1.2 Rationale for Indicator 2
Rationale: The ratio of students successfully 
completing post-secondary education
It is one thing to attract people into post-
secondary educational opportunities, but that 
in itself is insufficient to determine the contri-
bution education makes to community well-
being. Another question must also be asked: To 
what extent do students who enter a program 
actually complete it? This question is especially 
important in fields where a credential is re-
quired and educational programs lead to a for-
mal certificate or degree. 
Many factors can come into play in determin-
ing whether a student completes a program: 
• Pre-qualifications: Poor preparation, partic-
ularly in basic skills such as reading, writing, 
and math, are likely to have a negative impact 
on completion rates unless efforts are made 
by education providers to help students over-
come such deficiencies in the course of com-
pleting a program.
• Appropriate programs: To achieve high com-
pletion rates, there must be a connection 
between the aspirations and expectations of 
the students and the programs available to 
them. Due to economies of scale, post-
secondary program offerings at the local com-
munity level are often limited, so students 
may end up enrolling in a program just be-
cause it is the only option available, and then 
find that it is not suitable to their needs or 
interests.
• Institutional support: Sponsoring institutions 
need to display commitment and adaptability 
to support students through to graduation. If 
the institution takes a sink-or-swim approach 
with little accommodation to assist students 
in meeting the demands of the program, the 
completion rate is likely to be quite low. This 
factor is especially important with students 
who are the first generation in their family or 
community to pursue post-secondary educa-
tion. Institutions that take an active interest 
in helping students succeed by offering 
targeted support services and reaching out to 
work with students on their own terms will 
see higher completion rates.
Participation in and completion of post-
secondary education opportunities is one sign 
of a healthy community. As such, these factors 
together can serve as a reliable indicator of the 
role of education generally in contributing to 
the well-being of Arctic communities, especial-
ly in small, remote, indigenous communities 
where education can serve as a vehicle not only 
for achieving individual aspirations, but for 
community aspirations as well. Historically, 
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schooling has been used as a tool for assimila-
tion under conditions of colonial rule. This role 
is gradually giving way as indigenous people as-
sert their inherent rights of self-determination 
and put education to use as a tool for empow-
erment. It is our belief that the education indi-
cators outlined here capture and reflect the 
significance of such a transformation.
As with the first indicator, collecting the data 
for the ratio of students successfully completing 
post-secondary education opportunities is not 
difficult. They are part of regular registration 
data and are, therefore, available at relevant ad-
ministrative levels with limited costs. Again, the 
difference between various countries‘ national 
regulations is not a limiting factor for this indi-
cator, and the same limitations apply regarding 
the inclusion of non-formalized activities. 
A problem, however, that should be consid-
ered when comparing the two indicators is the 
potential mobility during the post-secondary 
study activity, such as when a student begins 
studies in one region, but completes the studies 
in another. Two other factors need to be con-
sidered: changes in availability of full programs 
offered, and changes in student aspiration and 
options regarding fulfilling programs in the 
same region as they started. All these factors 
may have an impact on the robustness of this 
indicator and should be included when analyses 
are attempted.
3.1.3 Rationale for Indicator 3
Rationale: The proportion of graduates who are 
still in the community 10 years later
It is of little value to a community to have 
educational opportunities available locally, only 
to see graduates of those programs leave the 
community due to lack of opportunities to 
apply their knowledge and skills or because of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of life in the 
community. Education that leads to a brain 
drain in the community indicates a poor fit 
between the educational services being provid-
ed and the opportunities and aspirations of the 
people and community being served. Thus a 
positive correlation between educational attain-
ment and longevity in the community can serve 
as a measure of the contribution of education 
to community well-being. Specifically, the pro-
portion of post-secondary graduates who 
remain in or return to their home community is 
an indication of several critical conditions:
• The link between educational opportunities 
and local needs/jobs. To remain in the com-
munity presumes that there is a means of 
livelihood available that fulfills the needs and 
aspirations of the post-secondary graduates. 
Presumably the providers of educational serv-
ices are cognizant of the employment needs 
of the community.
• The community‘s ability to respond and adapt 
to new conditions and sustain the quality of life 
required for a broad range of citizenry. It also 
puts upward pressure on the community to 
provide essential services such as education 
and health care at a level commensurate with 
the expectations of its members.
• The individual commitment to community 
well-being. Community retention rates reflect 
how inclined post-secondary graduates are to 
apply the knowledge and skills they have 
acquired in service to the community.
The time frame of 10 years was adopted to 
allow for the many individuals who leave home 
to go to school, to work, or to travel, but even-
tually find their way back to their home com-
munity where they settle and raise their family. 
If such a pattern applies to a particular commu-
nity, it is a sign of a healthy community, and it 
is likely to be evident over a 10-year time 
span. 
This third suggested indicator is by far the 
most difficult to monitor as there is currently no 
general system available to produce this type of 
data. However, data access may be feasible: 
first, several Arctic nations‘ registration systems 
may provide the necessary data and second, a 
question on retention could be included as a 
simple addendum to already existing surveys. 
3.2 Implications of Post-secondary Education 
for Community Well-being
Viable communities in the North traditionally 
have had an informal, sound, and reflected 
adaptive knowledge system. Different concepts 
(local, traditional, indigenous) have been used 
to show that communities have accumulated 
knowledge over generations of living in a parti-
cular environment, encompassing all forms of 
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knowledge − technologies, know-how skills, 
practices, and beliefs − that enable the commu-
nity to achieve stable livelihoods in their envi-
ronment (UNEP, 2008). This situation has al-
lowed groups and whole cultures to survive. 
This knowledge, however, has not traditionally 
been integrated into formal education systems, 
even though it is important for the sustainabil-
ity in local and indigenous communities of the 
circumpolar North and should be recognized as 
an integral part of the formal education. 
For many years the informal system has been 
at risk. The process of modernization and im-
plementation of welfare services may have add-
ed to the economic welfare of the population, 
but also acted as the slow and often invisible 
forces of change. If changes have been bal-
anced, they may have allowed an adaptive proc-
ess, merging the different knowledge systems 
and resulting in a positive outcome. But often 
large-scale resource exploitation has meant 
operations based solely on an imported knowl-
edge base. When such imported systems do 
not coordinate with existing systems, infor-
mal knowledge systems may be forced to yield. 
Most vulnerable to such forced changes are 
groups depending on traditional systems to sur-
vive. Additionally, implanting new knowledge 
systems tends, in the long run, to replace tradi-
tional systems without acknowledging the need 
for flexible and adaptive local solutions. 
When considering the effects of formal 
schooling in general, and post-secondary edu-
cation in particular, there is a need to distin-
guish between what may be considered a suc-
cess for the individual alone and what is needed 
to build sustainable and viable communities. It 
is also important to examine post-secondary 
challenges in the North in the context of the 
most significant features of the Arctic and sub-
Arctic regions. These would be small and scat-
tered communities of indigenous populations 
for which the area is their homeland and that 
exist on traditional economies. There are enor-
mous resources potentially targeted for exploi-
tation in ways that conflict with the traditional 
uses and benefits of the land, resources, and the 
local and the traditional knowledge base. Such 
exploitation often results in increased pressure 
on the indigenous and traditional economies 
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Visit to a reindeer camp 
near Yakutia, Russia, by 
participants in a 2003 
seminar on Circumpolar 
Education. 
Photo: Local resident
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and cultures to become more dependent on im-
ported knowledge production and technology. 
In the long run, this situation can negatively af-
fect the social system and culture of a commu-
nity, and it can undo any possibility of produc-
ing a positive outcome of modernization. 
Formal education must be framed within the 
wider domains of societal change—changes in 
culture, social organization, economy, and 
technology (Hoëm, 1978, 2007; Darnell and 
Hoëm, 1996; Barnhardt and Kawagley, 2004). 
Also important is the interplay of processes 
within and between these domains, their im-
pacts on the potential role of the education 
system, and the changes within the domains 
that happen at a different pace. Change in 
technology appears frequently and with rapid 
progress. Changes within culture and social 
organization occur gradually. In addition, the 
changes that take place occur in diverse ways in 
different societies. The particularity of the 
changes that occur in each society is driven by 
the specificity of the changes within and be-
tween the domains. If the formal education 
system is understood both to serve and to 
manage such processes, it must reflect and be 
based on these realities, be it at a micro level 
related to the local community, or at the macro 
level consisting of a larger regional entity or the 
whole nation-state. Variety needs to be met 
with variety if we are to achieve equity.
Higher education can contribute to a positive 
identity formation for the individual and build 
sound cultural capital for the integration of the 
people into the wider surroundings, based on 
understanding the totality of the individual and 
community needs. Therefore, the social, cultur-
al, political, and economic outcomes are con-
nected to the expectations of a formal educa-
tion system. But, as emphasized by the Saami 
political arena, the education system needs to 
focus on the communities themselves being in 
control of the knowledge and competence 
(Sami Parliament Council Political Program, 
2006-2009). Such local and regional knowledge 
production provides an opportunity to build a 
bridge of legitimacy between school and socie-
ty. Such a bridge must be manufactured to also 
accommodate knowledge exchange allowing a 
two-way lane. That is, there should be an ex-
change relationship between the educational 
system and the community, and between the 
local and regional knowledge systems and the 
wider contexts. 
Barnhardt (2005) suggests a similar systemic 
integration between a native knowledge stream 
and a western science knowledge stream. An 
illustration of such an approach is the Sámi 
University College‘s Bachelor in Reindeer 
Husbandry founded on both science-based 
knowledge and traditional knowledge. The 
students learn to identify and analyze those two 
knowledge systems within reindeer husbandry 
locally, nationally, and internationally (www.
samiskhs.no/article.php?id=241). The bridge 
should contain enough lanes to fulfill all expec-
tations, including the cultural and the instru-
mental capacity needs. The cultural expectation 
of the system is that a formal learning journey 
as an activity in itself contributes further to 
building sound, balanced human beings. In its 
broadest sense, such education itself is culture. 
3.3 Implications for Promoting Retention/
Graduation
Retention indicates how well the education 
system is able to hold students as they progress 
through the planned path to graduation. It is a 
measure of whether the system fulfills the ex-
pectations to serve as a vehicle for capacity 
building for the society as well as for adding 
value for the individual student. It contains in-
dications of the degree of participation and 
completion at the different levels of the educa-
tion process; a high level of participation and 
completion at post-secondary level (tertiary 
level) is an indication of a high retention rate at 
the elementary and secondary as well as at the 
post-secondary level. 
Policies promoting retention based on this 
view contain a systematic approach to address-
ing retention problems for different stages of 
the education process. As such, the retention/
graduation rate is an indication of both student 
and institutional performance. However, an 
understanding of the causes and the effects of 
the rate requires contextualized knowledge and 
understanding of the local situation. Dropping 
out is usually interpreted as a failure of the 
individual student, but by extension it also 
tends to be explained and generalized to reflect 
patterns of whole groups. For example, stu-
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dents from low socioeconomic backgrounds are 
often identified as “at risk,“ as are students 
from rural and isolated areas, and ethnic, indig-
enous, and linguistic minority groups. 
The traditional way of measuring educational 
retention is to determine the proportion of 
those who start a program and continue until 
they have completed it. However, these meas-
ures can easily be distorted by defining reten-
tion in reference to semester-by-semester or 
year-by-year completion rates. Given the high 
dropout/low retention rates associated with 
some programs and certain student popula-
tions, it is important to focus on final gradua-
tion figures for a cohort of students to get an 
accurate picture of program success based on 
actual completion.
Community well-being can be tied to post-
secondary success in different ways. Viable 
communities need access to a certain kind of 
public service that highly depends on profes-
sionally trained people. A workforce skilled 
both in their profession and trained to work 
appropriately in the linguistic and cultural 
setting is an incitement for community well-be-
ing. Viable communities will also foster candi-
dates for higher education and contribute to a 
varied and diverse workforce for the future.
In the international literature (see for exam-
ple Braxton, 2000) it is usual to distinguish 
between academic factors and non-academic 
factors, and the social integration of students 
into the college and university community. 
Findings suggest that retention programs that 
focus primarily on helping students master 
course content alone may only address immedi-
ate rather than longer-term deficiencies. Stu-
dents who master course content but fail to 
develop adequate academic self-confidence, 
academic goals, institutional commitment, 
achievement motivation, and social support and 
involvement may still be at risk of dropping out. 
As indicated by these examples there are many 
possible ways to focus on student retention, 
which must also be understood in the wider 
context, covering macro and micro measures, 
to increase student recruitment and fulfillment 
from groups that have not had the tradition of 
post-secondary education.
In the high Arctic the pattern historically has 
been that accessing post-secondary education 
meant exporting the potential future intellec-
tual capacity from the North to higher educa-
tion in the south. Where there were candidates 
for higher education, the tendency was for the 
individual to leave the community and submit 
to a cultural makeover, in many cases not to re-
turn with the achieved professional skills that 
could have been of value to the community. 
This indicates challenges both at the individual 
level and at the institutional level, as illustrated 
by Barnhardt and Kirkness (2001) who empha-
size that from an institutional perspective, the 
problem has been typically defined in terms of 
low achievement, high attrition, poor retention, 
weak persistence, etc., thus placing the onus for 
adjustment on the student. Seen from the per-
spective of indigenous students, however, the 
problem is often cast in more human terms, 
with an emphasis on the need for a higher edu-
cational system that respects them for who they 
are, that is relevant to their view of the world, 
that offers reciprocity in their relationships with 
others, and that helps them exercise responsi-
bility over their own lives.
There are existing post-secondary institutions 
in the Arctic that either by campus or program 
location and/or through adapted delivery 
systems try to improve accessibility. The 
University of the Arctic (UArctic), an umbrella 
organization of more than 100 universities and 
colleges in the circumpolar North, has improved 
accessibility to programs through exchange op-
portunities and distant delivery of courses. As 
of 2008 UArctic is moving into a next stage by 
revising its strategic plan focusing on critical 
future challenges in the North for the members 
to solve through joint efforts. Its member insti-
tutions have committed to join the UArctic 
charter and the UArctic value system, which 
also include accessibility increase.
Possible examples of post-secondary edu-
cation policies that address cultural differences, 
particularly for indigenous peoples, may be 
found in many of the Arctic regions. There are 
also some small but rather specialized colleges 
featuring a distinct linguistic and cultural pro-
file. There are university campuses with re-
search centers that focus especially on indige-
nous research and programs, and training cent-
ers that are tied into university- and college-
level delivery programs. The current systems 
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also contain different kinds of post-secondary 
program delivery, ranging from combinations 
of flexible teaching/learning platforms to tradi-
tional classroom-delivered courses. 
There are no current data on the degree to 
which the faculty composite of the programs 
linguistically and culturally is able to match the 
rather diverse student body of indigenous 
peoples of the North. Still, the existing system 
of post-secondary education is fighting severe 
challenges.
4.0 Concluding Comments 
Table 4.2 below summarizes the main questions 
in relation to accessibility and generalization of 
the suggested indicators. The first two indica-
tors are highly accessible, affordable, and easy 
to access; the third is possible to generate. It 
would, therefore, be possible to provide not 
only updated and comparable data, but also to 
ensure future access that may provide an excel-
lent tool to monitor state-of-the-art situations 
and provide time series for analyses that would 
be important in connection with future policy 
measures. 
By means of the three indicators outlined 
above, we are able to provide a rather precise 
indicator of both individual and community 
well-being and responsiveness to contemporary 
challenges and changes. Further, by means of 
status of enrollment in post-secondary educa-
tion, we are able to make assumptions about the 
quality of the complete pipeline of educational 
opportunities and cross-community and cross-
national comparisons with relative ease and 
accuracy, reflecting the level of interest on the 
part of young people to pursue educational 
goals, as well as the extent to which the com-
munity promotes education as a means to 
achieve its own aspirations. 
This information, along with data on comple-
tion rates, indicates the level of pre-qualifica-
tions a student has acquired prior to entering a 
program as well as the individual and commu-
nity measures to help students overcome such 
deficiencies in the course of completing a pro-
gram. Completion rates also provide a measure 
of the extent to which there is a connection be-
tween the aspirations and expectations of the 
students and the kind of programs that are 
readily available to them, just as it is a reflection 
of commitment and adaptability on the part of 
sponsoring institutions to support students 
through to graduation. As discussed above, 
participation in and completion of post-second-
ary education opportunities can be seen as one 
sign of a healthy community, and as such can 
serve as a reliable indicator of the role of edu-
cation generally in contributing to the well-
being of Arctic communities. 
Finally, the return rate is an indication of a 
link between educational opportunities and 
local needs/jobs. It is an indication of the com-
munity‘s ability to respond and adapt to new 
conditions and sustain the quality of life 
       •  1 − scalable to individual; 2 − scalable to household; 3 − scalable to community; 4 − scalable to region; 5 − scalable to country
Note: Parenthetical numbers in the Scalability column indicate some uncertainties. The question mark in the Data Affordability column indicates that data   
 might be generated at very high costs.
Table 4.2: Education Indicator Matrix
  Data  Data  Ease of  Robustness  Scalability•      Inclusiveness
Indicator Availability  Affordability  Measurement     
Rationale for Indicator 1:   Tier 1  3  High  3  (1, 2)  3
The proportion of students      3-5
pursuing post-secondary 
education opportunities
Rationale for Indicator 2:   Tier 2  3  High  (3)  (1, 2)  3
The ratio of students      3-5
successfully completing 
post-secondary education
Rationale for Indicator 3:  Tier 2/3  3?  Medium  (3)  (1, 2)  3
The proportion of      3-5
graduates who are still in 
the community 10 years 
later
−
−
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required for a broad range of citizenry. It is also 
an indication of individual commitment to com-
munity well-being to the extent that the post-
secondary graduates are inclined to apply the 
knowledge and skills they have acquired in 
service to the community.
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1.0 Introduction 
The Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) project 
domain of cultural well-being or cultural integr-
ity/cultural vitality was formed based on the 
conclusions of the Arctic Human Development 
Report (AHDR). The report concluded that 
“maintaining cultural identity“ was one of three 
dimensions of human development that resi-
dents of the Arctic recognized to be relevant 
over and above the dimensions included in the 
United Nations Human Development Index 
(AHDR, 2004).
Instead of “maintaining cultural identity,“ 
which seems to refer to a conservative notion of 
culture, we considered the notion of “cultural 
integrity,“ defined as the ability of a culture to 
retain fundamental elements over time. This 
focus is relevant because many indigenous cul-
tures have been under siege from intrusive out-
side influences for the past 60 years, and in 
some regions for much longer. An alternative 
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term we considered, “cultural vitality,“ had the 
advantage of encompassing the innovating and 
dynamic aspects of culture without ruling out 
cultural retention over time. In the end, how-
ever, the phrase “cultural well-being“ was 
adopted in reference to mainstream quality-
of-life research. It presents the advantage of 
neutrality with regard to the above-mentioned 
value-laden debate regarding the “traditional“ 
versus “innovative“ aspects of culture.
These remarks underscore the importance of 
defining culture, a concept about which vol-
umes have already been written. For our pur-
poses, the following assumptions served as 
starting points:
• Culture can be seen as sets of rules and 
values shared by a given society.
• Arctic societies are groups ranging from 
co-residents of a settlement to ethnic 
groups and nations.
• Arctic culture refers to shared rules and 
values of these diverse (Arctic) societies 
(AHDR, 2004).
Resulting from our broad definition of cul-
ture is a multidimensional understanding of 
cultural well-being and cultural vitality. We 
identified for our purposes the following 
dimensions of culture:
• Language (its use and retention)
• Knowledge (and its transmission) 
• Communication (including education and 
performance)
• Spirituality, such as religion and ritual
• Sociocultural events and media
• Economic and subsistence practices
• Social organization, institutions, and net-
works
Social science theorists have long ago ac-
knowledged that dimensions of culture such as 
those listed above cannot be mutually exclusive 
as they manifest themselves in “total social 
facts“ (Mauss, 1923-24) that can be apprehend-
ed only through a holistic perspective. Thus, 
some of these dimensions are already being 
addressed, and sometimes better addressed, by 
other ASI domains. This underlines the neces-
sity for all domains to work in concert and in 
close consultation to create synergies and avoid 
overlap.
1.1 The Concept of Cultural Well-being
Given the complexity of the concept of culture, 
the challenge is to determine an appropriate 
indicator of cultural well-being. This is a tre-
mendously difficult task. An indicator is meant 
to monitor social conditions and social change 
(Bauer, 1966). In this domain, the task is to 
identify an indicator that will measure condi-
tions and cultural change over time. It must be 
valid throughout the circumpolar world, for 
long periods of time, and for all peoples. It must 
relate to the phenomenon of culture itself or to 
aspects of northern culture and cultures. 
Any indicator of cultural integrity may not 
apply equally to all societies of the Arctic. The 
greater the degree of self-governance of a 
society, the more we can expect the society to 
pursue what it deems adequate for its cultural 
well-being and for the maintenance of its group 
identity. Self-governance provides no insurance 
against rapid cultural and social change, but it 
may offer a degree of buffering against some of 
its unwanted consequences. Self-governance 
may also allow cultural autonomy to find ex-
pression in domains such as justice, forms of 
governance, and economic development, to 
name but a few.
One way to monitor cultural integrity in the 
many distinct Arctic societies that do not enjoy 
a high degree of self-governance, such as ethnic 
minorities, is to construct a composite indicator 
that accounts for the diverse dimensions of cul-
ture. Whereas expressions of satisfaction (or 
lack of same) with cultural conditions can be 
elicited only through expensive and limited 
surveys, cultural integrity can be evaluated with 
the help of data that are regularly collected by 
national or regional governments, such as infor-
mation on language vitality, and by the ranking 
of local or regional policies and social realities 
that influence levels of cultural integrity.
1.2 Overview of Cultural Well-being in 
 the Arctic
Many of the societies identified in the AHDR, 
such as indigenous, old settler, Métis, and gen-
erally all long-term Arctic residents, have cul-
tures, and sometimes also languages, that are 
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distinct from those of the southerly parts of the 
country they inhabit. The distinctiveness of 
these cultures can be linked to the particular 
ways of life evolved by Arctic peoples to cope 
with living off the land in their demanding 
environment, to the longstanding isolation of 
their remote peripheries, and to the fact that 
many Arctic societies are Aboriginal and have 
been in contact with Western cultures for a 
relatively short period. Cultural integrity and 
associated well-being are unequally distribut-
ed throughout the Arctic today. For some 
societies, it has been and remains an issue 
of cultural survival, a politically loaded express-
ion sufficiently common for it to be evoked 
here. 
The very inclusion of cultural well-being 
among the dimensions of human development 
in the Arctic region stems from the recognition, 
in the chapter “Societies and Cultures“ of 
the Arctic Human Development Report (2004), 
that since World War II some societies have 
been undergoing very rapid changes that have 
acutely affected their cultures and the identities 
of their bearers. Several aspects of encroaching 
modernity drove these transformations. One of 
them was the rush to exploit the non-renewable 
resources of the North, generally with little 
regard for environmental consequences or im-
pacts on indigenous societies. Another was the 
spread of welfare state policies. Directed at 
indigenous peoples, these policies arose from 
paternalistic attempts at social engineering. In 
several countries, the goal was to assimilate the 
indigenous populations, as exemplified by the 
policies of Norwegianization, Russification, or 
Canadianization. In the Soviet Arctic, planned 
social change was based on Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.
Most of the social and cultural changes in the 
post-war era were directed by government 
agencies. Many of them, such as the provision 
of education, health care, and welfare, had 
ethical justifications. Even though some of these 
changes were for the better, the way they were 
imposed led to a loss of control over local affairs 
and over collective and individual destinies. In 
small northern settlements, local people could 
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not escape the impression that they were watch-
ing helplessly while things were being done 
around them and supposedly for them. The 
feelings of estrangement caused by the loss of 
control over changes in turn contributed to 
the rise of social problems, such as suicide, 
violence, law-breaking, and alcohol abuse. 
The decades around the middle of the 20th 
century were for many northern indigenous 
peoples the period in their histories when they 
had the least autonomy and, simultaneously, 
were undergoing the farthest-reaching changes 
they had ever experienced. Later on, with the 
hope of regaining some autonomy, came the 
reaffirmation of identities, cultures, and some-
times also languages. But cultural reaffirmation, 
although it does make reference to roots in the 
past, is not a return to traditions in the sense of 
simply reactivating previously existing customs. 
Rather, it is an active re-creation of culture 
and symbols, whose functions in current con-
texts differ from those they had a few decades 
earlier.
Thus, cultural well-being as an issue of 
human development in the Arctic stems from 
historical developments, some at longer time 
scales, such as the colonization of indigenous 
peoples by southerners, and others at decadal 
scales, such as the enforced march toward mod-
ernization of the late 20th century. Changes of 
the past few decades fostered the degradation 
of the cultural well-being of some societies. In 
this context, the purpose of an indicator should 
be to monitor the return to more satisfactory 
conditions, whatever direction and shape future 
cultures may take. Obviously, cultural well-be-
ing is closely linked with the potential for self-
governance for societies, including minority 
societies within large nations. 
2.0  Possible Cultural Well-being
 Indicators
While the term “culture“ cannot be assigned a 
comprehensive definition, part of the task at 
hand includes identifying one or more indi-
cators, each providing universally intelligible 
measures of cultural wellness across circum-
polar populations. Without making any claims 
about the comprehensiveness of the measures 
recommended for consideration, culture is con-
ceived of here not in a definitional sense, but 
rather as a concept inclusive of several dimen-
sions that could be both easily assessed and 
would represent prominent and universal 
dimensions of the concept of culture. Dimens-
ions of culture most easily assessed are those al-
ready subject to either some sort of measure-
ment by national governments or for which the 
raw data exist in each circumpolar country and 
are publicly accessible.
Deliberations toward identifying an indicator 
combined open discussion, brainstorming, and 
synthesizing ideas around the concept of cul-
ture, its relative importance among various 
circumpolar populations (indigenous or Ab-
original, non-indigenous/Aboriginal, youth, 
religious), the vitality of culture among various 
populations, and the variety of cultures in 
increasingly global and technologically influ-
enced circumpolar areas. Participants in the 
discussions represented a cross-section of social 
science researchers working in Arctic Canada, 
the US, and Greenland. The initial questions 
examined included the following:
• What is meant by culture? 
• What are its dimensions? 
• How can these dimensions be measured? 
• What are the indicators we see in the 
everyday of cultural wellness? 
• What indicators are adopted internation-
ally with respect to cultural wellness 
assessment? 
Initial discussions in a workshop in 2006 
identified key areas for social indicators that 
should be explored. The indicator that emerged 
as the leading contender for cultural well-being 
was the use and retention of language. Partici-
pants agreed that whether indigenous or non-
indigenous, language holds extensive and pro-
found cultural knowledge and functions as a 
link between generations necessary to the prac-
tice and retention of cultures. Participants also 
agreed that language is, in this sense, a facilita-
tor of culture among and between cultural com-
munities (Rushforth, 1981; Rice, 1986).
When considering populations in the circ-
umpolar North, the participants reached a con-
sensus that cultural well-being generally is a 
concern perhaps felt most keenly by minority 
cultures and in particular by those cultures 
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targeted by state policies of cultural assimila-
tion. Examples come to mind such as indigen-
ous peoples whose occupancy and use of lands 
and resources resulted in rights or ownership 
assertion often in the way of state formation or 
capitalist development. Indigenous peoples 
have often been subjected to discrimination, 
oppression, and cultural assimilation, and only 
in recent decades have they begun to recover 
successfully (Maybury-Lewis, 2002). Other 
minority populations include Métis or old settl-
er populations that have developed distinct 
languages, identities, and economic and cultur-
al practices (Ssorin-Chaikov, 2003; Thompson, 
2008). 
Indicator categories were identified that 
could indicate well-being or vitality of culture 
and cultural practices. Dimensions of culture 
could include communication (including edu-
cation and performances), spirituality (religion, 
ritual), sociopolitical and economic practices 
(events, media, subsistence), and social organ-
ization, institutions, and networks. Some of 
these dimensions are among those being 
addressed in other indicator domains, including 
education and fate control.
Part of the value of an indicator for cultural 
well-being is its universal applicability. We 
recognize that no society is of a uniform culture: 
in an increasingly technologically accessible, 
physically mobile, and virtual world, identifying 
an indicator relevant to all ethnic, age, gender, 
and occupational groups within societies poses 
a challenge. Within given cultures, there is also 
often great diversity in understanding tradition-
al versus contemporary cultural practices. Indi-
cators should not emphasize or bestow privi-
lege on certain groups or sectors of a society. 
For example, youth participation in cultural 
activities seems to be higher in those activities 
associated with cultural change, development, 
and transition. In contrast, adults and elders 
tend to gravitate to activities associated with 
cultural preservation and/or transmission. Part-
icipation in cultural activity may also vary along 
gender lines. 
How data might be gathered for potential in-
dicators is another key consideration. Resources 
Cultural well-being and cultural vitality
C
h
ap
ter 5
The strong sense of 
‘belonging‘, especially in 
smaller communities such 
as Siorapaluk in North-
west Greenland, the 
northernmost permanent-
ly inhabited settlement, is 
counter-balanced by gov-
ernment policies, even in 
a self-governed country 
like Greenland, that 
channel public invest-
ments to bigger towns. 
Photo by Yvon Csonka 
in 2007.
96 Arctic Social Indicators
must be available to gather data at the same 
scale and temporal frequency across the 
circumpolar world. This criterion further nar-
rowed the potential suite of indicators: 
• How applicable is it to whole populations 
rather than sectors (i.e., is it something 
that is universal)? 
• How accessible are the data (i.e., are data 
currently being tracked in all regions/
countries in forms that can be converted 
to meaningful aggregate data)?
• How generalized are the phenomena (i.e., 
tracking language retention rates is more 
easily done than tracking spirituality re-
tention rates)?
Several indicators correlate with dimensions 
of culture universally recognized as important. 
Indicators meeting the above criteria would 
relate to language, probably regarding its use 
and/or retention. 
Advocating for an indicator that focuses on 
language is not without its drawbacks. First, 
languages of the majority populations are not 
under threat (e.g., Russian in that country‘s far 
North, or English in northern Canada or 
Alaska). Second, critics may view a focus on 
language as essentialist in the sense that it is not 
expressive of the dynamism of culture gen-
erally; nor is it indicative of cultural stresses 
such as suicide rates or rates of violent death. 
The inevitable turn to language as a viable and 
informative indicator, however, rests on its 
ability to meet all criteria. All people speak a 
language; the extent to which people speak 
their mother tongue is a meaningful measure of 
cultural wellness no matter the proportion of 
the population that group might be; the con-
cept of language is universally recognized, so 
there is no debate over what constitutes rec-
ognized languages; and most importantly, the 
languages their populations speak are the 
subject of both interest and regular quantifica-
tion by all circumpolar states.
Another dimension of cultural vitality seemed 
encompassed by cultural events and perform-
ances, which can be tracked through the number 
of events per year and community (adjusted for 
population), the number of participants in cul-
tural events, or participation rates in the pro-
duction of cultural artifacts. For the complex 
domain of spirituality, the simple proxy of par-
ticipation rates in spiritual activities was sug-
gested. Finally, the number of print and broad-
cast media productions per community (adjust-
ed for population) was also discussed as a 
potential indicator.
In these discussions, general concerns includ-
ed data challenges (their availability and qual-
ity), the fact that some of these indicators made 
sense only for indigenous peoples, and that all 
these dimensions could vary according to 
ethnicity, age, gender, and occupational status. 
A subsequent workshop in the summer of 2007 
resulted in a much more focused view of possi-
ble indicators. At that workshop, we identified 
three potential classes of indicators: 
• First, a number of language indicators 
seemed a commonsense approach to 
addressing culture. We determined that 
language was perhaps the most intuitively 
obvious potential indicator. However, 
many dimensions of language vitality 
might be measured (see the section on 
language below for further discussion). 
• Second, we considered a composite indi-
cator (a table marking the presence and 
absence of traits) of cultural autonomy 
consisting of opportunities, institutional 
conditions, legal frameworks, etc. We 
realized that this indicator is also fairly 
bounded and clearly identifies the infor-
mation relevant for its assessment. Also, 
gathering data for such an indicator would 
be relatively easy and the data would like-
ly be non-controversial. This presents 
possibly the best example of an indicator 
easily comparable across nations, regions, 
and localities.
• Third, we looked at the notion of “belong-
ing“ as a cultural indicator. This is the 
most difficult arena for indicator construc-
tion, as the original idea of measuring 
(and ranking) the proportion of “long-
term stayers“ within a community has 
been discarded as too ambiguous. (This 
notion is discussed further below.) 
2.1.  Language Indicators for Cultural Vitality
The status of indigenous languages, including 
the extent and role of their use, provides a use-
ful indicator of cultural well-being for Arctic 
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peoples − provided we consider Arctic languag-
es per se and not languages that recently moved 
into the North due to colonization and assimila-
tion of northern territories. Cultural main-
tenance can be considered to correlate to a large 
extent with cultural well-being, and language 
maintenance is verifiable and quantifiable in 
ways that would make it an appropriate indi-
cator. Additional language indicators address 
political and social realities of indigenous 
languages.
The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic 
(SLiCA) provides data on language use and 
ability for the Inuit world. Three of their result 
tables are reproduced below to demonstrate 
some of the differences, even within a fairly 
homogeneous culture (and language) area (see 
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3).
2.1.1 Language Vitality
Language vitality can be considered an indi-
cator of cultural vitality. Some northern indi-
genous communities fully retain their native 
language, whereas others are in the process of 
shifting to a European language. In the earlier 
stages of language shift, older people typically 
know and use the native language (either mono-
lingual or bilingual, but native-language dom-
inant), while younger generations are bilingual 
but not native-dominant. As the shift progress-
es, the older generation eventually becomes 
bilingual but dominant in a European language, 
leaving the younger generation with a slight and 
mostly passive knowledge of the indigenous 
language.
Although there do exist populations of 
balanced bilinguals, where no language shift 
Table 5.1: Indigenous Language Use as a Child by Country
 Canada  Greenland  Chukotka  Alaska  Total
Learned indigenous language as a child *  95%  67%  61%  83%
Indigenous language spoken by parents at
home when respondent was a child  *  93%  64%  76%  83%
Indigenous language spoken by parents to
child at home when respondent was a child  *  90%  56%  59%  76%
Estimated Total  *  39,732  20,713  11,085  71,530
* Data not available
Source: Poppel et al. Reproduced with permission.
Table 5.2: Indigenous Language Ability by Country
 Canada  Greenland  Chukotka  Alaska  Total
Understand very well  79%  73%  40%  39%  60%
Relatively well  13%  24%  18%  15%  21%
From not at all to with effort  7%  3%  42%  46%  19%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Speak very well  77%  71%  37%  32%  56%
Relatively well  12%  25%  17%  12%  21%
From not at all to with effort  10%  5%  45%  56%  23%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Read very well  52%  62%  25%  13%  45%
Relatively well  18%  26%  17%  16%  22%
From not at all to with effort  31%  12%  58%  71%  33%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Write very well  54%  58%  24%  11%  42%
Relatively well  19%  26%  15%  11%  21%
From not at all to with effort  27%  15%  61%  78%  37%
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Estimated Total  19,870  39,629  20,417  10,957  90,873
Source: Poppel et al. Reproduced with permission.
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appears to be in progress, a maxim of those who 
study language planning is that stable bilingual-
ism does not exist without diglossia (i.e., where 
defined roles for each language are adhered to 
by the community of speakers). This often 
occurs in religious communities; for example, 
orthodox Hasidic Jews use Hebrew as a strictly 
religious language and Yiddish as a strictly 
secular language, often alongside English or 
another national language. Diglossia can also be 
observed in the use of colloquial and classical 
Arabic in much of the Arabic-speaking world, 
although classical Arabic has more than solely 
religious functions (Fishman, 1991; Dorais and 
Sammons, 2002).
Northern indigenous languages, however, 
typically do not develop well-defined situations 
of diglossia. Instead, one language − often the 
European one − is used for so-called high func-
tions relating to government, education, and 
media, while the indigenous tongue is used for 
“low“ functions, typically intimate, home, and 
community uses (Cooper, 1989; Paulston, 
1994).
The vitality of indigenous languages can be 
evaluated either by finding the percentage of 
speakers relative to the total population or by 
determining the average age of the group of 
youngest speakers. Both measurements indicate 
whether a population is in the process of 
language shift and the extent to which the shift 
has progressed. Various relevant data exist: the 
Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic 
(SLiCA) project has measured language vitality 
and use in a number of ways (the SLiCA Cultural 
Continuity Tables 87-114 treat various dimen-
sions of indigenous language use), and US 
census figures include speakers of languages 
other than English, along with people‘s ethnic 
identification (although speaker numbers do 
not always appear credible, because they seem 
high in many cases, such as in Alaska).
There may be many reasons for variations in 
numbers. Someone whom a linguist considers 
to be a speaker of a language may not self-
identify as a speaker in a community where the 
language is closely associated with the knowl-
edge of elders, which would of course lower the 
speaker count. In the case of high speaker num-
bers, as with the census, people may identify 
themselves as native language speakers even 
when a linguist or others may not consider them 
so. This issue may arise because the meaning of 
“speaker“ varies. To a linguist, a speaker gener-
ally would be considered someone who is able 
to hold a conversation in a language, even if the 
person at times hesitates or doesn‘t use a highly 
conservative form of the language. People may 
self-identify as speakers if they 1) know some of 
the language, such as individual words, 2) can 
pronounce and read the language out loud, and 
3) feel an ethnic identity that causes them to 
want to identify as speakers even if they possess 
little actual knowledge of the language. The 
background or motivation of the census taker 
can be a factor as well. Language status can be 
a political issue involving funding and other 
issues, and there may be a desire to boost indi-
vidual or group standing (Cooper, 1989).
Michael Krauss has provided estimates of 
speaker numbers for Alaska, updated in a 
recent article (Krauss, 2007). To arrive at his 
estimates, essentially he determined language 
status for individual villages through reports by 
knowledgeable people on the age range of the 
youngest native speakers and the oldest non-
Table 5.3: Summary of Current Use of Indigenous Language by Country*
 Canada  Greenland  Chukotka  Alaska  Total
All of the time  **  35%  2%  1%  20%
Most of the time  **  43%  13%  9%  29%
Some of the time  **  17%  17%  30%  20%
Very seldom  **  4%  23%  45%  16%
Not at all  **  1%  45%  16%  15%
 **  100%  100%  100%  100%
Estimated Total  **  34,990  18,678  10,946  64,614
  * Index constructed as sum of household, work, school, other divided by 4 & rounded
** Data not available
Source: Poppel et al. Reproduced with permission.
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speakers. Census data were examined and fig-
ures noting the percentage of population in 
various age groups were applied. While this 
method is not as accurate as a speaker count, it 
provides a reasonable estimate, since speaker 
counts can vary widely depending on who 
counts and how people identify themselves (see 
above).
There are reasonably reliable speaker num-
bers for Alaska, Greenland, Canada, and Russia. 
Where statistics are lacking, the method just 
outlined, however, can still be applied through 
the use of reliable census figures coupled with 
estimates of the ages of the youngest speakers. 
Estimates also exist for Siberian Eskimos and 
perhaps for other groups as well.
It may be that the actual percentage or number 
of speakers is not as important an indicator of 
cultural well-being as the issue of whether a 
given community is in the process of language 
shift or not. If there is no shift to a European 
language and away from the indigenous 
language, this aspect of cultural maintenance is 
present. If language shift is underway, then the 
precise progress of the shift may not be highly 
important, as experience leads us to expect 
the same sorts of results across geographic 
boundaries and regardless of the age of the 
youngest speaker.
Table 5.4 enumerates language retention rates 
for a variety of Arctic languages.
2.1.2  Official Status, Public Use, and 
    Education
Another category of indicators related to 
language involves a number of measurable facts 
about the legal status of minority or indigenous 
languages as well as their use in education and 
other public forums, such as in media and 
publications. This category of measurement 
echoes an awareness of the importance of state 
recognition for the fostering of cultural devel-
opment, a consideration that is further devel-
oped below (see “Cultural Autonomy“). 
Official government recognition of indi-
genous languages, including their use in edu-
cation, may take a variety of forms. In some 
cases, an indigenous language may share status 
as a co-official language, typically with a Europ-
ean language, such as Greenlandic and Danish 
in Greenland. There may be regional status, 
such as in the case of Inuktitut, which has 
official status in Nunavut but is not an official 
national language of Canada. In Alaska no 
indigenous language has official status at the 
national or state level, although some languages 
are given official local support, such as Inupiaq 
in the North Slope Borough.
Table 5.4: Arctic Language Retention Rates
Language  Total Population  No. of Speakers  % Retention
Ahtna  500  80  16%
Aleut  2,300  150  7%
Alutiiq  3,500  200  6%
Central Alaskan Yupik  25,000  10,400  42%
Chipewyan  6,000  4,000  67%
Chukchi  15,000  10,000  67%
Deg Hit‘an (Ingalik)  250  14  6%
Dena‘ina  1,000  50  5%
Dogrib  2,400  2,300  96%
Dolgan  7,000  5,700  81%
Enets  200  50  25%
Even  17,000  7,500  44%
Evenk  30,000  9,000  30%
Eyak  50  0  0%
Faroese  47,000  N/A  N/A
Finnish  ca. 5,000,000  N/A  N/A 
Gwich‘in  3,000  550  18% 
Hän  300  15  5% 
Holikachuk  180  5  3% 
Icelandic  290,000 N/A  N/A 
Inuit  93,200  73,600  79% 
Kaska  900  400  44% 
Karelian  131,000  62,500  48% 
Kerek  400  2  1%
Ket  1,100  550  50% 
Khanty  21,000  12,000  57% 
Komi  344,500  242,500  70% 
Koryak  9,000  2,700  30% 
Koyukon  2,300  300  13% 
Mansi  8,200  3,100  38% 
Nenets  35,000  28,500  81% 
Nganasan  1,300  500  38% 
Norwegian  ca. 4,500,000  N/A  N/A 
Saami group  57,200  26,100  46% 
Sakha (Yakut)  382,000  358,500  94% 
Selkup  3,600  1,570  44%
Siberian Yupik  2,300  1,300  57% 
Slavey  5,200  3,900  75% 
Swedish ca.  9,000,000  N/A  N/A 
Tagish  400  2  1% 
Tanacross  200  50  25% 
Tlingit  11,000  375  3% 
Tutchone  2,500  400  16% 
Tanana  400  15  4% 
Upper Kuskokwim  100  25  25% 
Upper Tanana  300  55  18%
Yukagir  900  70  8%
Sources: Dolgan, Karelian, Komi, and Sakha from All-Soviet Census for 1989. Alaskan data 
from Krauss, 2007. All other data from AHDR, 2004. No language retention data available 
for Faroese, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish. 
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This status can be readily determined in dif-
ferent regions and for different languages, al-
though situations can be hard to compare inter-
nationally and even within a single country 
since different governments have different legal 
bases for language recognition; no two cases are 
exactly the same. Some areas, for example, have 
bodies known as language commissions that 
oversee language use. In others, the use of an 
indigenous language in government and legal 
proceedings as well as in official documents is 
an appropriate indicator of status. Whether a 
language is official is not a simple yes-no ques-
tion, and differing levels of status need to be 
described and recognized.  
There is also much gradation concerning the 
place of various languages in educational 
efforts. In Greenland, the indigenous language 
is the majority school language, whereas in 
Alaska, indigenous language instruction in 
schools varies widely from full bilingual edu-
cation programs in Yupik first-language locales, 
to short classes a few times a week, to no indig-
enous language instruction at all. Where indig-
enous language instruction is not required, 
some children will be offered it and some will 
not, even in the presence of well-developed 
school programs. Again, situations may vary 
widely, so categories would need to be set up 
and applied to different cases (Dorais, 1990).
A study of language use in the media can 
indicate whether a particular tongue is in active 
use by the local population and has enough 
political clout to be used in broadcasting or the 
press. Many areas have local radio in an indig-
enous language, and some even have television; 
this is a strong statement, since television is 
expensive to produce and therefore needs to 
address a more sizable audience than radio. The 
same is true for newspapers, which are only use-
ful for populations who understand the written 
form of a language. 
Economic issues may also require media to be 
economically viable, perhaps self-supporting. 
Economic viability for indigenous-language 
media would make a strong statement about the 
status of a language, although subsidized media 
also point to strong support by government (or 
some other organization) in spite of lack of self-
support.
A related question involves the rate of publi-
cation in the indigenous language, which can 
also be taken as an indicator of cultural well-
being. A high rate, of course, points to wide 
knowledge and use of the language along with 
strong literacy among the target population. To 
measure the rate it is possible to count the num-
bers and categories of books, periodicals, etc. 
published in a particular language. Are there 
publications on creative writing, science, news, 
poetry? Are these publications bilingual?  Other 
measures include a range that may be viewed on 
a continuum of efficacy for achieving cultural 
autonomy goals, such as, in the Russian context, 
obshchinas. An indicator for public use of 
language and dissemination through the media 
might also include an assessment of the availa-
bility of forms of popular culture employing the 
language; presumably such use would make in-
digenous language appealing to younger gen-
erations and indicate cultural vitality, since the 
language would not be perceived as an artifact 
of elders and of a bygone era.
2.1.3 Limitations on Data
The Arctic Social Indicators project has estab-
lished criteria to determine the suitability of 
Trilingual sign with 
Inuktitut, French, and 
English on a street in 
Kuujjuaq, the largest town 
in Nunavik, located in 
Northern Quebec, 
Canada. Photo by 
Lawrence Kaplan
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proposed indicators for existing and ongoing 
measurement across all circumpolar nations. In 
the case of language, these criteria are the 
following:
• All national censuses record language use 
and make the information publicly availa-
ble.
• Arctic nations track language use and 
retention among indigenous populations.
• Fundamental aspects of language data 
information are consistent across nations 
collecting the information.
• Arctic nations may be open to special data 
tabulations.
2.2  Cultural Autonomy
Over the past few decades and centuries, many 
Arctic societies, especially indigenous ones, 
have been under pressure to change. Most 
nomadic populations have been made seden-
tary in communities, where most aspects of 
daily life were utterly foreign. Religion, social 
organization, education, language, economic 
activities, health care, housing, movements, 
technology, food, justice, etc., are all just as-
pects of culture. Changes to any or many of 
these aspects − which often occurred simulta-
neously and with little control from those in-
volved − did and still do affect the well-being 
of the group in question. In the present day, 
some self-governance arrangements within sov-
ereign countries, such as territorial govern-
ment in Nunavut, and to a higher degree, Self-
Government in Greenland, provide great po-
tential for cultural autonomy. However, assess-
ing cultural autonomy through some indicators 
becomes crucial for minorities that do not enjoy 
such large degrees of self-governance. 
Cultural autonomy is linked with the notion 
of cultural self-determination. This concept is 
drawn mainly from European experiences 
of accommodating ethnic minorities within 
nation-state borders, and it has been neither 
uniform nor easy, as recent studies on cultural 
autonomy measures within European nation-
states have shown (Malloy, 2005). Indigenous 
peoples within Russia and elsewhere have 
political institutions recognized, such as the 
Saami Parliament in Finland. Other measures 
include a range that may be viewed on a con-
tinuum of efficacy for achieving cultural auto-
nomy goals. These range from the somewhat 
less institutional approach such as Russian obsh-
china, to the establishment of autonomous 
districts or republics named for indigenous 
peoples whose homelands constitute their geo-
graphic basis (e.g., Komi, Sakha). These institu-
tions include rights to land use and politi-
cal organization, since indigenous cultural 
well-being is understood to rest in part on land-
based socioeconomic pursuits.
Generally, the concept of cultural autonomy 
applies in situations where a state may have one 
dominant ethnic group and significant minority 
ethnic populations. Thus the term has a norma-
tive political dimension. So, an institution fost-
ering cultural autonomy would not be, for ex-
ample, a dance troupe or an educational 
institution. Those institutions foster culture 
itself. Instead, an institution fostering cultural 
autonomy would have a mandate that would in-
clude representing the collective rights of its 
members to create cultural and educational 
organizations in the service of cultural develop-
ment activities, particularly in cases where the 
members are part of an ethnic minority. This 
also implies an obligation on the part of region-
al and national authorities to recognize and 
support cultural autonomy efforts.
Thus there are two aspects to this indicator: 
whether institutions exist for the purposes of 
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fostering cultural autonomy, and whether Arctic 
states or their regional governments have poli-
cies and/or other supports in place to enable 
cultural autonomy efforts. Recognizing the 
shared responsibility of government and ethnic 
minorities in the pursuit of cultural autonomy 
is necessary for an adequate understanding of 
cultural autonomy well-being. 
For our purposes, cultural autonomy is 
understood as opportunities and resources 
necessary for a population with a distinct culture 
to pursue what it deems adequate for its cultural 
well-being and maintenance of its group identity. 
With this understanding in hand, an indicator 
of cultural autonomy would address two 
factors, described below.
1) The existence of institutions that are 
created by ethnic populations and possess the 
following characteristics: 
• State recognition and the reception of 
funding or other support for its ongoing 
maintenance
• The aim of fostering the cultural interests 
and goals of a specific ethnic population 
(not necessarily “maintenance of tradi-
tion“), which may extend to social, poli-
tical, and economic interests and goals
• Representation of the interests of its mem-
bers in external relations on local/region-
al, national, and international levels
These criteria identify the interests of ethnic 
populations with respect to cultural autonomy. 
“Interests“ is a term that indicates the type of 
outcome desired by the ethnic group or institu-
tion without restricting or predetermining the 
mechanisms used for ensuring the outcomes or 
interests are achieved. By representing interests, 
institutions are able to engage flexibly with, for 
example, national governments, when deter-
mining ways that cultural autonomy may be 
pursued within the constitutional or legal frame-
works of a nation-state. For example, fostering 
interests culturally may mean the institution can 
seek participation in government-sponsored 
cultural programming and/or partner with 
other ethnic minorities to establish cultural pro-
grams to serve their cultural goals. Representing 
interests of members in external relations would 
be, for example, an institution such as the Inuit 
Tapirit Kanatami in Canada participating in the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, or RAIPON 
participating in the Arctic Council.
The following are some examples of such 
institutions:
• Indigenous people‘s cultural and political 
organizations created through land claims 
in Alaska and Canada (regional or local)
• Fédération Franco-TéNoise (French in 
northern Canada-regional)
• Obshchinas and indigenous people‘s rep-
resentative organizations in Russia (reg-
ional, local)
• Russian law on territories of traditional 
resource use of indigenous small-numb-
ered peoples (national, regional, local)
• Saami parliaments in northern Europe 
(regional or national)
• International organizations for ethnic 
populations divided by state borders 
(Inuit Circumpolar Council, Arctic 
Athabaskan Council, Aleut International, 
Saami Council-International) 
2) The existence of government policies and/
or other supports at the national or regional 
level fostering cultural autonomy efforts.
The indicator should apply to all Arctic resi-
dents, crossing the indigenous/non-indigenous 
divide. The appropriate scale of the indicator 
should be regional and encompass all groups 
claiming a distinct culture and/or language. 
When such groups are divided by national or 
regional borders, the indicator should be differ-
entiated accordingly. 
The following are some examples of such 
government supports: 
• Canada‘s multiculturalism policy through 
the Department of Canadian Heritage 
(national)
• Canada‘s two official languages: French 
and English (national)
• Canada‘s comprehensive land claim and 
self-government policies (national)
• Russian Federation law on obshchinas 
(national)
• Canada‘s Northwest Territories‘ 11 official 
languages: French, English, and all indig-
enous languages except Michif (regional).
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2.2.1 Data Limitations
An indicator on cultural autonomy would 
require compiling a variety of existing data, 
which would then be measured by a researcher. 
Such an indicator would be unique in that 
it would focus on raw data common to, and 
publicly available in, all Arctic nations. The 
indicator could function both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. For example, questions asked 
might include the following:
• Does a state have a law recognizing or 
facilitating the cultural autonomy of dif-
ferent peoples within it, or marginalized 
peoples within it?
• Is there an implementation policy or set of 
measures in place that makes the law 
meaningful?
• Does the state have necessary supports in 
place for people to access the opportuni-
ties for cultural autonomy afforded by the 
laws?
• Are people taking advantage of these 
opportunities?
It may also be possible to assemble qualitative 
aspects of this data, such as annual reports of 
activities and expenditures. These qualitative 
aspects are extremely important, as those best 
positioned to comment on the efficacy of cul-
tural autonomy measures afforded by nation-
states are marginalized peoples who may not be 
in a position to generate data or to criticize state 
governments. On the other hand, such an indi-
cator could also be narrowed down to a simple 
determination of whether cultural autonomy 
The (Finnish) Saami Act on Cultural Autonomy
Located in Inari, Finland, the Saami Parliament was originally established in 1973 but did not receive official status until 
more than two decades later, the result of a new section- 51 u (t)73/95-being added to Finland‘s constitution. A subsec-
tion of the changes, the Saami Parliament Act (974/95), officially brought the Saami Parliament into being. Under the 
Sami Parliament Act, 21 Saami representatives are elected every four years and charged with overseeing various aspects 
of Saami cultural autonomy. This includes developing legislation, initiating programs, and overseeing how funds directed 
to Saami people in Finland will be disbursed. Responsibilities include advocating for the rights of Saami with respect to 
education, land rights, social problems, and health issues. The 1995 constitutional amendments (which came into effect 
in 1996) respecting cultural autonomy considerably improved the Saami people‘s potential for language and culture 
development and recognition. However, implementing programs giving life to the constitutional amendments depends 
largely on adequate funding and resources. In addition, the amendments expanded the definition of a Saami person, amid 
fears that such an expansion might increase the potential for Saami assimilation (Finnish Sami Parliament, 1997).
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legislation or policies are in place and are acces-
sible by Arctic peoples. There seem to be no 
limitations on the data available for the success-
ful monitoring of this indicator.
2.3 Belonging
The notion of belonging, of feeling comfortable 
living in one‘s community and region, is attrac-
tive when considering concepts such as human 
development, living conditions, quality of life, 
and social well-being. Measuring this aspect on 
the basis of objective data, such as migrations, 
cannot reveal the degree of well-being associ-
ated with remaining in a community instead of 
emigrating. Emigration itself may be motivated 
by a desire to improve one‘s own or one‘s 
family‘s well-being. As an emic notion (i.e., one 
that focuses on the intrinsic cultural distinc-
tions that are meaningful to the members of a 
given society) belonging can only be captured 
through in-depth surveys. Many of the SLiCA 
variables could be considered in the construc-
tion of an indicator of belonging (see, for 
example, Tables 49-64 and 75-96 in Poppel et 
al., 2007). Short of collecting a number of vari-
ables, however, it might not be possible to 
elucidate the degree of well-being associated 
with staying in a community versus leaving it. 
In our age of universal virtual connections, a 
more fruitful approach may be to focus on the 
persistence of social networks within communi-
ties as well as the extent of “virtual communi-
ties“ encompassing members living in other 
places. The importance of family and social 
networks is a well-recognized attribute of 
many Arctic societies, one that is considered a 
foundation of their culture. Belonging in the 
Arctic refers as much to the surrounding land-
scape as to the family and social networks that 
individuals are involved in. These social bonds 
often are not cut when individuals or house-
holds leave a community. In the Arctic, social 
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scientists have emphasized how such bonds can 
have economic functions, such as when family 
members in towns send cash or materials to 
rural communities in exchange for country food 
(Fienup-Riordan et al., 2000; Fogel-Chance, 
1993; Lee, 2002).
Informal exchanges between households, 
whether local or not, may in fact constitute a 
good proxy for the perpetuation of the social 
bonds favored by many Arctic cultures. Arctic 
societies are believed to have created an original 
form of economic organization combining for-
mal income and other forms of activity and ex-
change; the keepers of official statistics have 
often been criticized for not taking into account 
the elements of this informal economy, such as 
hunting, fishing, gathering, and the associated 
processes of redistribution (Usher et al., 2003; 
Usher and Wenzel, 1987; Wolfe and Walker, 
1987). It is desirable to investigate the informal 
economy more routinely to understand the 
functioning of Arctic economies and to receive 
an indicator of its sociocultural functioning. 
To make such an indicator sustainable would 
probably require local observation networks. 
Such observation might be facilitated by mak-
ing it profitable for communities to show deci-
sion makers the crucial importance of the local 
economy and of sharing networks. 
2.3.1 Data Limitations
An indicator designed to track belonging could 
prove problematic without severely narrowing 
its array of potential measures. As discussed 
above, the belonging indicator includes areas 
that are difficult to assess and/or to quantify. In 
addition, these data are not currently being col-
lected, likely due to their complexity. The data 
are thus subject to extensive limitations: ade-
quate data are not being collected, standardiz-
ing the data across societies and cultures could 
be difficult, and conceptual aspects of such 
an indicator have not been standardized within 
the circumpolar world (at least relative to the 
measurable dimensions of, say, language or 
cultural autonomy).
3.0 Selected Indicators of Cultural 
Well-being for the Arctic
The foregoing discussions have demonstrated 
that language retention, cultural autonomy, and 
belonging are important components for an 
understanding of cultural well-being in the 
Arctic.
3.1 A Composite Indicator 
Table 5.5 illustrates the elements of a composite 
indicator for cultural vitality. Such a composite 
index would present the advantage of taking 
into account developments that affect cultural 
well-being but that may diverge from each 
other. For example, language retention in a 
group may decrease even as the subsistence way 
of life (including economic, social, and cultural 
aspects) remains comparatively strong. Likewise, 
cultural autonomy per se may not provide a suf-
ficient buffer against language erosion or a 
reduction of subsistence activities due to the 
encroachment of industry. The weighing of the 
different parameters of such a composite indi-
cator could be accomplished only meaningfully 
when applying it through the use of real data, 
an exercise which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
3.2  Other Indicator Options
The task presented was to find one to three 
indicators that could be adopted as a measure 
for the domain of cultural integrity/vitality. The 
foregoing discussion probes the potentials, 
values, and drawbacks of selecting each indi-
cator, but three options that meet the eligibility 
criteria seem to emerge. 
As mentioned, the so-called cultural vitality 
index, a multidimensional composite indicator, 
best reflects the complexities and dynamics of 
culture in the circumpolar North. At the same 
time, we are aware that such a composite indi-
cator poses significant problems of measuring 
and weighing multiple sub-domains and, thus, 
might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, 
indicators are valuable for their immediacy and 
accessibility; they are not necessarily meant to 
provide a larger picture or possess explanatory 
power for all social phenomena (Bauer, 1966). 
A composite would provide a sense of the state 
of things within different dimensions of cult-
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ural vitality/integrity, which policy makers 
may find of more value as indicators are tracked 
over time and through various local, national, 
and international developments. After all, we 
believe that complexity cannot be expressed 
through simple measures.
This brings us to our next indicator option, 
one where data and measurements are readily 
available. Within the context of the cultural 
vitality/integrity domain, this is language reten-
tion, or language vitality. This option is accept-
ed as valid, readily understood by both policy 
makers and Arctic populations, and universal 
both in the circumpolar world and within the 
various populations constituted by it. All 
peoples, all cultures, have language. Language 
usage, rates of retention, and demographics of 
language users are the sorts of information that 
provide a sense of overall cultural integrity/
vitality.
The third option would be to combine the 
stand-alone language retention indicator with 
other measures. One possibility would be to 
add “consumption/harvesting of country food“ 
(an indicator used for “material well-being“ 
and “closeness to nature“). This measure is 
clearly related to cultural vitality, and it would 
put the results of the language retention indica-
tor into perspective. For example, it might help 
explain why, in some cases, cultural well-being 
is not that great despite language retention or, 
on the contrary, that a particular culture may 
be thriving despite some language loss. This 
option might seem like a composite indicator at 
Table 5.5: Composite Indicator for Cultural Vitality
Indicator Elements  Indicator
•  Do laws and policies exist in a given state or region that recognize institutions  Cultural autonomy
that advocate for the cultural autonomy of national minority populations?
•  Do institutions representing national minority cultures exist?
•  What is the proportion of such institutions to minority peoples, e.g. are all peoples
represented through such organizations?
•  Are resources available to such institutions?
•  Are funding policies in place and how well-resourced are they? 
•  What percentage of a population speaks its ancestral language compared with the   Language retention
population as a whole? 
•  What percentage of people are engaged in recreational or subsistence activities  Belonging
on the land?
•  What is the relative size of the informal (subsistence-based) sector of the economy?  
“Waiting” – a boat used 
for whaling sits at the 
edge of the lead waiting 
for the animals to pass by; 
Point Hope, Alaska. Photo 
by Benjamin Hopson III
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first glance, but the idea here is to compare and 
contrast two indicators instead of creating 
another composite indicator.
Finally, there are some who would reject the 
very notion that cultural well-being can be cap-
tured by one or more (single or composite) in-
dicators. We acknowledge that such a rejection 
can be based on good scholarly motives but be-
lieve that it is counterproductive politically, 
since it only reinforces stereotypes about the 
“softness“ of culture. We appreciate that policy 
and state decision-making often does not have 
the luxury of declining to act. Likewise, we feel 
that culture is too important to be left out of the 
mix of Arctic social indicators.
4.0 Concluding Comments
Whatever indicator is chosen, connections 
between cultural well-being and other dom-
ains must be kept in mind. For example, the 
notion of cultural autonomy seems to be tied to 
fate control and should be considered in con-
cert with that group. Likewise, contact with 
nature − which some consider to be a cultural 
construct − might contribute to cultural well-
being. Also, the relative size of the informal 
economy might be relevant for cultural well-
being, insofar as it serves as a proxy for sharing 
and social networks. Finally, since the educa-
tion domain group seems to be putting rela-
tively little emphasis on non-formal modes of 
transmission of knowledge to the next genera-
tion, this dimension of education might fall into 
the purview of cultural well-being.
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1.0 Introduction
Historically, Arctic societies have fed, sheltered, 
and clothed themselves and maintained their 
well-being, in large part through a close rela-
tionship and interdependence with the natural 
environment. Arctic human-environment inter-
actions fulfill the physical needs for food and 
shelter and also ground humans spiritually in 
their cultural worlds. Generally speaking, Arctic 
societies have undergone tremendous change in 
the last century, due mostly to the forces of 
globalization, resource development, urbaniza-
tion, and modernity. These changes, in turn, 
have affected and transformed Arctic human-
environment interactions by fragmenting and 
exploiting lands and ecosystems, redefining 
rural ways of life through structures such as 
settlement policies and working-class obliga-
tions, and replacing local ways of knowing with 
mass communication, information, and techno-
logy. Despite these changes, most Arctic inhabi-
tants, to a greater or lesser degree, maintain an 
interrelationship with the natural world based 
upon their cultural legacy, continued need for 
food, clothing and shelter, and a strong sense 
of place and meaning in the Arctic environ-
ment. Contact with nature, albeit a somewhat 
intangible attribute of human development and 
therefore difficult to measure, is nonetheless 
central to the legacy of and contemporary state 
of well-being in Arctic societies. 
1.1 Concept of Contact with Nature
A close connection to and need for contact with 
nature is not, of course, confined to the Arctic. 
Human-environment interrelationships are cen-
tral to global ecosystem health and human well-
being. Key literature of the contemporary envi-
ronmental movement in the West emphasizes 
the universal need for, on both physical and 
spiritual levels, humanity’s continued contact 
and interdependence with the natural world 
(Leopold, 1948; Muir and White, 2006; Brody, 
1997; Lopez, 2004). More recently, Louv (2005) 
has labeled our contemporary Western socie-
ties’ disconnect with nature as a “nature deficit 
disorder,” and has made this call to action: 
“Healing the broken bond between our young 
and nature is in our self-interest, not only be-
cause aesthetics or justice demand it, but also 
because our mental, physical, and spiritual 
health depend upon it.” However, this broad 
expanse of literature is lacking in specific def-
initions of exactly what the contact with nature 
interrelationship looks like that would lead to 
measureable variables. We know that Arctic 
societies demonstrate a strong interdependence 
with the natural world for their identity and 
subsistence needs. Therefore, one logical path 
toward developing indicators for contact with 
nature would be by finding ways to measure 
participation in various livelihood activities. 
This is the path we paid special attention to and 
describe here in detail.
 
1.2 Overview of Contact with Nature in 
 the  Arctic
The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) 
identifies “living close to nature” as one of the 
three dimensions of human development that 
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Arctic residents perceive as essential to their 
well-being above and beyond the three United 
Nations Human Development Indicators. But 
what exactly does living close to nature or, as 
termed for our purposes, “contact with nature” 
mean as a measurable quality in a community 
and/or a region? The AHDR does not provide 
a set definition for the concept but does empha-
size the important place of nature in human 
Arctic relations, characterizing Arctic societies 
as “place-based systems” that “feature hum-
an adaptations…closely tied to local envir-
onments” (AHDR 2004:241). Further, the re-
port implies the importance to human well-
being of contact with nature by saying that “a 
failure to stay close to nature results in a loss of 
roots and various forms of alienation from the 
natural world” (AHDR, 2004). Beyond that ref-
erence, the AHDR gives little guidance for the 
development of an indicator for contact with 
nature. 
For Arctic societies, indicators of human 
development must be unique to the Arctic but 
also address the well-being of both indigenous 
and non-indigenous people and be appropriate 
to all communities and countries in the cir-
cumpolar North. For our purposes here, “in-
digenous” refers to those who inhabited an area 
prior to colonization or the establishment of 
state boundaries. The Arctic is home to a diver-
sity of indigenous groups. Non-indigenous in-
habitants of the Arctic are either 1) longtime 
residents whose ancestors settled during the 
colonial process, or 2) relative newcomers from 
more southern climes who have either moved 
to the North to take a job and have stayed, or 
who have come as temporary residents to take 
advantage of high-paying jobs. The latter ex-
ample pertains especially in the Russian context 
and the post–World War II Soviet efforts to 
develop the military-industrial presence across 
the country.  
Whether northern residents are indigenous 
or non-indigenous, the majority participate in 
some or many activities in nature. Residents of 
urban and rural areas alike engage in outdoor 
activities for both utilitarian purposes, to pro-
cure wild and domestic food sources, and for 
recreational purposes. Although Arctic indi-
genous inhabitants generally depend on their 
natural environment for more of their food than 
do non-indigenous inhabitants, there is never-
theless a strong tradition across all Arctic com-
munities to gather berries, fish, garden, and 
engage in other food-procuring activities such 
as hunting and herding. 
The literature provides little guidance for 
indicator development in the area of contact 
with nature. Although community, sustainabil-
ity, and conservation indicators are increasingly 
common, few are relevant to Arctic societies 
and almost none are relevant to contact with 
nature. There are, however, some exceptions. 
One is the Survey of Living Conditions in the 
Arctic (SLiCA), perhaps the best source for 
indicators with the potential to measure contact 
Illustration of reindeer carved 
into antler bone from central 
Europe circa 12,000 B.C. 
Reproduced with permission 
from Rosengarten-museum, 
Konstanz, Germany.
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Traditional Foods in the Arctic
From prehistoric and historic through to modern times, the procurement and slaughter of wild 
game and the management of domestic animals (e.g., reindeer, horses) has always been about 
much more than just food. In addition to basic sustenance, interaction with animals provides 
the basis for clothing, shelter, tools, art, language, education, calendar, status, spiritual fulfill-
ment and, not least, the maintenance of intra- and interhousehold sociocultural relations though 
formal and informal codes of sharing and reciprocity (Nelson, 1969; Beach, 1981; Wenzel, 
1991, 2005; Crate, 2006a; Stammler, 2005; Vitebsky, 2005; Müller-Wille, et al., 2006). In other 
words, interaction with animals is a key element of the social fabric of local communities 
throughout the Arctic. 
Some people outside the Arctic may believe that hunting and herding represent dying ways 
of life. However, examples of consumption of wild foods and youth retention indicate other-
wise. For example, in the early 1980s, ringed seal provided nearly two-thirds of the edible bio-
mass entering the Inuit hamlet of Kangiqtugaapik, Nunavut, formerly known as Clyde River. 
Ringed seal figure prominently in the diet in all seasons, falling below 50% only in summer 
when ice is out (Wenzel, 1991). In 1984, even when sealskins had no exchange value because 
of the EEC ban on them, harvesting was demonstrably important to the Kangiqtugaapik econ-
omy. Since 1983, when the EEC ban began to have a strong negative effect on all forms of 
hunting, the total harvest of country foods has actually increased some 15% to 20% (Wenzel, 
1991). On the other hand, the human population of Kangiqtugaapik has increased some 250% 
to 300% during the same period. Conservative estimates made with data from the recent 
Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study (Priest and Usher, 2004) reveal that total harvest of the four 
staple species (ringed seal, caribou, narwhal, and arctic char) provided each of approximately 
125 households with between 850 kg and 900 kg of edible foods in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Compared with a generation ago, the total harvest for Kangiqtugaapik is provided by 
relatively fewer hunters, highlighting the importance of sharing. Even though the increased har-
vest has not kept pace with population growth, it is difficult to argue that hunting and country 
food consumption are somehow disappearing. On the contrary, sharing and consumption of 
wild foods are seen as important components of modern Inuit identity (Wenzel, 1991, 2005).
Children fishing through cracks in the ice near Kangiqtugaapik, Nunavut, Canada.                    Photo by B.C. Forbes
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with nature. However, SLiCA results are limit-
ed to the Inuit in northern Canada, northern 
Alaska, and Greenland, and the indigenous 
peoples of Chukotka, Russia. Despite its geo-
graphical limits, the three SLiCA Ties to Nature 
tables (Tables 13, 17, and 31) appear to be 
relevant to the contact with nature domain and 
could potentially provide data (Kruse et al., 
2007; Kruse et al., 2008).  
Another relevant source of existing Arctic in-
dicators is the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation’s 
socioeconomic indicators set out in the In-
uvialuit Final Agreement of 1984. The three key 
goals of that agreement are to 1) preserve 
Inuvialuit cultural identity and values; 2) enable 
equal and meaningful participation in Canadian 
society; and 3) protect and preserve Arctic wild-
life, environment, and biological productivity. 
The Inuvialuit socioeconomic indicators were 
intended to track and measure progress toward 
those goals. Several of those indicators have 
potential as indicators for the contact with 
nature domain and may also provide a source 
of data for other ASI domains. In pursuing the 
goal of “a diverse economy” for instance, the 
first three indicators are potentially useful for 
the contact with nature domain:
• percentage of population who harvest for 
commercial use
• percentage of population who sell fish meat, 
carvings, etc.
• percentage of population who bought and/
or sold country food
In addition, three other indicators may be 
relevant to the health domain:
• percentage of households where half or 
more of the meat and fish eaten in the last 
year was country food
• percentage of children consuming wild meat 
three or more days per week
• percentage of the population very or some-
what satisfied with the availability of coun-
try food to their household 
Lastly, the Community Well-being Index, a 
composite index of the well-being of Inuit com-
munities in Canada developed by Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), combines 
four measures: income, housing, education, and 
labor market. However, it has little to say about 
contact with nature (O’Sullivan and McHardy, 
2004; McHardy and O’Sullivan, 2004; Cooke 
et al., 2004).
Beyond specific existing projects that involve 
some level of indicators, other available data 
relevant to contact with nature are those per-
taining to the harvesting and consumption of 
country food. One example, albeit primarily 
non-Arctic but nonetheless methodologically 
interesting, includes corroborating data from 
coastal Canada where country food consists of 
primarily mainly fish and seafood. In recent 
years studies have shown the decreasing or 
increasing consumption of seafood, the reasons 
for these changes, and the proportion of wild 
seafood in diets. A number of studies indicate 
that average Canadian consumption of tradi-
tional food is 4.5 kg per capita annually 
(Conacher, 1993) whereas Mohawk consump-
tion is 8.4 kg per capita annually (Chan, 1998). 
Five Vancouver Island First Nations consume 
60.5 kg per person per year (Ross and Child, 
2008) and Quebec Inuit consume 109.5 kg per 
person per year (Dewailly et al., 1993). The 
Ross Vancouver Island Study reports that in-
habitants procure their seafood via a mixture of 
traditional harvesting (89%), supermarkets 
(8%), and restaurants (3%). Reasons for de-
clining consumption are given as “abundance 
has changed” (38%), “way of life has changed” 
(28%), “pollution concerns” (25%), “lack of 
time,” “change of tastes,” and “government 
regulation” (Ross and Child, 2008). This study 
also reveals that consumption of traditional 
food is highest in the older age groups, indicat-
ing a shift away from traditional food consump-
tion in the young. This trend is a source of great 
concern to First Nations communities and indi-
viduals who are quick to point out that eating 
traditional food is central to their culture, 
spirituality, health, and well-being. 
One major constraint to measuring contact 
with nature is the lack of current data. Recent 
data, although patchy both temporally and 
spatially, do indicate a strong connection be-
tween Arctic inhabitants and local resources. 
Clearly the mandate to develop indicators for 
contact with nature is extremely challenging. 
The task involves the development of a base-
line, a flexible measure that could apply in dif-
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Youth Retention
According to Turi (2002), in general there are no recruitment problems in reindeer herding 
except in certain taiga regions of Russia. There is general agreement among reindeer herders, 
scientists, and local authorities that reindeer husbandry cannot be learned in institutes or 
schools. To be a good herder, one must grow up in a reindeer-herding family. For the sake of 
recruitment, it is important that the child spend his or her first years before school in a brigade 
(Ulvevadet and Klokov, 2004). In order to get a school education, children from herding 
families can only stay with their parents for a few months a year during the summer holidays. 
The school administration accommodates the wishes of children who want to spend more time 
in the camp with their parents and learn more about reindeer herding and husbandry. These 
students are allowed to leave before the official end of the school year, and sometimes they 
arrive after it has begun. In this way the school children can stay in the herding camps up to 
five months a year (Ulvevadet and Klokov, 2004).
Research on the structure and size of reindeer herding families in YNAO, Taimyr, and 
Chukotka has shown that compared with families that are settled, nomadic families have 
better demographic indices for characteristics such as the average size of the family, average 
number of children per family, and natural increase (birth rate and death rate). For example, 
the average size of a nomadic family in Chukotka was 3.9 persons versus 2.8 in a settled family. 
In YNAO the corresponding ratio was 5.1 to 4.0, and in Taimyr it was 5.5 to 3.5. Nomadic 
families usually consist of married couples with children, while populations in permanent 
settlements often consist of a mix of families and divorced and unwed women with children. 
This shows that the maintenance of nomadic reindeer herding is an important demographic 
factor that contributes to the maintenance of indigenous peoples, although herder families are 
deprived of many material comforts and conveniences. It is important to emphasize that the 
last population census (2002) showed that the Nenets, with close relations to nomadic reindeer 
herding, had the largest population growth among all of the northern peoples of Russia 
(Ulvevadet and Klokov, 2004).  
Most schools in the Baffin region of Nunavut, Canada, now run through Grade 12. Upon 
graduation, several students go to Iqaluit for training at Arctic College. According to Wenzel 
(Dept. of Geog., McGill, pers. comm., 2007.), two former Kangiqtugaapik residents have 
passed the college’s law program. But if students want a job with the Government of Nunavut, 
the territory’s largest employer, they must relocate to Iqaluit or one of the places to which 
departments have been decentralized (around northern Baffin these are Pond Inlet and Igloolik). 
As a result, Kangiqtugaapik underwent a slight population loss in 2006. 
In rural Viliui Sakha villages of northeastern Siberia, Russia, post-Soviet demographic trends 
show youth relocating to regional centers or to the capi-
tal city, Yakutsk. Although it is commonly thought that 
youth leave because they prefer the more cosmopolitan 
lifestyle in the centers, recent research reveals that most 
desire to live in their home villages, raise their own food, 
and be close to their kin, but they are forced to leave be-
cause the rural areas lack jobs opportunities (Crate, 
2006b; 2006c).
Nenets boy, with reindeer herding dog on tundra, holding boxes of 
tea and a biscuit. Yamal Peninsula on the summer pastures of 
Yarsalinski sovkhoz, near Bovanenkovo Gas Field, July 2005. 
Name of boy unknown. 
Photo by B.C. Forbes. 
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ferent regions such as Alaska, Iceland, and 
Russia, access to current and consistent data in 
all countries and regions, and means to address 
data gaps, among other issues. 
2.0 Possible Indicators of Contact 
with Nature
The first step in identifying indicators for con-
tact with nature is to develop a set of criteria 
that potential indicators would have to fulfill. 
The indicators need to be few in number and 
reflect key aspects of Arctic human develop-
ment in the contact with nature domain. They 
need to be tractable in terms of measurement 
and be either monitored at a reasonable cost or 
have data readily available from other sources. 
They also need to be policy relevant, general-
izable, stable, easy to measure, and suitable for 
longitudinal analysis. Additionally, indicators 
need to be relevant across the circumpolar 
Arctic to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples and communities, and to both women 
and men. 
To begin the process of identifying and eval-
uating indicators, we first free-listed potential 
indicators, subjected each to a test of several 
criteria outlined in an evaluation matrix, and 
then, based upon that test, chose the 10 most 
suitable: 
• Time on the land
• Number of traditional activities
• Number of people or households engaged in 
the traditional economy
• Harvest (kilograms per annum per capita)
• Consumption of country foods (kilograms 
per annum per capita) 
• Income spent on nature-related activities
• Local control of resources
• Proportion of economy dependent on natu-
ral resources
• Youth in traditional subsistence activities
• Demography (youth retention)
We further subjected these 10 indicators to 
the following criteria: data availability, feasibil-
ity of measurement, clear meaning, affordabil-
ity, robustness over time, reporting level, and 
applicability to indigenous and non-indigenous 
peoples. Three of the indicators proved robust 
for these criteria: 
• Harvest (kilograms per annum per capita)
• Consumption of country foods (kilograms 
per annum per capita)
• Number of people or households engaged in 
the traditional economy 
The main hurdle for all three indicators is 
data availability. While data are available for 
most of the circumpolar North, Russia is highly 
problematic. There are statistical data for these 
three variables through the end of the Soviet 
period, but all such data remain questionable 
due to inconsistency and rounding up to “meet 
the plan.” Furthermore, there exists a data gap 
during the transition period after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and what data exist are patchy. 
For example, the government did count wild 
reindeer hunted and also kept numbers of 
domestic reindeer in households—so there are 
numbers of households involved in the econo-
my. Another nuance is that in the Arctic north 
of Russia, data are more available for indi-
genous communities because they are more 
routinely collected. Some data are available 
at republic and oblast levels, but may be ex-
pensive to obtain – even more expensive if 
you’re a “white” researcher from the West. 
Being in business to sell data is widespread in 
Russia.  
There are also problems for tracking house-
hold or individual harvest and consumption 
patterns in Fennoscandia. For households that 
are involved in reindeer herding, statistics are 
not kept on the number of animals or amount 
of meat retained for personal consumption. In 
Fennsocandia and Russia, both non-indigenous 
and indigenous households are often heavily 
engaged in the traditional economy through 
activities such as fishing and berry and mush-
room picking. Since some products, such as fish 
and cloudberries, are sold commercially, there 
may well be excellent statistics for annual har-
vest, yet these will not reflect personal or house-
hold consumption levels. That being said, it 
should be noted that SLiCA offers a promising 
source of data for two of the three potential in-
dicators (participation in traditional economy 
and consumption of country foods).  
It is also important to note that in addition to 
the issue of data availability, all measures of 
contact with nature involving harvest and 
resource use pose a special challenge for inter-
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pretation and therefore demand some triangu-
lation of the data with other domains. Human 
development is traditionally measured on a 
one-dimensional scale: the higher the observed 
value on a human development scale, the high-
er the level of human development. In the case 
of contact with nature, however, we must 
accept the fact that more is not always better. 
Consider the case of a community with a single 
employer who decides to leave. Jobs are lost. 
Cash is scarce. People choose to hunt and fish 
more. Contact with nature increases. Consider 
the same community, only this time a second 
employer arrives with a policy of granting leave 
for hunting and fishing. Cash incomes increase, 
and the subsistence leave policy is successful. 
People choose to hunt and fish more. Contact 
with nature increases. Thus, we cannot under-
stand whether an increase in our measures of 
contact with nature is positive or negative with 
respect to human development by only examin-
ing the contact with nature measure itself. We 
can, however, properly interpret its meaning if 
we corroborate contact with nature measures 
with those of material success.
2.1 Indicator: Participation in the 
Traditional Economy 
2.1.1 Participation in Traditional/Outdoor 
    Activities
Although the indicator of participation in tradi-
tional/outdoor activities appears at first to be 
an excellent and tangible indicator of contact 
with nature, it presents two challenges: poor 
availability of data and difficulty in translating 
measures across the diversity of Arctic popula-
tions. For example, consider the diversity and 
range of activities possible across the Arctic, 
from hunting, fishing, and foraging to bird 
watching, hiking, and dog sledding – and the 
list goes on. Such a slate of activities for differ-
ent populations and regions is found in SLiCA 
data, but similar data would need to be collect-
ed for the non-SLiCA regions. Some of these 
activities are more relevant to indigenous than 
non-indigenous populations and some are 
pursued predominantly by either women or 
men. In sum, ensuring that the diversity of 
activities would be inclusive of all groups would 
make this indicator too complex and would 
necessitate an enormous and unwieldy data-
gathering effort. 
2.1.2 Time on the Land
Perhaps there would be a way to solve the data 
problem of the participation in the traditional 
economy indicator by focusing on the quantita-
tive measure of time spent in activities or “time 
on the land.” Many rural Arctic populations 
depend on subsistence resources for some per-
centage of their household food. Subsistence-
dependent Arctic inhabitants, by design, need 
to spend significant time in nature engaged in 
harvesting activities (Berkes and Jolly, 2001). 
The more a household depends on subsistence 
resources, the more time its members need to 
spend on the land.
The rationale for considering time on the 
land as an indicator for the contact with nature 
domain is that it represents time away from a 
household context, spent in nature and in-
volved in subsistence and/or other outdoor 
activities. It is important to note that some 
research has shown Arctic inhabitants are 
spending less time on the land and in contact 
with nature, and that this trend is in turn affect-
ing other aspects of well-being. As Young 
(1996) succinctly states, “Spending less time on 
the land has been shown to be a direct correlate 
of obesity in Arctic populations, suggesting that 
along with less time on the land, Arctic popula-
tions are also engaging in less healthy diet prac-
tices. Again, this is a reminder of the impor-
tance to corroborate indicators to gain the most 
robust measures of well-being.
Before considering the applicability of time 
on the land as an indicator, we first provide a 
few “close-ups” of how time on the land is, in 
fact, key to human well-being in the Arctic.
Close-up: reindeer herding
Among nomadic tundra Nenets herders inhabi-
ting the Yamal National Autonomous Okrug 
(YNAO) of  northwestern Russia’s tundra, rein-
deer are intensively managed 24 hours a day, 
365 days a year, by whole families and across 
generations (Krupnik, 1993; Stammler, 2005). 
Among intensive herding populations, the herd 
size of individual households varies greatly 
(Stammler, 2005). Generally, the further north 
a herder lives, the bigger the herd. In northern-
C
h
ap
ter 6
Contact with nature
116 Arctic Social Indicators
Reindeer Herding in the Arctic
There are more than three million semi-domesticated reindeer across northern Eurasia of which 
700,000 are in the Saami area (Baer, 2002). Reindeer herding is a small activity in terms of its 
employment and economic impact. There are fewer than 100,000 people engaged in it, includ-
ing elderly people and children. In other words, reindeer herders make up less than 1% of the 
total human population of the Arctic. On the other hand, while the rest of the total Arctic 
human population is declining in most areas, the number of reindeer herders is actually grow-
ing (Turi, 2002). It is estimated that, including consumption of meat for personal use, the total 
meat production by reindeer herding is 18,000 tons per year with an approximate commercial 
value of USD $50 million to $52 million. The Nordic quota constitutes more than 50% of this 
amount. This roughly equates with the combined production capacity of three to four medium-
size fish farms (Turi, 2002). Reindeer herding is, therefore, significant for thinly populated 
northern regions but fairly insignificant economically compared with the main competing 
interests within modern Fennoscandia such as the mining, hydro power, timber, and tourist 
industries (Beach, 1981; Turi, 2002; Forbes et al., 2006). 
Reindeer management has brand value in modern Finland, meaning marketable value over 
and above that of meat. Some herders have created niche markets for custom-made meat pro-
ducts, such as high-end restaurants in Helsinki. After Finland joined the EU, the much-criti-
cized centralized slaughterhouses had an unintended positive side effect. Reindeer meat slaugh-
tered in these slaughterhouses and processed in meat factories is not considered good enough 
for private buyers. Demand for traditionally slaughtered reindeer that is cut specifically for 
household use is higher than some herders can produce (Hukkinen et al., 2006).
On the Yamal and Kola Peninsulas in Arctic Russia, annual per capita consumption of rein-
deer meat is extremely high (ca. 200 kg to 225 kg) (Konstantinov, 2005; Stammler, 2005). 
Although figures for harvest and consumption were not available, we know that herders also 
spend a great deal of effort procuring fish year-round, especially in summer when they prefer 
not to slaughter their reindeer to avoid wasting the molting fur. On the Yamal Peninsula, large 
families are the norm among nomadic Nenets, and youth retention appears to be high (Ulvevadet 
and Klokov, 2004). Along with the steadily increasing reindeer population, these data indicate 
that reindeer herding is a vibrant livelihood, albeit one faced with threats from accelerating oil 
and gas development (Stammler, 2005; Forbes et al. 2009 in press).
Nenets women 
corralling reindeer 
outside chums at winter 
pastures near Nadym, 
YNAO. Notice reindeer 
skin coats, boots and 
chum covering.
Photo by B.C. Forbes
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most Yamal, a herd of 500 is seen as sufficient 
for the subsistence needs of a household, where-
as in the central and southern parts, a herd of 
150 to 300 is adequate. Among the mountain 
herders in the southwest of YNAO, a private 
herder with 100 animals is thought to be well-
off. The absence of firewood in the far north 
and the need to transport wood over long dis-
tances considerably increases the need for trans-
port animals. Monthly reindeer meat consump-
tion among tundra Nenets is fairly consistent 
outside of summer, when the staple food be-
comes freshwater fish to avoid slaughtering 
molting animals and in doing so wasting the val-
uable fur, which can be used for many purpos-
es (clothing, bedding, tent covering, etc.). Ac-
cording to Stammler (Univ. of Lapland, pers. 
comm., 2007), an average household may 
slaughter an adult male or female animal every 
10 days for consumptive use, including food for 
dogs kept for managing the herd. Nenets rein-
deer are the smallest in size among the four do-
mestic breeds or ecotypes in Russia. The aver-
age weight for male after slaughter is 52 kg to 
58 kg (Stammler, 2005). Across YNAO in 1998, 
there were 2,618 nuclear family-based house-
hold units managing nearly 600,000 reindeer 
(WRH, 1999). As of 2007 the number of herd-
ed animals was over 630,000 (UralPolit, 2008).
Whereas the actual number of deer owned by 
a household is based on the people’s need for 
subsistence and on their herding skills, the size 
of the grazing herd is a management decision. 
Baskin (1991) has established that the min-
imum herd size that can be managed effectively 
is 35 animals, the most efficient herd sizes is be-
tween 100 and 300 animals, and that a herd 
of more than 3,000 becomes mostly unmanage-
able. 
In addition to matters of basic management, 
herd size must be considered with regard to a 
wide array of different factors, such as hus-
bandry form (e.g., intensive versus extensive; 
see Ingold, 1980), security, workforce, and 
wealth storage, all of which are interdependent 
(Beach, 1981). Beach (1981) notes that a big 
herd can supply a herding family with enough 
food in the way of meat without suffering a 
steady decline in numbers. All slaughtered rein-
deer will be replaced in the course of reproduc-
tion, a resource not available to the small herd-
er, who would consume more meat per year 
than the herd could reproduce. In earlier times, 
the herder would have been forced into milking 
husbandry. Thus, for big herders, extensiveness 
and meat consumption traditionally went 
together at the other end of a gradient from 
small herding, intensiveness, and milking, which 
formed a unit (Beach, 1981). 
Since the transition from traditional Saami 
herding to the modern mixed economy, most 
small herders in Fennoscandia must now 
supplement their income from other sources to 
maintain their herds and their households above 
the poverty line or subsistence minimum (Beach, 
1981; Ulvevadet and Klokov, 2004). However, 
as it goes with hunting in a mixed economy 
(Wenzel, 1991), while alternative income may 
help one to remain in herding, any part-time or 
seasonal supportive work necessarily takes time 
away from the active herding job (Beach, 
1981).
Müller-Wille et al. (2006) explore the transi-
tion from hunting to herding in the Saami re-
gion of Fennoscandia during the period ca. 
1400–1700. In the newly emergent economy, 
the reindeer-herding Saami had the most secure 
social system among all the Saami subgroups as 
well as the colonizing settlers. Their food 
supply exceeded their own needs, and poorer 
About Much More Than 
Just Food
Of course, the procurement and slaughter 
of wild game and the management of do-
mestic animals (e.g. reindeer, horse, cattle) 
is about much more than just food, from 
prehistoric and historic through to modern 
times. In addition to basic sustenance, in-
teraction with animals provides the basis 
for clothing, shelter, tools, art, language, 
education, calendar, spiritual fulfillment 
and, not least, the maintenance of intra- 
and inter-household socio-cultural rela-
tions though formal and informal codes of 
sharing and reciprocity (Nelson 1969; 
Beach 1981; Wenzel 1991, 2005; Stammler 
2005; Vitebsky 2005; Müller-Wille et al. 
2006). In other words, interaction with ani-
mals is a key element of the social fabric of 
local communities throughout the Arctic. 
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members were provided with reindeer meat for 
survival. However, Krupnik (1993) argues that 
widespread intensive domestication in northern 
Russia after about 1600 was driven not by a 
shortage of food but by the limited supply of 
reindeer skins for clothing, shoes, winter tent 
coverings, and other household items necessary 
for surviving in such a cold climate.
Close-up: hunting
After eight to 10 hours of active breathing-hole 
seal hunting in the eastern Canadian Arctic, 
hunters begin the one- to two-hour trip home, 
hopefully with at least one seal lashed to each 
sled (Wenzel, 1991). One out of every five to six 
waits at a breathing hole in a day is likely to 
yield a seal. The 30 kg of meat and edible 
organs provided by one adult seal can energeti-
cally sustain one adult hunter for six full days. 
Longer winter journeys for caribou or polar 
bear are made by parties of up to five hunters 
and carry enough fuel and equipment to be self-
sufficient for a month (Wenzel, 1991). 
Factors such as distance necessary to travel to 
find a species and the return that can be expect-
ed relative to the effort invested must be con-
sidered. Each hunt, therefore, involves an 
elaborate calculation by hunters of yields and 
how alternatively to deploy their time, energy, 
and material resources (Wenzel, 1991).
In 1971, among a team of four hunters from 
Clyde River (Kangiqtugaapik), Baffin Island, 
during a four-week period of winter sealing, 
hunting was done on 21 days (452 hunting 
hours) and a total of 34 ringed seals were cap-
tured. Hunters spent 204 hours actually hunt-
ing, another 160 hours repairing and manufac-
turing equipment, and 88 hours traveling to and 
from the ice. They were rarely absent from the 
community overnight and did all of their equip-
ment repair and manufacture in the community 
(Wenzel, 1991).
In the contemporary context, winter sealing 
among Kangiqtugaapik Inuit is still mostly done 
on day trips, but longer distance hunting con-
sumes at least weekends. The coastal area 
around modern Kangiqtugaapik is dotted with 
cabins, so being out is more comfortable than 
it used to be. The longest trips are for summer 
caribou and take a minimum of four to five 
days. There are still some hunters who are out 
probably 200 days each year, but they are rare 
as money for equipment and fuel is always an 
issue. Wenzel believes that an average of 100 
days out per adult male is probably a reasonable 
guess since his own data are biased toward 
hunters who are not restricted by, for example, 
employment during weekdays (Wenzel, Dept. 
of Geog., McGill, pers. comm., 2007).
According to Nelson (1969) northwest Alask-
an “Eskimos are very particular about traveling 
when it is light outside, because they regard 
night travel as highly unadvisable. They always 
plan to travel so they camp or be home well 
before dark.” Hunters dictate their activities 
mostly according to the presence of game or the 
distance they have traveled during the day. 
Generally, hunters try to leave the village 
sometime in the morning and return by mid-
night. But nothing actually regulates when they 
will return except hunger or the urge to go 
home. 
Ringed seal pups are a highly desired food 
and Kangiqtugaapik hunters spend considera-
ble time searching for dens during the three- to 
four-week period from mid-April to mid-May 
when denning occurs. It is surprising how much 
hunting effort is spent: approximately five hours 
per pup with five attempts per successful cap-
ture (Wenzel, 1991). After the denning period 
ends in spring, both adults and pups can be 
hunted by rifle from a camouflaged snowmo-
bile. This method means approaching from 
downwind and each stalk takes only about five 
minutes, so many more seals can be stalked. It 
is difficult to estimate the time and effort ex-
pended in the various types of spring sealing, as 
hunts may last up to 24 hours and are often 
combined with wider travel (Wenzel, 1991).
 At Point Hope, Alaska, a single hunter may 
kill 200 ringed seals and a few bearded seals in 
a single winter. A crew of hunters at Wainwright, 
Alaska, can sometimes take 20 seals in a 
summer’s day from the ice edge. Ice-edge seal-
ing can provide a hunter with 1,000 pounds of 
game a day, even more on occasion. A single 
bearded seal may weigh that much alone. Under 
normal conditions during the winter, a hunter, 
if proficient, brings home one to three seals 
with each trip out. In the mid-1960s, only 200 
or 300 seals were killed in years when caribou 
were abundant, more when there was not 
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enough of this preferred meat or when few 
walruses were taken (Nelson, 1969).
Considering time on the land
Although the indicator of time on the land, not 
unlike the indicator of participation in tradi-
tional/outdoor activities, may at first glance 
seem ideal, it too has irreconcilable issues. First, 
not all subsistence activities require the same 
time on the land (or sea) input in relation to 
energy/kCal return. Human populations use 
wild resources that are available within their 
ecosystem, and so we see herders, hunters, and 
fishers in inland areas and fishers/sea mammal 
hunters along the coasts. Similarly, some sub-
sistence activities are located fully on the land 
(e.g., fish camps, bear hunts, Sakha horse breed-
ing), others only require partial time on the land 
(e.g., cattle and some reindeer production), and 
some, no time on the land (e.g., gardening). 
Similarly, some subsistence requires a house-
hold to live close to full-time on the land (e.g., 
reindeer/caribou herding). In short, the diver-
sity of time required for various subsistence 
activities, whether they are seasonal, daily, or 
one-time events, and whether they are located 
adjacent to a household or away, make develop-
ing and using this indicator problematic. 
A second problem is deciding on consistent 
measures for this indicator. Are we talking 
about number of minutes, hours, days, weeks, 
or months per year? Do we measure overnights 
differently than returning home each night? 
Exactly what of the time do we count? If 
resources are far away, do we count travel time 
to those resources or just the time spent in the 
subsistence or other activity? These issues of 
time could be overcome by developing case-
by-case or subsistence activity-by-subsistence 
activity average time input amounts. However, 
this would be a grandiose undertaking, consid-
ering the diversity of socioeconomic, political, 
and environmental contexts that the various 
Arctic populations live and practice. 
A third problem with time on the land as an 
indicator is lack of data. To date there is only 
anecdotal evidence available and only in several 
(but not all) Arctic regions. Gathering data 
would require asking people in an extensive 
circumpolar survey, the likes of SLiCA, which 
is not possible, given the scope, time, and re-
sources needed. There may be some data from 
which time on the land could be extrapolated, 
as in Norway where there are data in munici-
palities on the number of licenses issued for 
fishing with skidoos. In that context, it is clear 
that Saami municipalities give more licenses for 
skidoos than other Norwegian municipalities. 
But again, extrapolating this data and compar-
ing them across circumpolar countries is pro-
hibitive.
A fourth issue is the gender bias that time on 
the land would introduce. In Arctic societies 
there is a tendency for women to be settled in 
villages and men to go out on the land. This 
could be resolved by developing different 
measures for men and women, but doing so 
would further complicate the process. 
Lastly, the urban-rural difference would also 
be problematic. In urban settings individuals 
and/or households either make a complete 
summer exodus to the rural areas to participate 
in subsistence and other outdoor activities or 
reside part- or full-time at a dacha to grow gard-
ens, forage, and perform other activities, some-
times while maintaining daily employment. This 
diversity of contacts makes time on the land 
an unmanageable indicator for contact with 
nature.
In most Arctic societies, men spend more time on the 
land hunting, fishing, and herding than their female 
counterparts, with the latter more often staying home to 
attend to the subsistence activities there. Here pictured is 
a Viliui Sakha grandmother cleaning the ducks that her 
sons brought home with her granddaughter looking on 
and learning her future role. Pictured Matryona Yegorova 
and granddaughter Kathryn Yegorov-Crate, Elgeeii village, 
April 2000. Photo by S.A. Crate.
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Gardening, especially for 
such staple crops as 
potatoes shown here, 
represents one of the 
many forms of ‘time on 
the land’ for Sakha, 
native horse and cattle 
breeders of northeastern 
Siberia, Russia. 
July 2004. 
Photo by S.A. Crate.
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2.2 Indicators: Consumption of Country 
 Food and Harvest 
There is a wide range of wildlife and plant spe-
cies in the Arctic used for food, especially by 
indigenous populations but also by non-indig-
enous residents (Crate, 2006a; 2008b; Forbes 
and Kofinas, 2000; Klein, 2005). Dietary and 
cultural changes in the last century have decreased 
the proportion of wild food that Arctic communi-
ties consume. Both the increased access to market 
food being available stores and a trend toward 
modernity, with youth aspiring to higher educa-
tion and career paths outside their home villages, 
have contributed to a decrease of wild food 
harvesting activities in many communities. Never-
theless, wild foods are valued for their superior 
taste and nutritional qualities and for their connec-
tions to cultural identity.
Indigenous populations of Canada and Alaska 
refer to their wild foods as “country foods,” 
while other Arctic inhabitants refer to “tradi-
tional foods.” For our purposes, it is important 
to expand that understanding to include 
domesticates, both animals (reindeer, cattle, 
horses, etc.) and plants (garden and field), con-
sidering that again, these sources are produced 
on a small scale, subsistence and/or limited-
market level in a human-environment context 
similar to wild species.
Despite the general tendency for Arctic resi-
dents to consume less country food, there are 
some anomalies. Census-type surveys of 
Inuvialuit harvesters conducted in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and then again in the 1990s, show 
that the geographic extent of harvesting over 
that time period stayed about the same, but the 
ratio of country foods from marine and terres-
trial sources shifted, showing a reliance more on 
the latter. Despite the change in sources of 
country food, the central place of country food 
in the Inuvialuit household diet remained un-
changed (Usher, 2002). Parallel observations 
were made in the eastern Canadian Arctic as 
detailed by Wenzel (1991) and Priest and Usher 
(2004).
Close-up: Viliui Sakha and other case studies
In the post-Soviet context, country foods be-
came highly desired for reasons of economics 
and cultural identity. With high unemploy-
ment, households turned to country foods to 
feed themselves. And in the case of the Viliui 
Sakha, native horse and cattle breeders of north-
eastern Siberia, country foods represented what 
it meant to be “Sakha” in a post-Soviet ethnic 
revival (Crate, 2006a; 2008a). Village-level data 
show an overall increase in country food con-
sumption since the fall of the USSR. These data 
also reveal great disparity among households, 
with some consuming close to 75% country 
food and other consuming none. Such disparity 
can be explained in various ways. Households 
not consuming country foods tend to be made 
up of single mothers with few, if any, kin rela-
tions in the immediate or adjacent villages 
(which limits their pooling of the needed re-
sources of land, labor, and animals) and with 
substantial subsidies to allow for reliance on 
store-bought foods. Households consuming a 
majority of country foods tend to have ample 
resources (land, labor, animals, and tools) and 
the necessary knowledge base to produce coun-
try foods. To the extent that country food pro-
duction requires intimate human-environment 
interaction, it can be used as an indicator of 
contact with and closeness to nature.
The importance of kehii, or house gift, to 
Viliui Sakha, illustrates beautifully one unex-
pected place that country foods can play (Crate, 
2003). Kehii is considered a fundamental part 
of Sakha social interaction. Most often it is giv-
en by guests when they are staying with a house-
hold, but it can also be given to the guests by 
the host. Country food is most often given, and 
its rareness increases the value of the gift. An 
especially prized and rare kehii is wild straw-
berry jam because the berries are only slightly 
larger than a pinhead and grow in a sparse 
ground cover plant that is difficult to find. More 
common examples of a kehii include a jar 
of crème fraîche, a portion of blood sausage 
(either cow or horse), and wild-caught fish or 
meat, usually moose or bear. Kehii symbolizes 
the bond between guest and host. It also speaks 
to the level of country food the gift giver’s 
household accesses and its associated contact 
with nature. 
Kehii also plays a central role in Viliui Sakha 
rural-urban etiquette. As in other Arctic con-
texts (Chan and Kuhnlein, 2005) indigenous 
communities closer to urban centers tend to eat 
less country food because they have greater ac-
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cess to store-bought food, employment rates are 
higher and therefore there are greater monetary 
resources to purchase food, and there is less ac-
cess to and time for country food harvesting. 
This does not mean that urbanites do not con-
sume county food. In fact, it is common to 
visit a Sakha household in the capital city, 
Yakutsk, and find wild strawberry jam, crème 
fraîche, and homegrown meats in the larder. 
The source of country food in urban contexts is 
largely based upon kin relations in home villag-
es. Often city dwellers spend their summers in 
the heavy labor of hay cutting for winter forage 
and receive in return their full year’s supply of 
country food including cow, horse, and pig 
meats and organs; wild berry preserves; and 
milk products, including frozen milk, all of 
which is sent into the city on cargo trucks 
during the winter. In addition to or in the 
absence of such kin connections in the country, 
Sakha urbanites often have a dacha just outside 
of the city where they spend most of the 
summer, as their work permits, to grow a large 
portion of their vegetable needs, forage as they 
can, and “have contact with nature.“
Other studies also suggest the role of country 
foods in bridging the urban-rural divide and in 
maintaining cultural identity. For example, the 
only ethnic and cultural distinctions between 
those urban Inuit living in northern Canada and 
those who have moved south to live in Montreal 
is the sharing of country food (brought to the 
city from the North) and the speaking of their 
native Inuktitut (Kishigami, 2002). The same 
study found that urban Inuit who intermarry 
soon lose their taste for country foods. 
In some cases, studies on the urban-rural 
dynamic underscore the central role of country 
food for native urbanites and the country-spe-
cific politics involved. In an analysis of how 
urban native and non-native residents would be 
affected by the rural-residence option, Lee 
(2002) documented how urban Alaskan Yup’ik 
women exchange their city’s riches, in this case 
day-old doughnuts with country foods includ-
ing duck, caribou ribs, seal meat and skin, tom 
cod, and salmon berries. Greenland’s Home 
Rule government has been active in promoting 
the marketing of country foods. Historically 
Greenlanders earning wages have bought coun-
try foods from Greenlandic hunters. Today this 
continues in local kalaalimineerniarfik (place 
where Greenlandic foods are sold). The govern-
ment today promotes the use of nutritious and 
culturally valued foods to further their goals of 
sustainable development and to bolster rural 
economies (Marquardt and Caulfield, 1996).
Dietary differences between northerners and 
“outsiders” persist today, even among groups 
that are considered highly acculturated and 
have long ago been brought into a cash econ-
omy:
An Eskimo once told me that his people 
simply could not live on a steady diet of 
white man’s food. At first glance it seemed 
he might have made this statement only to 
support his wish to hunt, even though he 
was earning a steady income. But on sec-
ond thought, the overwhelming truth of 
his statement is readily apparent if we 
simply reverse the roles, placing the out-
sider in a position of having to live entir-
ely on the Aboriginal Eskimo diet. It 
would be very difficult, as I learned from 
personal experience and observation of 
others, for the white man to make such a 
shift in his own diet. And it is at least as 
difficult for the Eskimo to live on the 
white man’s food. (Nelson, 1969).
Northwest Alaskan Eskimos believe that hav-
ing good food, especially when camping, is 
essential if they are to work at full capacity and 
keep themselves fortified against the cold 
(Nelson, 1969). Nelson (1983) provides a tabu-
lation of “uses for selected major species,” 
which includes moose, caribou, and black and 
C
h
ap
ter 6
Contact with nature
Pictured here is a com-
mon sight when enter-
ing a rural Viliui Sakha 
home in mid-December. 
Most households slaugh-
ter annually, just after 
temperatures drop 
below freezing day and 
night. Once their total 
slaughter is in, they 
divide it between their 
household and the 
various kin households 
that helped with the 
haying the previous 
summer. 
December 2000. 
Photo by S.A. Crate.
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brown bear. It reveals the thoroughness with 
which these and other species are consumed by 
the Koyukon of interior Alaska. In general, 
there is a strong seasonality of consumption 
patterns in most Arctic and boreal cultures 
(Nelson, 1969; 1983; Helm, 1981; Damas, 1984; 
Vitebsky, 2005). For example, among modern 
Nenets, mid-May to mid-June is the “month of 
bird nests.” During this time reindeer herders 
can shoot up to 30 geese a day, which provide 
a welcome addition to their diet at a time when 
they prefer not to slaughter their animals. For 
protein during summer migration, Nenets 
nomads subsist mainly on freshwater fish and 
similarly try to avoid killing useful animals 
(Stammler, 2005).
Animals are important to the Koyukon of in-
terior Alaska not only as food and objectives of 
the subsistence quest, but also as personages 
and powers who share the world in which hu-
mans live (Nelson, 1983). In Eurasia, the utility 
of tame reindeer has gradually evolved over the 
last millennium from being primarily a means 
of transport for hunting other game to being 
used as meat—an end product regulated by 
agricultural norms set by the various states 
(Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway) (Krupnik, 
1993; Vitebsky, 2005; Hukkinen et al., 2006; 
Müller-Wille et al., 2006). For nomadic herd-
ers, meat is a by-product of the process of rejec-
tion. In other words, the animals eaten are those 
that are no longer useful enough to keep 
(Vitebsky, 2005). 
There is a basic geography of consumption in 
the North, with marine mammals historically 
being the mainstay of most coastal dwellers 
north of the treeline, while caribou, reindeer, 
moose, and other land mammals figure more 
prominently in the diet of those who live in the 
boreal forest and forest-tundra regions (Helm, 
1981; Damas, 1984; Krupnik, 1993). Within 
subsistence cultural groups, there can also be 
distinct ecological “exploitative” zones tradi-
tionally characterized by differences in hunting 
technology and diet (Damas, 1984). Although 
significant changes are possible in subsistence 
activities over time within a given region in con-
junction with climate and other drivers, broad 
scale spatial variations persist in the modern 
Arctic and so have important implications for 
regional resource management (Forbes and 
Kofinas, 2000; Klein, 2005; Nuttall et al., 2005; 
Forbes and Stammler, 2009). 
Among Inuit in North America and eastern 
Asia, certain types of food with fats and oils are 
consumed to maintain body warmth – in both 
people and working dogs – during camping, 
hunting, traveling, and under emergency condi-
tions (Nelson, 1969; Krupnik, 1993). Vitebsky 
(2005) remarks similarly on the Tungus rein-
deer herders of modern Sakha Republic in east-
ern Siberia; in their climate animal fat is as im-
portant as protein. Alaskan Koyukon conscious-
ly exploit the fat cycles of many animals, large 
and small, which strongly affects their harvest-
ing patterns since fatter animals are selected for 
their better food value and flavor (Nelson, 
1983). Skilled hunters can pick out the best an-
imals, ranging from moose to over-flying ducks, 
in a split second and adjust their efforts accord-
ingly. The Koyukon particularly prize the rich, 
fatty, and delicious meat of the black bear 
(Nelson, 1983), although they also consider the 
body and mesentery fat and rendered grease of 
both moose and caribou to be delicacies. Fats 
and oils have many other uses beyond their high 
caloric and lipid content (Nelson, 1969; Damas, 
1984). The meat of the Siberian marmot is so 
full of fat that it cannot safely be eaten when hot 
and is regarded as medicine rather than food 
(Vitebsky, 2005). Indeed, among the Evenki, 
bear fat is used to heal wounds (Vitebsky, 2005), 
and marrow fat from the hind legs of mountain 
sheep is said to make a person a good hunter 
and stop bones from aching (Vitebsky, 2005). 
Animal fats and oils are not commonly eaten 
alone, but used more as a condiment or addi-
tive, and especially in the cold season they con-
stitute an almost essential part of every meal 
where meat is eaten (Nelson, 1969; Wenzel, 
1991). They can also be used as emergency 
lighting and cooking fuel. Obtaining the seal 
meat and fat is hard work; an average hunter 
burns about 3,000 calories a day while standing 
motionless over a breathing hole and fighting 
off the cold (Wenzel, 1991). Among Inuit, 
young ringed seals are said to be the best for 
eating (Nelson, 1969; Wenzel, 1991). Seal meat 
is also considered high quality as dog food be-
cause it keeps the animals warm during fierce 
winter gales (Nelson, 1969).
As for food preference, Nelson (1969) com-
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pares three different groups of Inuit from 
Wainwright, St. Lawrence Island, and northern 
Greenland. Among each group the most pre-
ferred food was the one most available. The 
Wainwright people are traditionally inland 
Eskimos and take more caribou whenever 
possible because, as they often say, a person can 
never get tired of caribou, even though it is easy 
to tire of all other kinds of meat. Similarly, 
north Greenlanders whose staple food is seal 
often say that a person may get tired of all 
other kinds of meat, but never seal meat. And, 
in turn, the St. Lawrence Islanders, who appar-
ently shoot a greater volume of walrus than any-
thing else, say that one never tires of walrus. 
The use of meat for domestic or subsistence 
purposes carries with it a completely different 
set of notions to the use of meat as a commod-
ity. Among Yamal Nenets, a shared meal of 
fresh, warm, raw reindeer meat and blood is 
called aibat (Stammler, 2005). After the men are 
finished, women and children are invited to 
have their share. Everybody brings their own 
knives for cutting the meat to eat on the spot. 
Aibat vividly exemplifies how the conversion 
from live to dead property is a conversion from 
shared rights to exclusive rights. The live animal 
might have been used by different people for 
various purposes. During subsistence slaught-
ering, its resources are shared for the last time, 
and entitlements literally become more exclu-
sive as the life and warmth leaves the animal. 
Therefore, fresh, warm, unfrozen meat or blood 
is shared during aibat, but once it becomes 
cold, the animal enters the exclusive domestic 
sphere of the owner’s household. The practice 
of slaughtering for aibat, in the community 
sphere of exchange, is done only with privately 
owned animals. 
Similar practices governing the slaughter, 
consumption, and sharing of food among North 
American Inuit are detailed by Nelson (1969) 
and Wenzel (1991). Reviewing historic and 
modern practices, Wenzel (2005) concludes 
that sharing among Inuit, or ningiqtuq, is more 
nuanced than can be represented in the two 
main models prevailing within the literature. 
The result is an economy that, from Alaska to 
Greenland, optimizes social inclusiveness 
rather than the maximization of individual or 
family economic well-being (Wenzel, 2005). 
In modern Nordic reindeer management, the 
most immediate goal is to maximize the effi-
ciency and profitability of meat production. 
In the case of Sweden, such so-called rational 
herd management derives from a combination 
of agricultural and Saami innovations but is 
neither completely Saami nor Swedish in con-
tent (Beach, 1981). Similarly, the main aim of 
tundra reindeer herding in Russia from the per-
spective of the state is meat production 
(Jernsletten and Klokov, 2002). The number of 
domestic animals has varied widely over the last 
century, just as the intensity of herding ranges 
widely in space and time (Ingold, 1980). Average 
annual meat production as measured by kilo-
grams per animal increases threefold from so-
called low-intensity to high-intensity herding. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, numbers de-
clined moderately to precipitously in several 
sectors of the Russian north, a strong exception 
being the YNAO, where numbers continued to 
increase (Jernsletten and Klokov, 2002).
Since the economic significance is minor, 
there are clearly other factors of reindeer herd-
ing that make it attractive to so many people 
across such a large portion of the Arctic. The 
strength of the livelihood is probably that 
it represents a lifestyle that is professionally 
challenging and rewarding, and thus represents 
a meaningful life for people (Turi, 2002).
Swedish law permits a maximum of 276,000 
reindeer in the country and the number varies 
annually according to conditions. Since the 
early 1980s, 70,000 animals are slaughtered 
annually, about 60% of which are calves, 
representing some 2,000 tons of meat. About 
20% of the production is exported, while in re-
cent years Sweden has also imported reindeer 
meat, mainly from Russia (Baer, 2002). 
According to a report by the Russian Ministry 
of Agriculture, a five-person family in YNAO 
needs 385 reindeer for subsistence based on an 
average supply of meat, furs, and live reindeer 
needed for transport. However, the general 
model used in this calculation does not account 
for the particularities of place; in the North, for 
example, more transport animals are needed to 
carry firewood, and in the forest-tundra there 
might be alternative sources of income and 
food (e.g., from game) (Stammler, 2005).
On average, the Swedish population con-
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sumes only 250 g of reindeer meat per person 
per year (Beach, 1981). In Finland, average 
annual reindeer meat consumption is slightly 
higher at 400 to 500 g per person (Hukkinen et 
al., 2006; Särkelä. Finn. Assoc. of Reindeer 
Herding Districts, pers. comm., 2007). This 
contrasts with the situation among herders of 
Russia’s Kola Peninsula, who in the mid-1990s 
were slaughtering one animal every six days or 
so, thus consuming about 570 g of reindeer 
meat a day (Konstantinov, 2005). At slaughter-
ing time in the “really venison-oriented public” 
of Lovozero, village residents are allowed to 
buy meat at wholesale prices and a typical f
amily stocks their freezer with 30 to 40 kg per 
person (Konstantinov, 2005). 
Country foods in conflict
Country foods have also met with resistance 
from the outside world. In parts of the Arctic 
the rise of the animal rights movement has come 
into direct conflict with country food consump-
tion (Wenzel, 1991). These actions impacted 
northern residents most notably following the 
1969 anti-sealing campaigns, after which the 
animal rights drive attacked all fur trapping 
(Myers, 2005). Contaminants, most notably 
persistent organic pollutants (POPs), present 
a second area of “conflict,” or pressure not to 
utilize country foods. Although the 2001 Stock-
holm Convention on POPs, which obligates the 
elimination of certain chemicals, the Arctic and 
its residents who mostly eat high on the food 
chain, are sinks for POPs. This issue came into 
public consciousness when high levels of POPs 
were found in the blood and breast milk of 
Inuit in northern Canada (Downie and Fenge, 
2003). 
3.0 Selected Indicator of Contact 
with Nature: Consumption or 
Harvest of Traditional Food
Based upon our analysis above, we recommend 
that the one indicator for contact with nature 
should be “consumption or harvest of country 
food“. One of the most frequently cited means 
of maintaining contact with nature is the har-
vesting and eating of traditional foods. Chief 
Charlie Jones of the Pacheedaht First Nation in 
British Columbia, Canada, who died at age 113, 
attributed his longevity to eating “proper food” 
– whale, seal, elk, deer, bear, beaver, and 
salmon. But he went on to lament that “now the 
rivers are fished out; there is too much felling 
of forests and the wild animal have been driven 
away” (Ross and Child, 2008). These sentiments 
are echoed across the Arctic where good health 
as well as spiritual and cultural sustenance are 
supported by the harvest and consumption of 
traditional or country food. The harvest and 
consumption of traditional food is also cited as 
the primary, if not the only, contact with nature 
in Arctic societies. 
Table 6.1 is a matrix of the consumption and 
harvest of traditional food as indicators for con-
tact with nature.
A small sample of the 
bounty of country food 
in a permafrost cooler in 
Tuktoyaktuk, an Inuvialu-
it hamlet located in the 
Inuvik region of the 
Northwest Territories, 
Canada. 
Photos by L. King.
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4.0 Concluding Comments
The primary reasons for recommending the 
consumption and harvest of country food are: 
the centrality of its consumption to Arctic cul-
tures and peoples; the availability of data and 
the ability of communities across the Arctic to 
collect those data; the generalizability of the 
concept across Arctic regions, for indigenous 
and non-indigenous peoples, for rural and ur-
ban residents, and for women and men; and fi-
nally, the data also lend themselves well to 
aggregation and to time series. 
This indicator provides the flexibility needed 
in the diversity of Arctic contexts. With it, one 
could measure both harvest and consumption 
or could choose one or the other depending on 
relevance to the particular region as well as ease 
and feasibility of data collection. Choices can 
and must be made about: whether to use house-
hold or individuals or aggregates of communi-
ties and /or regions; how to measure propor-
tions of food consumed by the households (i.e. 
– none, less than half, half, or more than half); 
whether to tally harvest by species; and in what 
contexts kilogram per household could be 
used.
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1.0 Introduction
Arctic regions have long been resource periph-
eries and internal colonies of the states that 
encapsulate them. Political decisions made in 
far-flung nation-state capitals and economic 
decisions made in corporate boardrooms in dis-
tant metropolises have determined the traje-
ctories of development that Arctic regions have 
experienced. Arctic residents are dependent on 
the resources of their homelands, the health of 
their ecosystems, and the right to use those eco-
systems. Yet their power over the use and pro-
tection of these territories and resources has 
been compromised by outside forces. Thus fate 
control is of critical importance to the sense of 
well-being and human development in Arctic 
areas.
1.1 The Concept of Fate Control
Fate control is, simply put, people‘s ability to 
guide their own destiny. While literature on fate 
control is scant, the concept is highly linked 
with the more common term “empowerment“: 
the process of achieving the capacity to “make 
choices and then to transform those choices 
into desired actions and outcomes“ (Ibrahim 
and Alkire, 2007). Fate control, thus, is the out-
come of empowerment.
To control their own fate, people must have 
the capacity to make their own decisions; they 
must also have the resources to implement these 
decisions (World Bank, 2000). Each of these 
aspects has both an internal and external com-
ponent: a person or community needs both the 
internal capacity and resources and a lack of ex-
ternal barriers to make and implement deci-
sions. The “concrete material, social, and insti-
tutional preconditions to exert agency“ are crit-
ical to empowerment (Ibrahim and Alkire, 
2007), and it is these to which we have paid 
special attention.
1.2 Overview of Fate Control in the Arctic
Fate control, or the lack of it, can be experi-
enced at the personal, household, community, 
and regional levels. Finnmark County in 
Norway, Greenland, Nunavut in Canada, or 
Sakha Republic in Russia may experience eco-
nomic and political dependence on, respective-
ly, Oslo, Copenhagen, Ottawa, or Moscow. 
Smaller communities in each of these regions 
may experience a lack of control in relation to 
the regional centre, Alta, Nuuk, Iqaluit, or 
Yakutsk, respectively. Individuals and house-
holds in an Arctic community may experience 
more or less control over their fate than do their 
neighbors, depending on their capacities and 
resources. Yet it is the collective control of fate 
that seems of critical concern to Arctic resi-
dents. Many communities and regions of the 
Arctic endure a residual dependence on outsid-
ers, who play a major role in administering 
political, economic, and cultural institutions 
even at the local level, and notably on a higher 
scale. Boom-bust economic cycles characterize 
large parts of the Arctic, with concomitant high 
unemployment and underemployment in many 
regions, and dependence on transfer payments. 
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Thus, we have focused first and foremost on 
fate control as a collective benefit.
Peoples of the Arctic give prime importance 
to fate control: in the Arctic Human Develop-
ment Report (AHDR) fate control was, there-
fore, mentioned as one of the three main areas 
that determine well-being in the Arctic (AHDR, 
2004). Lack of collective fate control has given 
rise to demands for self-determination and self-
government throughout the Arctic on different 
scales. In fact, over the last several decades we 
have witnessed the development of self-govern-
ment institutions in many areas of the circum-
polar North − for example, in Greenland, Inu-
vialuit, and Nunavut. 
While the term “devolution“ is often used to 
describe this process of downward transfer of 
decision-making power, it also suggests the be-
stowing of power from a higher to a lower level, 
ignoring the role of the lower-level groups in 
demanding this transfer. Rather, the process of 
transferring decision-making power and con-
comitant control over resources to more local 
levels almost always depends on insistence and 
doggedness on the part of the lower-level in-
stitution, as well as acquiescence by higher-
level ones.  
Fate control has become an essential narra-
tive of Arctic residents, and the desire to deter-
mine their own fate has been frequently ex-
pressed by indigenous peoples and groups 
within the Arctic:
We want to govern our own lives and our 
own lands and its resources. We want to 
have our own system of governance, by 
which we can control and develop our 
land for our benefit...We must become a 
people making our own history. To be 
able to make our own history is to be able 
to mould our own future, to build our so-
ciety that preserves the bests of our past 
and our traditions, while enabling us to 
grow and develop as a whole people 
(quoted in Brody, 1957).
Our lives are based upon the endeavors 
of the past generations; we are living and 
working in the present and we are build-
ing for future generations. Only when we 
have attained a secure position legally, so-
cially, and financially can our cultural life 
be fully developed and remain a living cul-
ture (quoted in Sillanpää, 1994).
Indeed, the right to fate control for indige-
nous peoples is enshrined in the recently adopt-
ed (13 September 2007) UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, most notably in 
Articles 3 and 4 (on self-determination), Article 
5 (on distinct political, legal, economic, social, 
Home Rule building 
in Nuuk, Greenland.
Photo: Birger Poppel
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and cultural institutions), and Article 26.2 (on 
ownership, use, and control of lands and re-
sources). This United Nations declaration 
underlines the significance of fate control − in 
all its aspects − as a key factor for the well-
being and human development of indigenous 
peoples.
However, fate control is not just a preoccupa-
tion of indigenous peoples. Arctic residents 
who are not indigenous, but who were born 
and/or have established long-term ties within 
the North also argue for greater control in de-
termining their own future (Thompson, 2008). 
This is, for example, emphasized when long-
term immigrants to the Arctic take part in the 
political life and claim rights equal to those of 
the indigenous peoples.
How might we measure changes in fate con-
trol over time? Below we identify and then dis-
cuss several possible indicators of fate control 
and consider measures to track changes in these 
indicators. We focus on indicators for collective 
fate control, but offer suggestions for measures 
of individual fate control as well. We conclude 
by proposing a fate control index.
2.0 Possible Indicators of Fate 
Control in the Arctic
We identified 12 possible fate control indica-
tors. We then grouped these indicators under 
the following categories, acknowledging that 
the categories are not discrete; overlaps exist 
among them.
Political Power and Political Activism
  1. Political participation
  2. Perceived political influence
  3. Resistance
Decision-making Power
  4. Proportion of local personnel in key deci-
         sion-making positions
  5. Local control over place names
  6. Rights to land and sea resources
Economic Control
  7. Self-generated income 
  8. Local control of the economy 
Knowledge Construction
  9. Knowledge/information about politics 
10. Access to information
11. Language retention 
Human Rights
12. Recognition of human rights 
In elaborating on these indicators and consid-
ering potential measures for them, we deter-
mined that a relatively simple and transparent 
index of fate control could be created to incor-
porate elements from the categories above. The 
different indicators and the proposed fate 
control index are discussed below. 
2.1 Indicators of Political Power and 
 Political Activism
All Arctic countries of today can be described 
as modern political democracies adhering to 
four factors: 
1. Governments at the local, regional and/or 
national level are democratically elected.
2. Both men and women have political rights.
3. There are arrangements to ensure the rep-
resentation of the concerns of indigenous 
peoples and ethnic and other minorities.
4. Institutions analogous to non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and labor unions 
exist.
These four factors are key to the existence of 
real and perceived political fate control.
Institutional arrangements vary from country 
to country. In the Fennoscandinavian countri-
es, the indigenous Saami have their own ethno-
political governmental institutions; in Nunavut 
and Greenland, public governments have 
established themselves; in Greenland as well as 
some of the other Arctic countries, people have 
a long historical tradition of establishing a large 
number of NGO-like organizations (e.g., 
women‘s, youth, environmental, and indige-
nous organizations). The modern political 
development in Greenland and Scandinavia 
would be unthinkable without the existence of 
strong or influential political parties and labor 
unions. In Alaska and Canada, the land claims 
processes were driven by Native or indigenous 
organizations. Differences in the institutional 
arrangements and in the power of the various 
organizations (state, indigenous, NGO) pro-
vide challenges to finding commensurable indi-
cators across the Arctic.
2.1.1 Political Participation
Political participation in decision-making is a 
common measure of empowerment, and it can 
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be measured in a variety of ways such as the 
participation of voters in elections, the repre-
sentation of political platforms via political 
bodies (e.g., parties), and the number or 
density of NGOs.
2.1.1.1 Electoral participation 
Voting participation is a formalized and com-
paratively passive but common form of civic 
engagement in democratic societies. The popu-
lation exercises the right to vote in national, 
regional, local − and in selected jurisdictions, 
indigenous-elections. Consequently, electoral 
participation is an important indicator of a 
functioning civil society. It is also an indicator 
of fate control because the availability of oppor-
tunities and willingness to engage in representa-
tive democracy are directly linked to the ability 
to exercise (or implement) control over one‘s 
destiny. One distinctive feature of several Arctic 
electoral systems is the duality of public and 
indigenous governance institutions. 
Using electoral participation as an indicator 
has several advantages. First, data are easily 
available: government statistics exist, and the 
information has been gathered by the Survey of 
Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA), which 
included a question about participation in the 
last election at various levels (see Tables 176 to 
180 in SLiCA, www.arcticlivingconditions.org). 
Second, data on electoral participation are 
measurable, and third, the data work across 
scales. 
A disadvantage of this indicator is its internal 
validity. Arctic countries have substantially dif-
ferent civil society traditions, political systems, 
and modes of representative democracy 
(AHDR, 2004): actual and perceived meanings 
of voting (or non-voting) depend on the 
country and/or region-specific conditions, 
socio-demographic stratification of votes, and 
prevalent attitudes toward political processes. 
In addition, different elections also have dis-
similar “weight“ (perceived or real) in terms of 
fate control. In jurisdictions with strong region-
al and self-governments, regional and local elec-
tions see higher turnouts than do national (e.g., 
in the Canadian territories, Greenland, and the 
Faroe Islands). More centralized countries, 
where national governments exercise consider-
able authority over local issues (e.g., Russian 
Federation) show the opposite tendency. Some 
“hot-issue ballots,“ in which stakes of individu-
al voters are high, tend to attract more voters 
than regular elections (e.g., a 2005 amalgama-
tion referendum drew 74% of voters in the 
Evenki Autonomous District of central Siberia, 
whereas the general parliamentary elections in 
2003 saw a turnout of only 48%).
Definitional issues also pose problems for 
comparisons across space: in some places the 
participation rate is calculated on the basis of 
the voting age population, in others it is on the 
basis of the eligible voting population, and most 
frequently it is on the basis of the registered vot-
ers. In some places in the Arctic registration is 
voluntary (Alaska), whereas in others it is auto-
matic (Russian Federation). Therefore, in terms 
of fate control how do we, for example, inter-
pret that the turnout for the Saami parliament 
election in Norway is very high, but that only 
a minority of the Saami population has reg-
istered? 
Saami Parliament, Norway. 
Photo: Saami Parliament
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Also causing problems with this potential in-
dicator are ongoing electoral reforms. Because 
of this and the other limitations, at the collec-
tive level the use of political participation as a 
proxy indicator of fate control seems limited. 
However, self-reporting of participation of the 
various elections open to an individual is a func-
tional measure of activism and reasonable proxy 
for personal political power.
2.1.1.2 Political representation 
The concept of political representation is relat-
ed to electoral participation. Political repres-
entation considers not the willingness to vote, 
but the opportunity to exercise fate control 
through representation in political bodies. 
Presumably, the greater the representation 
people have, the more opportunities exist to 
control their destiny. Representation may also 
affect the propensity to cast votes, since it may 
influence perception of how much individual 
votes matter. On the other hand, the “impact 
factor“ of votes from a particular region may 
determine the degree to which the “voice“ of 
this locality is heard. 
For example, when Home Rule was intro-
duced in Greenland, outlying districts sent their 
own representatives to the Home Rule Parlia-
ment, but today this is no longer the case. 
Further, as part of the amalgamation deal with 
the Krasnoyarsk Kray, the Evenki and the 
Taymyr Autonomous Districts in Russia 
received a right to elect proportionally more 
representatives to the regional legislature than 
other municipalities. Political involvement of 
certain groups of voters (e.g., ethnic minorities) 
often depends on whether they enjoy special 
representation arrangements in the governing 
bodies. The number of women elected or run-
ning for election to the various bodies is also an 
indicator of fate control − at least for half the 
population. 
There are generally two forms of elected 
political institutions that exert decision-making 
power in the Arctic: public and indigenous gov-
ernments. The principles of elections and func-
tions of elected bodies vary across the Arctic, as 
does the relative importance of these two types 
of institutions. Some indigenous self-govern-
ment institutions, such as the Saami Parliaments 
and the Alaska Native Corporations, give equal 
rights to those living inside and outside the 
original homelands of the group. If a large 
sector of the electorate lives outside the original 
homeland, the issues and locus of fate control 
might look different for the various groups 
making up the electorate. These complications 
make measuring fate control, and especially 
cross-jurisdictional comparisons, challenging.
2.1.1.3 Non-governmental organizations
Another possible measure of political participa-
tion is the number of registered non-govern-
mental organizations (including labor unions, 
political parties and indigenous organizations) 
in the Arctic. The number of such organizations 
has been used as an indicator of democratiza-
tion, though not without criticism (Fisher, 1997; 
Henderson, 2002; Mercer, 2002). In the Arctic, 
it appears that NGOs work predominantly in 
the environmental sphere, although also in the 
indigenous rights sphere. Local NGOs encour-
age participation among local inhabitants (in-
cluding, but not limited to indigenous persons) 
(Domrin, 2001; Golenkova, 1999). 
Could the growth in NGOs indicate increased 
fate control? The recent heightened constraints 
on NGOs in the Russian Federation seem to be 
associated with an increasing centralization and 
decreased autonomy at lower levels of govern-
ment. Yet there are also examples of NGOs 
challenging local fate control: for instance, 
environmental NGOs opposing hunting and 
trapping, or even opposing resource develop-
ment that is supported locally. Thus, using a 
change in the number of NGOs as a measure 
poses problems of interpretation.
2.1.2 Perceived Political Influence
It is important that people not only have the 
opportunity to participate in the political pro-
cess, but also to feel that they can make a dif-
ference by influencing the process. Indeed, a 
demand for increased control over their fate 
could indicate a lack of perceived political 
influence, although political apathy can also 
result from a perception of lack of control. 
Perceptions of political influence can only be 
measured directly by such surveying. SLiCA in-
cluded questions on whether people thought it 
mattered if they voted and whether they were 
satisfied with the influence they have over the 
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management of different resources (see SLiCA 
Questions F.12, H.7, H.9; www.arcticliving-
conditions.org, Tables 200-203, 227-234). 
Voting patterns, especially “protest“ voting, 
might be used as a proxy, but this poses prob-
lems of assumptions regarding reasons why 
the populace is voting in certain ways. Also, 
different cultural traditions of protest voting 
challenge the validity of this indicator. 
2.1.3 Resistance
In broad terms, resistance might be seen as an 
indicator of lack of control, or as an indicator 
of an incipient stage in the evolution of empow-
erment. Strikes, demonstrations, and acts of 
civil disobedience all involve the opposition to 
decisions imposed and actions taken by higher-
level authorities. Resistance, and particularly 
acts of civil disobedience, serve as ways for 
marginalized populations to make their con-
cerns visible to state authorities and to demand 
that the state deal with those concerns.
The Arctic has witnessed many cases of civil 
disobedience, especially on the part of indig-
enous peoples. An examination of several of 
these cases over the last 150 years (Dahl, nd) 
suggests that from an analytical point of view, 
resistance is a good indicator of progress, both 
facilitated by and encouraging the evolution of 
more localized social, political, or cultural con-
trol. The cases examined are characterized by 
circumstances in which the traditional ind-
igenous structures seem unable to handle a new 
situation, yet in which local people have also 
not had access to or have tried in vain to use 
non-traditional (i.e., colonial) institutions. If 
civil disobedience is an exceptional form of 
resistance, it nevertheless seems a reliable indi-
cator of the evolution of increased fate control. 
Many of the cases of civil disobedience have led 
to spectacular changes in the rights of indig-
enous people: for example, the Barrow Duck-In 
in Alaska in 1961 (Arnold, 1976; Blackman, 
1989; Burwell, 2004; Case and Voluck, 2002; 
Dahl, nd), the protest against the icebreaker 
Sigyn in Greenland in 1975 (Dahl, nd); the Alta 
Dam protest in Norway in 1979 (Dahl, nd; 
Minde, 2005; Paine, 1982), and the Igloolik 
Bowhead whale hunt in Canada in 1994 (Dahl, 
nd; Høgh, 2000).
Problems with using this indicator include 
lack of comprehensive data, issues of measura-
The Icebreaker Sigyn
In May 1975, hunters along the Nuussuaq Peninsula in northwestern Greenland were surprised to see an approaching 
ship. They soon realized that it was the Sigyn, an icebreaker, and that it intended to break the ice between them and 
the land. The men were hunting on land-locked ice, and they knew that once it was broken it could drift, creating a 
very dangerous situation. The hunters wondered why they were not consulted or at least warned. Soon their dismay 
turned to anger, and a group from Niaqornat approached the ship with their dogsleds. The ship‘s personnel signaled 
the hunters to clear out of the ship‘s way, but the hunters refused. One hunter, who spoke some Danish, soon learned 
that the ship was on its way to the lead-zinc mine of Maarmorilik, at the head of the Uummannaq Fjord. 
When the ship‘s captain failed to persuade the hunters to move, he contacted the authorities. The mine sent a heli-
copter with the mayor and council members of Uummannaq municipal council. Meanwhile the Sigyn attempted to 
change its course, but once again the hunters blocked its passage. 
This may not have been the first incidence of civil disobedience in Greenland. Yet it was founded on promises by 
the mining company and government officials that the „settlements should not suffer from the mining.“ The hunters 
eventually agreed upon a compromise for that year, allowing the icebreaker passage through a less damaging route. 
More importantly, their protest resulted in a ban on icebreaking from 1 January to 1 June in future years, with icebreak-
ing after 15 November conditional on approval from the local municipal council. Compensation was also negotiated 
for the losses suffered by decreased opportunities to hunt.
The protest, improbable just a few years earlier, accompanied increasing demands in Greenland for greater fate con-
trol—a movement that would a few short years later result in Home Rule. Locals insisted that their own interests, in-
cluding in subsistence activities, be respected in the face of increasing resource extraction by external (Danish) and 
foreign interests (Dahl, nd).
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bility and even definition (what constitutes an 
act of resistance or civil disobedience), and in-
terpretation. Moreover, it is likely that the 
incidence of resistance activities would take a 
bell-shaped curve rather than a linear correla-
tion, being low in cases of very repressive 
regimes where almost no fate-control exists, 
and low again in cases where fate control is very 
high.
2.2 Indicators of Decision-making 
Power
2.2.1 Proportion of Local Personnel in Key
   Decision-making Positions
Having “outsiders“ inhabit key managerial 
positions may erode a community‘s or region‘s 
fate control. This feeling is heightened when 
those occupying such managerial positions do 
not speak the local language. Yet many areas of 
the Arctic experience a residual dependence on 
outsiders to run and administer political, eco-
nomic, and cultural institutions. Requirements 
of formal education for such positions reinforce 
these arrangements. A concern here is that de-
cisions by an outsider may not inculcate local 
values (cultural, environmental, etc.). 
This indicator, while of interest, poses diffi-
cult questions of how to define “local.“ One 
approach would be to measure indigenous, 
rather than local, managers; yet this might lead 
to significant misrepresentation of the situation. 
We considered whether a proxy measure could 
be created, and we contemplated one that com-
bined a probability of living in a locality for a 
certain time (e.g., more than 10 years) with a 
probability of holding a managerial occupation. 
We dismissed this indicator as posing intracta-
ble problems in terms of data availability and 
measurability.
2.2.2 Local Control over Place Names
Place naming has long constituted part of the 
process of asserting sovereignty over territories 
(Berg and Kearns, 1996; Thorton, 1997). The 
“inscription of names to places in the landscape 
can be read as a trope for enfranchisement“ 
(Heikkila, 2007); the act of naming places and 
having those names recognized, accepted, and 
used by others is inherently an act of power and 
authority. In fact, renaming of places by indig-
enous peoples has been referred to as “re-con-
quest“ (Herman, 1999). This is exemplified in 
some areas of the Arctic where there has been 
a concerted effort to have pre-colonial place 
names (including names of streets, public insti-
tutions, mountains, etc.) officially recognized 
and reinstated on maps, road signs, and else-
where where non-indigenous place names have 
been imposed. An interesting variant of this 
occurred in the Canadian Arctic in 1997 when 
The Barrow Duck-in
In Barrow, Alaska, May 1961, 138 hunters presented themselves to the game warden to be arrested. Each carried an 
illegally shot duck. They were protesting the recent arrest of two fellow villagers for shooting geese and ducks out of 
season. 
In rural Alaska, migratory wildfowl are important subsistence resources in the spring. The whale hunt was poor in 
1961, by May ice-based seal hunting was dangerous, and the caribou had not yet arrived. Yet an international conven-
tion between the US, Canada, and Mexico prohibited the shooting of migratory wildfowl during the only season that 
they were to be found in northern Alaska. Long mostly ignored, the treaty was suddenly being enforced − likely be-
cause of the power politics deriving from Alaska gaining statehood in 1959. 
The Native resistance ended with the charges being dropped and the villagers being told that they would receive 
forewarning of all future inspections. More importantly, the resistance paved the way for much broader efforts, first in 
terms of Aboriginal subsistence rights, and eventually in terms of land claims. This act of civil disobedience was an 
initial assertion of the Iñupiat taking control over their fate, one that would provide a paradigm for future resistance 
to assaults on Aboriginal lands and livelihood (e.g., Project Chariot, Rampart Dam) and one that helped unite Native 
Alaskans politically in their eventual demands for recognition of their rights to land (Dahl, nd).
C
h
ap
ter 7
Fate Control
136 Arctic Social Indicators
the people of northern Quebec fought the pro-
vincial government‘s policy requiring the re-
naming of several English place names into 
French (George, 1997).
This indicator has appeal as a proxy as it 
would seem to measure bottom-up efforts for 
local control. As well, the use of indigenous 
place names has been suggested as an indicator 
of cultural revitalization by at least one indige-
nous (though not Arctic) group, with resultant 
measures including the “number and/or per-
centage of maps and signs produced...that are 
bilingual or primarily use [the indigenous 
language]“ and “the number and/or percentage 
of maps and signs...that are partially bilingual“ 
(Quinn, 2007). While these local level measures 
would be difficult to collate, possible measures 
do exist. As all Arctic countries have official 
committees or boards to consider place name 
changes, it would be possible to track the 
locally requested changes of names that are suc-
cessful. Alternatively, maps could be used to 
track such changes.
However, the issue of relevance remains. This 
indicator may have limited importance to non-
indigenous peoples. Indeed, non-indigenous 
and indigenous inhabitants of the same area 
sometimes have opposing agendas regarding 
the renaming of places, which complicates the 
indicator‘s validity as a measure of fate control. 
In addition, the importance of renaming may 
vary over Arctic space. For instance, it appears 
that renaming places is of higher importance in 
the Canadian Arctic than in the Russian north 
(although some renaming occurred in the early 
post-Soviet period to purge the landscape of 
names linked to the more oppressive facets of 
Soviet regimes). 
2.2.3 Rights to Land and Sea Resources
For many Arctic residents, but especially indig-
enous peoples, the rights to possess, occupy, 
and use their homelands and the resources 
these contain is intrinsic to their identity. 
Enjoying such rights, the decision-making pow-
ers they entail, and the economic benefits they 
guarantee is a key component of fate control. 
The AHDR asserts that “local ownership of 
resources may deliver significant benefits to 
local and sub-federal government“ (AHDR, 
2004), noting the role of Prudhoe Bay in the 
North Slope Borough in Alaska‘s well-being.
In the Arctic, land and resource rights were 
traditionally collective rather than invested in 
individuals; ownership was not a concept com-
mon to most indigenous peoples. During the 
colonial period, states claimed and asserted 
proprietary, exclusionary, and disposition rights 
to Arctic territories and to the resources they 
embrace. While use rights to some renewable 
resources, such as flora and fauna, were often 
afforded to Arctic residents, governments leased 
or otherwise transferred non-renewable and 
some renewable (e.g., timber, fish) resource use 
rights to external companies. These users often 
eroded the ability of Arctic residents to practice 
their use rights, through competition over land 
and resources and environmental degradation. 
In short, Arctic residents have often benefited 
very little from extraction of their homeland‘s 
resources, while suffering high costs. 
The Paradox of the North 
„In the North we have found a paradox. On one hand, the North 
is the part of Canada in which Aboriginal peoples have achieved the 
most in terms of political influence and institutions appropriate to 
their cultures and needs. On the other, the North itself is a region 
with little influence over its own destiny. Most of the levers of poli-
tical and economic power continue to be held outside of the North 
and, in some cases, outside Canada...The political development 
achieved in the last 20 years in parts of northern Canada is striking. 
A framework for the future is beginning to emerge. As far as the 
economic and social future of northern communities is concerned, 
however, complacency would be ill-advised“ (Report on the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995).
Piece of map showing 
Inuit place names 
in syllabic.
Reproduced with the 
permission of Natural 
Resources Canada 2009
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Meanwhile property rights in the Arctic have 
been increasingly formalized, from a “com-
mons“ situation where customary law prevailed 
to legal recognition by the state (AHDR, 2004). 
Formalization includes transfer of authority 
between levels of governances, as well as nego-
tiated agreements to these share rights among 
such levels.
2.2.4 Local Control over Resource-governing
   Institutions
The ability to exercise the right to land and 
resources depends on the capacity to effectively 
regulate (govern) the use of the resources. 
Therefore, the rights to land and sea resources 
should be considered together with the meas-
ures of local control over resource-governing 
institutions.  
In many areas of the Arctic, states have 
assumed control over significant segments of 
the land and resources, transferring decision-
making power to southern capitals. More 
recently, the fallacies of doing so have become 
apparent; state institutions have begun to 
recognize the role that local knowledge may 
play in helping to wisely manage resources and 
plan land use, and that an integrated approach 
to resource management is more productive 
(Berkes et al., 1991; Smith, 2002; Usher, 
2000; White, 2006). Numerous co-management 
regimes have developed in response to local de-
mands for greater control over land and re-
sources as well as to state realizations of the 
benefits such arrangements may bring (AINA, 
1995; Osherenko, 1993). Through co-manage-
ment, local communities are able to reassert 
control and bring local knowledge and values 
to bear on resource and land-planning deci-
sions. 
The following factors could serve as indi-
cators for rights to land and sea:
1. The proportion of renewable resources in a 
given jurisdiction that are under the control 
(use and disposition) of local authorities. 
This could be calculated for key resources 
such as wildlife, fish, and forest/timber.
2. The proportion of land in a given jurisdiction 
(township, county, region, province, indige-
nous settlement area) over which local popul-
ation has some significant form of exclusion-
ary rights (ranging from rights to deciding by 
local referendum whether external develop-
ment is allowed to co-management rights 
over territory). 
3. The proportion of non-renewable resources 
in a given jurisdiction that are under the con-
trol (proprietary and disposition) of local 
authorities. This could be calculated for key 
resources such as minerals and hydro-
carbons.
The indicators are understandable and rele-
vant, yet information might provide a de jure 
picture that differs from practices on the 
ground. The reliability of data is likely to vary 
by geographic area, but the ongoing cost of col-
lecting data would be relatively low, and the 
data would be comparable over time and sensi-
tive to change. Comparisons over space would 
be aided by not focusing on “ownership“ but 
rather on the specific property rights (use, dis-
position, exclusion, proprietary) relevant to 
each indicator. 
2.3 Indicators of Economic Control
A distinctive feature of the Arctic economy is 
its inherent duality with the co-existence of a 
land-based traditional sector (also ice- and sea-
based), which is frequently geared toward sub-
sistence, and an export-oriented resource-
based sector, which is frequently based on non-
renewable resources. The two are interconnect-
ed by their reliance on natural resources and by 
their impact on the existential experiences of 
Arctic residents engaged in either or both types 
of economy. Recent decades have witnessed the 
increasing empowerment of local, particularly 
indigenous, populations to control the lands 
and resources. Colonial discourses of terra 
nullius and resource hinterlands have been 
replaced by more pluralistic discourses of indi-
geneity, environmentalism, and sustainability. 
Gains in local control over the primary factors 
of production (i.e., land and resources) have 
been institutionalized in the legal systems of 
Arctic states, most prominently through land 
claims agreements. The degree and extent of 
control vary, as do implementation mech-
anisms. 
At the same time, globalization trends have 
increasingly exposed the Arctic to external 
market forces and actors. The export orienta-
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tion of the staples sector has always dictated a 
resource frontier that was an internationalized, 
contested, and dependent on space, prone to 
external domination and control. Integration 
and deregulation trends over the past three 
decades have exacerbated this exposure. Large-
scale extraction projects require huge invest-
ments, and export economies are consequently 
dominated by large, vertically integrated corpo-
rations, which command production, employ-
ment, and infrastructure development in Arctic 
regions.
These opposing trends of increased self-gov-
ernance and globalization have created a com-
plex and highly contested environment in which 
there are a number of ways to measure eco-
nomic fate control, both institutionally and 
practically. These include qualitative assess-
ments of legal systems of resource governance 
and empirical analysis of Arctic economies in 
terms of ownership and control over their eco-
nomic base and export dependency.  
2.3.1 Self-generated Income
The idea of using self-generated income as an 
indicator evolved out of discussions on the use 
of transfer payments as a promising (in its ease) 
indicator. Self-generated income, as a partial in-
verse of transfer payments, fulfilled our desire 
to focus on “strength“ indicators. Also, the 
notion of transfer payments offers many com-
plications − from the highly conceptual (e.g., to 
what extent these funds should be considered 
payments by outsiders for access to local 
resources rather than “welfare“) to the more 
prosaic (e.g., what is included in different coun-
tries‘ understandings of what constitutes trans-
fer payments to individuals, locales, and 
regions, and what challenges this provides to 
comparability across space). 
The relevance of self-generated income to 
fate control lies in the idea of financial autono-
my. Self-generated income can be calculated at 
all levels: individual, household, community, 
and regional. Proxies could include self-
employment income plus earned income (wag-
es), or local investment capacity (savings or 
other measures).
Accessibility of data poses a problem at the 
lower levels; reliability would depend on the 
proxy adopted. The indicator certainly is sensi-
tive to change and temporally comparable; 
comparisons across space and especially across 
international boundaries would pose greater 
problems.  
At levels above the individual or household, 
economic self-reliance can also be estimated for 
different jurisdictions based on their fiscal inde-
pendence. This may be measured by the ratio 
of self-generated revenues to expenditures. 
Regional and municipal authorities, as well as 
Aboriginal governments, that are fiscally auto-
nomous may enjoy significantly increased fate 
control. Fiscal dependency, caused either by an 
insufficient local tax base or imbalanced rev-
enue-sharing regulations, curtails the ability of 
responsible officials to exercise effective control 
over their jurisdictions. Budgets in many north-
ern regions depend heavily on transfers from 
upper levels of government. In Canada, for in-
stance, the federal government provides 60% to 
90% of budget revenues to the northern terri-
tories. This case exists even in relatively re-
source-rich areas, when skewed revenue shar-
ing practices are in place. For example, Russia‘s 
northern regions are able to retain only 20% 
of the mineral resource use tax while the re-
mainder flows to Moscow (Oleynik, 2007). In 
2005-06, the Canadian government received 
$244 million in oil, gas, and diamond royalties 
from the Northwest Territories, leaving no 
share to the region (Roland, 2007).
2.3.2 Local Control of the Economy
Export-orientation inevitably places a regional 
economy in a dependent position in respect to 
foreign markets. The boom and bust cycles 
have defined the economic time-space of the 
Arctic ever since the fur trade and cod fishing 
opened up the Arctic as a staples frontier. Now 
at the beginning of the 21st century, export-
oriented sectors, mostly based on the extraction 
of hydrocarbon and mineral resources, timber, 
and fish, still dominate the economic landscape 
of the Arctic. The primary sector accounts for 
31% of the Arctic‘s gross national product 
(GNP), provides most of the Arctic‘s exports, 
and supplies the bulk of well-paid jobs 
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen, 2006). Resource 
dependency varies over the Arctic‘s regions, but 
large-scale industrial extraction projects gener-
ate the lion‘s share of export revenues. 
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This export reliance can diminish local con-
trol over economic destiny and leave regions 
relatively defenseless against external fluctua-
tions of commodity prices or political decisions 
when such resources are not owned or control-
led locally. The higher the weight of the export-
oriented sector of the economy, the less the 
ability of local residents to exercise control over 
their economic futures. 
An export-orientation ratio could serve as an 
indicator, but it would be difficult to interpret 
what upward or downward trends actually 
mean. Export reliance is not wholly negative. 
The other side of this Janus is economic “open-
ness.“ From a neoclassical economic interpreta-
tion, openness can be beneficial, as it stimulates 
integration, competition, and exchange. More 
open economies perform better than isolated 
ones, especially in the case of small economies 
with limited production mix. In the Arctic, the 
utility of such openness is, however, more 
questionable, given the staples nature of the 
economy and the level of control over various 
staples. Uneven terms of trade between raw 
materials and manufactured goods severely 
undermine possible efficiencies of resource 
specialization and produce dependency rather 
than prosperity, which is a point that was 
argued by Harold Innis in 1930 (Innis, 1999).  
Thus, the fundamental question related to 
control over economic fate is not whether open, 
export-oriented economies are more or less 
efficient, but whether northerners exert suffi-
cient power over these economies to determine 
their own economic destiny. A prevalence of 
foreign (or external) control over entities that 
dominate the Arctic basic industries would 
signal less empowerment and control over 
destiny. No matter how readily the external 
actors engage in power-sharing agreements, co-
management, or other partnerships with local 
stakeholders, the seat of final decision-making 
will remain in distant headquarters, dictated by 
shareholders‘ interests.
We assume that the propensity of local stake-
holders to implement control over economic 
decisions is proportional to the degree of local 
ownership of businesses in the region. Whereas 
a separate measure can be developed (e.g., 
an ownership control ratio), this indicator is 
directly linked to the ability to control local in-
stitutions of economic governance in general (as 
discussed in the previous section). In addition, 
the fundamental problem with implementing 
measures specifically based on corporate 
(business) control arises from the complexity of 
corporate ownership structures. Thus, although 
it is possible to develop such an indicator to 
better reflect fate control in terms of economic 
institutions, in this report we consider this 
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unfeasible, since the measures of the institu-
tional fate control have been already intro-
duced.   
2.4 Indicators of Knowledge 
Construction
2.4.1 Knowledge and Information about 
   Politics
Control of destiny is aided by having sufficient 
and good quality information about policy 
changes and political decisions that will affect 
an individual‘s life. “Informational assets“ are 
seen as an important ingredient of self-empow-
erment (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005). SLiCA in-
cluded a question about level of knowledge 
about politics (see SLiCA nd, Question F.4; 
www.arcticlivingconditions.org, Tables 194 to 
198). However, this indicator did not appear to 
merit development because its direct relevance 
to fate control seemed more limited than other 
indicators under consideration. As well, data 
would be difficult to access without surveying.
2.4.2 Access to Information
Access to information is critical to making in-
formed decisions about fate, and it has been 
noted as a key ingredient to increasing empow-
erment (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Alkire, 
2005; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). Thus we con-
sidered such access as a possible measure of fate 
control. Our discussions especially considered 
access to information about politics, but infor-
mation also may improve the ability to direct 
cultural and economic futures. 
Measures of this indicator could include the 
level of Internet coverage, the number of news-
papers sold or published per capita, the number 
of radio or TV stations carrying news available, 
the number of visitors to relevant websites, etc. 
It seems that the Internet might be the best 
proxy, given global trends.
Internet coverage could be measured by 
Arctic people‘s addresses and subscriptions, al-
though doing so would probably be very diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Coverage could also be 
measured by phone access, both land-line and 
mobile. Another possible measure considered 
was identifying the number of websites pro-
duced in and by Arctic residents/communities. 
However, while this method could be feasible 
for sites and services produced by public 
authorities, it is problematic for privately pro-
duced sites as they can be hosted anywhere. 
Ultimately, we felt that the relevance of these 
measures to the indicator is not fully clear.
2.4.3 Language Retention
While language retention may be seen as a criti-
cal measure of cultural vitality (see Chapter 5), 
it also is an important measure of fate control 
and can serve as a valuable proxy. Successful 
language retention requires a relatively ad-
vanced institutional and society framework that 
extends beyond the development of language 
curriculum and course offerings. A living 
language requires a certain number of speakers. 
For young people to choose and use their 
language, they have to see it as an asset for their 
future. 
There are different ways of measuring 
language retention, including its use in the com-
munity, in the work environment, in the media, 
in the political area, and in the educational 
system (at different levels). We can also look at 
whether the language is supported by new 
technologies (such as spell-check tools for com-
puters, web pages, etc.). Finally, we can consid-
er whether the native language is regarded as an 
asset by non-native speakers.
This indicator appears to be focused on the 
fate control of indigenous peoples rather than 
Arctic residents as a whole. Yet we propose 
an index that considers speaking one‘s own 
language, whether that of the dominant popula-
tion or of a minority population (see below). 
We feel this indicator not only addresses knowl-
edge construction, but also the issue of human 
rights. As language retention is being suggested 
as the indicator for another domain, the data 
will be available. 
2.5 Indicators of Human Rights
In a global perspective, concerns regarding 
human rights, including the protection of 
minorities, have increased in recent years. In 
the Arctic region the focus seems to have been 
mainly on the development of indigenous rights. 
Human rights, including indigenous rights, are 
critical to fate control.  
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Indicators of the recognition of human rights 
could involve examining whether a state has 
ratified key conventions that address human 
rights, such as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, or the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Other notable issues that have an 
impact on human rights in the Arctic are 
climate change, rights to access resources, and 
protection of cultural rights. States‘ adoption of 
conventions, laws, and agreements that protect 
such rights could be monitored (e.g., the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act and the National Museum of the American 
Indian Act in the US, the Utimut Agreement in 
Denmark-Greenland, the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Convention of North America, and various EU 
bans on the import of seal skins). 
Formal human rights mechanisms such as 
these are valid indicators of fate control. They 
fulfill the criteria for testing and assessment in 
terms of data availability, internal validity, 
robustness, and simplicity. As indicators they 
do pose challenges in terms of which treaties, 
agreements, and conventions to include, and 
the focus is mainly on the indigenous popula-
tion (or at least this will likely be the perception 
of many Arctic stakeholders). Perhaps the 
largest drawback is that they work mostly at the 
national level. 
Human rights cut across political, economic, 
and cultural domains. A number of other indi-
cators indirectly address human rights. As com-
ponents of our collective fate control index, we 
have chosen indicators that address human 
rights, and especially indigenous rights in terms 
political power, decision-making power, and 
knowledge construction.
3.0 Selected Indicator of 
Fate Control
3.1 A Fate Control Index
A possible and rather simple, but powerful, way 
of looking at fate control is to create an index 
where a region (community, district/county, 
province/territory/republic) would be evalu-
ated under each of the following four measures. 
In proposing this index we recognize that “com-
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posite indexes generate problems of attribute 
selection and weighting“ (Crilly et al., 1999; 
Fahey 1995). Transparency is sacrificed, and 
aggregation is problematic. On the other hand, 
their advantage for comparative and analytical 
purposes is difficult to dispute, and, not sur-
prisingly, many existing human development 
and well-being indixes are composite ones (e.g., 
UN HDI, Community Well-Being Index 
[McHardy and O‘Sullivan 2004]). 
We developed the fate control index as a 
combination of individual indexes that charac-
terize the sub-domains of fate control (see Table 
7.1). These measures cover the different cate-
gories of concern, identified above, that we feel 
are key facets of fate control: political power, 
decision-making power, economic control, 
knowledge construction, and human rights. 
Each measure is described below.
3.1.1 Component Indicator 1 The percentage 
of indigenous members in governing bodies 
(municipal, community, regional) relative to the 
percentage of the indigenous people in the total 
population
All Arctic communities consist of indigenous 
peoples, settlers, and immigrants. Seen in the 
perspective of human development, fate con-
trol should imply that none of these groups are 
discriminated against. Although the usual situa-
tion might be that the indigenous peoples are 
disfavored, any kind of discrimination or une-
qual power signals less control. 
This indicator measures relative political 
activity and power among different ethnic 
groups. It can be measured at the municipal, 
community, regional, or national level. 
• If the indigenous population has 40% of the 
seats and makes up 80% of the population, 
the score will be 0.5.
• If the indigenous population has 80% of the 
seats and makes up 80% of the population, 
the score will be 1.0.
• If the indigenous population has 90% of the 
seats and makes up 80% of the population, 
the score will be 0.88.
The highest fate control will be 1.0 and scores 
below or above indicate less control.
3.1.2 Component Indicator 2 The percentage 
of surface lands legally controlled by the inhab-
itants through public governments, Native 
organizations, and communes
As noted above, the ability to regulate the use 
of land and resources is a key component of fate 
control and to the well-being of Arctic resi-
dents. This indicator thus addresses political 
power, economic control, and decision-making 
power, while having a cultural dimension as 
well. Moreover, as international conventions 
stipulate indigenous rights to land, this indi-
cator incorporates a dimension of human rights. 
Focusing on legal authority (control) may help 
to avoid the “ownership“ conundrum of private 
title, a Western-centric ideology of develop-
ment. Legal control may be implemented 
through various mechanisms, including, but 
not limited to, ownership (public and private), 
lease, right of use, and delegated/assumed gov-
erning authority exercised by northern resi-
dents or institutions. Legal authority to land 
and resources incorporates, at local and higher 
levels, the ability to evoke customary law and 
tenure systems that are culturally or otherwise 
locally relevant. 
This indicator ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. (e.g., 
Table 7.1: Index of Fate Control (Collective)
Component Indicators  Sub-Domains
The percentage of indigenous members in governing bodies (municipal,  Political power/
community, regional) relative to the percentage of the indigenous people  human rights
in the total population
The percentage of surface lands legally controlled by the inhabitants through   Decision-making power/
public governments, Native corporations, and obshchiny  human rights
The percentage of public expenses within the region (regional government,  Economic control
municipal taxes, community sales taxes) raised locally 
The percentage of individuals who speak a mother tongue (whether Native or not)  Knowledge construction/ 
in relation to the percentage of individuals reporting corresponding ethnicity  human rights
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50% = 0.50). The measure would not include 
federal lands not directly controlled by local 
populations. It would include lands under 
long-term lease or use such as “territories of 
traditional nature use“ (territoriya traditsionno-
go prirodopol‘zovanie) in the Russian Federa-
tion.
3.1.3 Component Indicator 3 The percentage 
of public expenses within the region (regional 
government, municipal taxes, community sales 
taxes) raised locally
This indicator provides one measure of eco-
nomic control. Without fiscal independence, a 
democratically elected and popular government 
may nevertheless have limited ability to carry 
out its decisions.  
This indicator ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. (e.g., 
50% = 0.50)
3.1.4 Component Indicator 4 The percentage 
of individuals who speak a mother tongue 
(whether Native or not) in relation to the per-
centage of individuals reporting corresponding 
ethnicity
Language retention serves as a proxy for fate 
control in terms of knowledge construction and 
human (and particularly indigenous) rights.   
• If 25% of individuals who claim a specific 
ethnic background claim to speak that group‘s 
mother tongue, and 75% do not, the score 
will be 0.33.
• If 100% of individuals who claim a specific 
ethnic background claim to speak that group‘s 
mother tongue, the score will be 1.0.
This indicator ranges from 0.0 to a high 
of 1.0. 
The collective fate control index results from 
adding the four component indicators. The 
score thus ranges from 0.0 (minimal fate 
control) to 4.0 (high fate control). 
The four components together highlight the 
key areas of collective empowerment in the 
Arctic. In term of the effectiveness of the indi-
cators chosen (Parkins et al., 2001), we feel that 
the proposed measures for the four indicators 
are understandable (i.e., it is easy to discern 
what they are telling us); they are relevant to the 
indicators; data are accessible, retrievable and 
mostly trustworthy; and the cost of collection is 
reasonable (see Table 7.2). As well, it should be 
easy to compare data over time. 
3.2 Future Directions: Index of Individual    
Fate Control
We also offer the possibility of calculating an 
individual fate control index that parallels our 
collective fate control index. The sense of con-
trol over destiny is an important parameter of 
fate control. Subjective judgments about indi-
• 1 = scalable to individual; 2 - scalable to household; 3 - to community; 4- to region; 5 - to country
Table 7.2: Data Challenges
  Data  Data  Ease of  Robustness Scalability• Inclusiveness
Indicator Availability  Affordability  Measurement   
Percentage of indigenous 
members in governing bodies  Tier 2  3  Medium  3?  1-5  - 
relative to percentage of 
indigenous people in total 
population
Percentage of surface lands 
legally controlled by local  Tier 2   3  Medium  3  3-5  3
inhabitants
Percentage of public expenses 
within region raised in that  Tier 2  3  High  3  3-5  3
jurisdiction
Percentage individuals who speak 
mother tongue in relation to 
percentage of individuals  Tier 2?  3  Medium  3?  1-5  3
reporting corresponding 
ethnicity
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vidual empowerment personify the degree and 
effectiveness of fate control. 
Whereas our collective measures are largely 
available from the secondary data source, for 
our index we suggest relying on SLiCA-type 
data, with the provision that in the future such 
data should sample all Arctic residents, not just 
indigenous residents (see Table 7.3). 
 
3.2.1: Component Indicator 1 The percentage 
of elections in which an individual votes. 
This indicator is calculated as the number of 
elections the individual voted in divided by the 
number available to him or her. 
Political power is exercised primarily by 
voting. SLiCA Question F.6 asks, “Which of 
the following last elections did you vote in?“ It 
offers six types of elections for Alaskan variant 
of survey: city, traditional council, village cor-
poration, native regional corporation, state, and 
national. The respondent answers “yes,“ “no,“ 
or “not applicable“ to each question. Thus a 
respondent‘s political participation score would 
be calculated by dividing the number of “yes“ 
responses by, in this case, six minus the number 
of “not applicable“ answers.  
Scores would run between 0.0 and 1.0 
(=100%), with 1 being indicative of the highest 
level of political participation
3.2.2 Component Indicator 2: Satisfaction with 
influence local people have on the management 
of natural resources.
This indicator offers a proxy for capacity in 
terms of ability to exert influence over local 
land and resource issues. Two questions from 
SLiCA would combine to calculate an indicator 
of individual satisfaction: H.7 (on satisfaction 
with the degree of influence that local people 
have on the management of local renewable re-
sources) and H.9 (on satisfaction with the de-
gree of influence that local people have on the 
management of local non-renewable resources). 
An answer of “very satisfied“ would be assigned 
a score of 4; a “very dissatisfied“ a score of 0. 
The answers for both questions would be com-
bined, and then divided by 8, to receive a score 
between 0.0 and 1.0.
3.2.3 Component Indicator 3: Satisfaction with 
level with one‘s standard of living.
This indicator offers a proxy for economic 
control at the individual level. SLiCA Q.E.24 
asks how satisfied an individual is with her or 
his standard of living. An answer of “very satis-
fied“ would be assigned a score of 4.0; a “very 
dissatisfied“ a score of 0.0. The answer would 
be divided by 4, to receive a score between 0.0 
and 1.0.
3.2.4 Component Indicator 4:  The percentage 
of individuals who speak a mother tongue 
(whether Native or not) in relation to the per-
centage of individuals reporting corresponding 
ethnicity.
This indicator is identical to the one used for 
the collective fate control index and incorpo-
rates the domains of knowledge construction 
and human rights:
• If 25% of individuals who claim a specific 
ethnic background claim to speak that group‘s 
mother tongue, and 75% do not, the score 
will be 0.33.
• If 100% of individuals who claim a specific 
ethnic background claim to speak that group‘s 
mother tongue, the score will be 1.0.
The individual fate control index results from 
Table 7.3: Index of Fate Control (Individual)
Composite Indicator - Individual  Sub-Domain
The percentage of elections in which an individual votes  Political power/
 human rights
Satisfaction with influence local people have on the management of natural  Decision-making power/ 
resources human rights
Satisfaction level with one‘s standard of living  Economic control
Percentage of individuals who speak mother tongue (whether Native or not)  Knowledge construction/ 
in relation to percentage of individuals reporting corresponding ethnicity  human rights
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adding the four component indicators. The 
score thus ranges from 0.0 (minimal fate con-
trol) to 4.0 (high fate control). 
This individual index depends on surveying. 
It would require an effort akin to the SLiCA 
project, but one that involves the whole popul-
ation of the Arctic, not only the indigenous 
population.
3.3 Final Proposal: A Single Indicator 
of Fate Control
While we feel that the collective index of fate 
control presents a more complex and, there-
fore, more realistic indicator of fate control, the 
problems associated with composite indexes 
encourage us to select one indicator above 
others, to be used where the composite is con-
sidered too problematic. Components of our 
fate control index appear as indicators for other 
domains; thus we propose that if the index is 
not to be used, the single most important indi-
cator (given the larger context of the group of 
Arctic social indicators recommended in this 
report) be the percentage of surface lands 
legally controlled by the inhabitants through 
public governments and Native corporations.
4.0 Concluding Comments
Fate control is one of the primary indicators of 
human well-being in economic, social, political, 
and domestic realms. An ability to control 
people‘s own destiny, as well as to exert author-
ity over land and resources is a particularly 
important indicator in the context of the Arctic. 
The notion of fate control is deeply interrelated 
with other domains of human life, and in many 
ways defines the framework under which these 
other domains operate. Given its conceptual 
complexity and all-pervasiveness, fate control is 
a highly multifaceted category that is hard to 
measure by a single indicator. This chapter 
demonstrates the necessity of building a system 
of indicators that encompasses a variety of 
meanings and aspects of fate control.
Our current index and indicators have been 
constructed using already available or easily 
obtainable data, and we recommend conduct-
ing further data collection in the manner of 
SLiCA, but encompassing the entire Arctic 
population (indigenous and non-indigenous) 
and all regions of the Arctic. This will greatly 
enhance the analytical power of suggested 
indicators and allow communities to better 
associate sub-domain-specific measures of fate 
control with their local conditions.
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1.0  Introduction
The long range goal of devising Arctic social 
indicators is to design and move towards the 
implementation of a system for monitoring 
changes in human development in the Arctic 
and to further our understanding of living con-
ditions within this region. Doing so will ulti-
mately help us to find ways for improving the 
quality of life in the North.
In this final chapter, we highlight some of the 
major findings of the ASI work towards achiev-
ing this goal, with summaries, main conclusions 
and list of recommendations based on the con-
tent and key findings of the preceding chapters 
of this report. This is followed by the presenta-
tion of a small set of ASI indicators that can be 
used by the Arctic Council, its Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG), pol-
icymakers, and other stakeholders who are in-
terested in a manageable, yet comprehensive, 
set of indicators that as a collective provides a 
good overview of the state of human develop-
ment in the Arctic. The chapter then briefly ad-
dresses the critical data challenges identified in 
this project and concludes with a set of key 
recommendations regarding future availability 
of Arctic-appropriate data and an Arctic Social 
Indicators monitoring system.
2.0  Summary and Major Findings
Health and Population Domain
As described in Chapter 2, an extensive number 
of indicators of health and population exist. 
Classical indicators of public health and health 
care include infant mortality, child mortality, 
and access to health care. Mental health indi-
cators include suicide rate and self-assessed 
health; chronic disease indicators include obes-
ity and smoking rate. These indicators would be 
particularly informative if we could partition 
the data made by age, gender and ethnicity. But 
as described in Chapter 2, some challenges 
related to breaking out data by ethnicity, as well 
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as to privacy and publication constraints re-
main. While governmental vital statistics are 
collected initially at the level of the individual, 
they are released to the public in aggregated 
forms that do not always permit sub-regional or 
sub-group analysis.
Regarding population indicators, a general 
set of indicators would include: Total popula-
tion, number of births, number of deaths, and 
net migration. Secondary indicators derived 
from population numbers include birth rates, 
teenage birth rates, mortality rates, infant or 
child mortality rates, population growth or de-
cline rates and projections, and age/sex/ethnic-
ity composition of the population, including 
age and sex ratios.  Thus, the list is long. But, 
for each of these indicators there are practical 
constraints on how small the geographical unit 
of data collection can be, and data availability 
presents critical challenges.  
To identify a single indicator of human health 
presents a significant challenge, as quality of life 
is not a uni-dimensional domain. If nevertheless 
just one indicator for health has to be identified, 
the findings of the ASI Health and Population 
Domain team point to infant mortality as the 
best option. Although this indicator has its 
drawbacks (e.g. it is based on small numbers), 
its strengths are, as explained in Chapter 2, that 
it relates directly to quality of life and people’s 
sense of well-being. It also integrates a wide 
range of health-relevant parameters, including 
health infrastructure, sanitation, nutrition, be-
havior, social problems and disease.  Internation-
al comparisons have established its broad valid-
ity as a proxy for societal development. In terms 
of selection criteria infant mortality rates pro-
vide a good indicator because the measure is 
clearly defined, comparable and widely availa-
ble, and includes data for time series and at sub-
regional scales.  
Similarly, it is a challenge to choose a single 
indicator regarding population or demography, 
with standard indicators such as population 
size, rates and components of change, and com-
position all being important.  In terms of Arctic 
communities, one demographic indicator of 
particular importance has been net migration. 
The quay in the village 
Sarfannguit, West Green-
land, a thriving fishing 
settlement with 107 
inhabitants (2009). Photo: 
Rasmus Ole Rasmussen
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As discussed by the Health and Population 
Domain team, both in- and out-migration re-
flect the current local sum of various push and 
pull factors. While out-migration by young 
adults can make places economically and cul-
turally less viable, proportionately large in-
migration can signal economic strength, but at 
the same time may place pressure on tradition-
al ways of life.  Like infant mortality, net migra-
tion integrates different forces, and tells some-
thing basic about where one place is heading, 
or how it compares with others (Chapter 2).
Material Well-being Domain
Material well-being of a place can be defined as 
a measure of local residents’ command over 
goods and services. As argued in Chapter 3, 
when constructing an indicator of material well-
being for the Arctic we must consider the spe-
cific features of the Arctic that make it a special 
case. Here material well-being is derived from 
market and non-market activity, as well as trans-
fers from higher levels of government. While 
the Arctic economy in many ways differs from 
that of the more industrialized southern regions 
of the countries which have northern ter-
ritories, the Arctic regions also vary amongst 
themselves by the type, quality, and quantity of 
industrial resources produced, just as they vary 
by the importance of the indigenous population 
and the local economy. Different economic and 
political systems characterize the Arctic regions. 
These differences present significant challenges 
for devising appropriate indicators of material 
well-being.
Indeed, devising and measuring the perfect 
indicator of Material Well-being that captures 
the uniqueness of the Arctic economy and the 
importance of both market and non-market 
activity and transfers would be both challenging 
and costly.  In selecting an appropriate indi-
cator we need to balance the information it pro-
vides with the cost of constructing the indi-
cator. The discussion by the ASI domain team 
on Material Well-being in the North took as its 
point of departure the general criticism of GDP. 
Weaknesses of using the GDP measure as an 
indicator of Arctic material well-being are 
many, and include the non-inclusion of non-
market production, flow of resource rents, dif-
ferences in cost-of-living, annual price and out-
put fluctuations, and the lack of consideration 
of distribution of income and environmental 
impacts. As discussed in Chapter 3, many indi-
cators exist that represent an improvement over 
GDP, such as income indicators, economic 
participation indicators, indicators of basic 
necessities and housing, poverty, and indicators 
of net-migration. Indicators such as these, how-
ever, also have weaknesses when applied to the 
Arctic context. Still, based on a range of selec-
tion criteria, at least four indicators of material 
well-being hold promise: per capita household 
income; net-migration; subsistence harvest; and 
a composite index that takes into account each 
of the three sectors of the Arctic economy.
Based on the ASI selection criteria discussed 
above per capita household income is identified 
as the best  indicator currently available. One 
of its particularly notable strengths is that it 
provides a more accurate estimate of income in 
the North than does the standard measure of 
GDP. Yet it has its limitations: a major disad-
vantage is that it ignores both direct services 
purchased with public transfers and also pro-
duction in the traditional economy. Ignoring 
subsistence harvest and the transfer economy in 
effect leaves us with an indicator of minimum 
material well-being. Aside from this weakness, 
the primary challenge in the use of per capita 
household income will be developing a means 
of adjusting this indicator for price differences 
between time periods and across regions. At the 
same time, a fair and reasonable measure of 
material well-being in the Arctic must take into 
consideration all three aspects of the Arctic 
economy; the formal and informal economy, 
and the transfer component. This could be 
achieved by either creating a composite index 
that accounts for all three sectors as proposed, 
or alternatively by recommending a set of three 
indicators that collectively account for the three 
parts. 
In the final analysis, as with other indicators 
discussed in this study, until more data become 
available, including new approaches to primary 
data collection, any attempt to measure and 
track material well-being in the Arctic more 
accurately is incomplete (Chapter 3).
Education Domain
In constructing an indicator for education that 
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is appropriate to the Arctic context the ASI 
Education Domain team decided to focus on 
the post-secondary level. Populations in the 
Arctic are, in general, more highly educated 
than in many other areas of the world, even if 
they lag behind the more southerly regions 
of their own countries. All forms of educat-
ional attainment at an advanced level are con-
sidered, including the development of vocation-
al, technical and subsistence skills and ex-
pertise, as well as the completion of certificate 
and degree programs that are of benefit to the 
individual and the community. This angle to 
devising an appropriate indicator of education 
in the North also has the benefit of allowing us 
to use the constructed indicator as an indirect 
measure of the overall quality of pre-tertiary 
educational services, since without strong 
educational support from early childhood ed-
ucation through elementary and secondary 
schools, post-secondary educational attainment 
is likely to be weak.
The ASI Education Domain team considered 
three indicators of education: the proportion of 
students pursuing post-secondary education 
opportunities; the ratio of students successfully 
completing post-secondary education opport-
unities; and the proportion of graduates who 
are still in their own community (or have re-
turned to it) 10 years later. Of these possible 
indicators the recommendation is to select the 
ratio of students successfully completing post-sec-
ondary education opportunities. The main ratio-
nale for this choice rests on a number of impor-
tant considerations. As explained in Chapter 4, 
several factors can come into play in determin-
ing whether a student completes a program or 
not, including poor preparation, particularly in 
basic skills areas such as reading, writing and 
math, as well as insufficient support systems for 
academic and cultural acclimatization. Comple-
tion rates can provide a measure of both the 
level of pre-qualifications a student has requir-
ed prior to entering a program, and also a meas-
ure of the extent to which there is a connection 
between the aspirations and expectations of the 
students and the kind of programs that are 
readily available to them. Completion rates are 
Town of Akureyri, North-
ern Iceland, summer 
2009. Photo: Joan 
Nymand Larsen
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also a reflection of commitment and adaptabil-
ity on the part of sponsoring institutions to 
support students through to graduation. This is 
especially the case with students who are the 
first generation in their family or com-
munity to pursue post-secondary education. 
Participation in, and completion of, post-sec-
ondary education opportunities is one sign of a 
healthy community in the circumpolar North, 
and as such can serve as a reliable indicator of 
the role of education generally in contributing 
to the well-being of Arctic communities. This is 
especially the case in small, remote, indigenous 
communities where education can serve as a 
vehicle for achieving not only individual aspira-
tions, but community aspirations as well
(Chapter 4). 
Cultural Well-being Domain
The complexity of the concept of culture makes 
it a significant challenge to determine an appro-
priate indicator of cultural well-being, one 
which can provide a universally intelligible 
measure of cultural wellness across circumpolar 
populations. In Chapter 5, culture is defined as 
a concept that includes several dimensions, 
some of which can be more easily assessed and 
tracked than others. 
Language retention, cultural autonomy, and 
sense of belonging are all elements that influ-
ence overall cultural integrity and are discussed 
as important components for an understanding 
of cultural well-being in the Arctic. While vari-
ous indicators of these three components of cul-
tural well-being can be identified, one option is 
to construct a composite indicator taking into 
account each of these three distinct dimensions 
of culture. 
As argued by the ASI Cultural Well-being 
Domain team, cultural integrity can be evalu-
ated with the help of data that are regularly col-
lected and by ranking local and regional poli-
cies and social realities that influence it. In the 
end, Chapter 5 presents a composite indicator 
that takes into account cultural autonomy (e.g. 
do laws and policies recognize institutions that 
exist to advocate for cultural autonomy or 
national minority populations?); language re-
tention (what percentage of a population speaks 
its ancestral language?); and belonging (what 
percentage of people are engaged in recreation-
al or subsistence activities?). The rationale here 
is that a composite index presents the advant-
age of taking into account developments 
that affect cultural well-being, but that may 
diverge. 
A cultural vitality index, a multidimensional 
composite indicator, best reflects the complex-
ities and dynamics of culture in the circumpolar 
North. Such a composite will provide a sense of 
the state of affairs within the different dimen-
sions of cultural vitality/integrity, which policy 
makers may find of significant value as indi-
cators are tracked over time and through var-
ious local, national, and international develop-
ments. However, the drawbacks would in-
clude the significant problems of measuring 
and weighing multiple sub-domains and, thus, 
such an indicator might be difficult to imple-
ment.
While a composite indicator will provide a 
more multidimensional picture of a complex 
concept, the Cultural Well-being Domain  team 
chose to also identify a more accessible indi-
cator which might be more readily available, 
although with significant trade-offs. The ad-
vantage of using the single indicator of language 
retention as an alternative is that data and meas-
urements are readily available. The Cultural 
Well-being Domain team agreed that no matter 
whether indigenous or non-indigenous, langu-
age holds extensive and profound cultural 
knowledge and functions as a link between gen-
erations that is critical to the practice and reten-
tion of cultures. The team members also agreed 
that language is, in this sense, a facilitator of cul-
ture among and between cultural communities. 
Conclusion: Measuring Change in Human Development in the Arctic
A group of Dene playing 
the traditional Hand Game 
at Ross River, Yukon, 
Canada. Photo: Rasmus 
Ole Rasmussen
152 Arctic Social Indicators
This single indicator is accepted as valid, read-
ily understood by both policy makers and local 
residents throughout the circumpolar world. 
All peoples and – all cultures – have language. 
It is through data about language use and 
language users, as well as through rates of 
language retention, that we can get an under-
standing of overall cultural integrity and vitality 
(Chapter 5).
Closeness to Nature Domain
Arctic societies have undergone significant 
change in the last century, due mostly to the 
forces of globalization, resource development, 
urbanization, and modernization. These chang-
es, in turn, have affected and transformed Arctic 
human-environment interactions. Despite these 
changes, most Arctic inhabitants, to a greater or 
lesser degree, maintain an interrelationship with 
the natural world. Residents of urban and rural 
areas alike engage in outdoor activities for both 
utilitarian purposes, to procure wild and do-
mestic food sources, for recreational purposes, 
and for spiritual purposes.  
As discussed in chapter 6, contact with nature 
is a somewhat intangible attribute of human de-
velopment in the Arctic and indicators are ex-
tremely challenging to develop and difficult to 
measure. One major constraint to measuring 
contact with nature is the lack of current data. 
Among a range of indicators considered, three 
indicators proved the most robust based on 
selection criteria: Harvest of country foods; 
consumption of country foods; and number of 
people or households engaged in the tradition-
al economy. The Closeness to Nature Domain 
team recommended as its indicator the con-
sumption or harvest of country food because of 
the centrality of country food consumption to 
Arctic cultures and peoples, the availability of 
data and the ability of communities across the 
Arctic to collect those data, as well as the 
generalizability of the concept across Arctic 
regions, for indigenous and non indigenous 
people, for rural and urban residents, and for 
women and men. To use this indicator, one 
could measure both harvest and consumption 
or could choose one or the other depending on 
relevance to the particular region as well as ease 
and feasibility of data collection. While there 
are significant challenges related to data collec-
tion for measures of this indicator, the team 
strongly recommends consumption and harvest 
of country or traditional foods as the best proxy 
indicator for contact with nature in all Arctic 
regions (Chapter 6).
Fate Control Domain
Like closeness to nature and cultural well-
being, fate control was identified as being of 
specific concern to Arctic residents. As noted in 
Chapter 7, while fate control, or the lack there-
of, can be experienced at the individual level, it 
is the collective level on which the Fate Control 
Domain team decided to focus. The team also 
noted the overarching significance of this do-
main to all the other domains.
The Fate Control Domain team proposed an 
index of fate control, comprising four indi-
cators that it felt to be relatively simple and 
Adult reindeer takes a 
break from the intense 
mosquito harassment 
outside during summer 
migration with Nenets 
herders on Yamal Penin-
sula. Injured calves are 
often nurtured closely until 
their wounds or broken 
bones are healed and they 
can migrate on their own. 
Even when they are fully 
grown they remain partic-
ularly habituated to people 
and may request to enter 
the chum by ‘knocking‘ 
at the ‘door‘ with their 
antlers. This animal was 
about 10 years old at the 
time and knew quite well 
how to squeeze himself 
into and out of the narrow 
entrance, despite his large 
rack of antlers. 
Photo by B.C. Forbes. 
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transparent, which combines indicators that 
characterize all of the sub-domains of fate con-
trol identified in Chapter 7. The merits of such 
an index are its advantage for comparative and 
analytical purposes, and its recognition of fate 
control’s conceptual complexity as a domain.
The index’s composite indicators are: 1) the 
percentage of indigenous members in govern-
ing bodies (municipal, community, regional) 
relative to the percentage of the indigenous 
people in the total population; 2) the percent-
age of surface lands legally controlled by the in-
habitants through public governments, Native 
corporations, and communes; 3) the percentage 
of public expenses within the region (regional 
government, municipal taxes, community sales 
taxes) raised locally; and 4) the percentage of 
individuals who speak a mother tongue (wheth-
er Native or not) in relation to the percentage 
of individuals reporting corresponding ethnic-
ity. Each of these indicators’ rationale is ex-
plained in Chapter 7. As the above index focus-
es on collective fate control, Chapter 7 also sug-
gests how a similar index might be constructed 
for the level of individual arctic resident. 
The Fate Control Domain team recognizes 
that composite indices present challenges in 
terms of transparency and aggregation, and 
selection of appropriate weights of individual 
components. The team suggests that the best 
single indicator may be the percentage of sur-
face lands legally controlled by the inhabitants 
through public governments and Native corpo-
rations (second component of the index); 
and suggests that this indicator be tested along 
with the composite: if it proves an adequate 
proxy, it could be used in place of the index 
(Chapter 7).
3.0  A Small Set of Arctic Social 
 Indicators
In this section we summarize our recommend-
ations of a small set of Arctic Social Indicators 
for tracking human development in the Arctic. 
The recommended set of indicators is the col-
lection of best-choice indicators representing 
the best available option from each of the six 
domains, given the constraints and limitations 
relating to data availability and to their con-
struction such as in the case where the ASI do-
main teams opted for composite indices be-
cause of the complexity of these concepts. The 
chosen set of ASI indicators represents key ele-
ments of prominent features of human develop-
ment in the Arctic. Once measured, verified 
and possibly refined through further testing 
and analysis, this set will help move us further 
towards the implementation of a system for on-
going monitoring and analysis. It will also pro-
vide critical information on human well-being 
in the Arctic that is accessible to policy makers, 
Arctic Council working groups, Arctic stake-
holders, and others interested in Arctic moni-
toring and tracking the elements that have been 
identified as prominent features of human 
development and quality of life in the Arctic. 
Based on a number of selection criteria as de-
scribed in Chapter 1, and the discussion pre-
sented in the six substantive chapters of this re-
port, the ASI working group recommends a list 
of seven Arctic social indicators. Each of these 
indicators is proposed by one or more ASI 
domain teams. Based on preliminary analysis, 
we expect that these chosen indicators will per-
form well based on our selection criteria of data 
availability, ease of measurement, internal valid-
ity, affordability, robustness, applicability and 
attainability at various levels (household, local, 
regional), and applicability to indigenous as 
well as non-indigenous populations. The ASI 
working group has placed special emphasis on 
the selection criteria of data availability and 
ability to access data currently.  
RECOMMENDED SET OF ARCTIC 
SOCIAL INDICATORS:
(1) Infant Mortality (Domain: 
Health/Population)
(2) Net-migration (Domains: 
Health/Population and Material 
Well-being)
(3) Consumption/harvest of local foods 
(Domains: Closeness to Nature and 
Material Well-being)
(4) Per capita household income (Domain: 
Material Well-being)
(5) Ratio of students successfully completing 
post-secondary education (Domain: 
Education)
(6) Language retention (Domain: 
Cultural Well-being)
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(7) Fate Control Index (Domain: 
Fate Control)
This final set of indicators will be measured, 
tested, and possibly also refined depending on 
the outcome of further testing and analysis in 
terms of its ability as a collective to track chang-
es and facilitate comparisons among regions in 
the Arctic. While testing, verification, and re-
finement is the task of ASI Phase II, in the cur-
rent report the ASI working group recommends 
this set as the best possible set given the avail-
ability of time and other resources, including 
availability of data currently. As a collective the 
set is expected to do a good job of tracking 
changes in human development.
Still, existing challenges relating to data 
cannot be ignored. If we did not strive for im-
provements in data availability and improved 
quality we would forgo the opportunity and fail 
to meet the present challenge of obtaining a re-
fined and best-choice set of ASI indicators 
where trade-offs are minimized to the largest 
extent possible.  It is within the scope of the 
ASI to identify and work towards meeting these 
challenges. As demonstrated in this report, 
several of the indicators proposed throughout 
this report have weaknesses related to availabil-
ity of data, affordability, and level, and applica-
bility to both indigenous and non-indigenous 
inhabitants of the Arctic. In order for an indi-
cator to do the job of tracking changes in 
human development and to be as reliable as 
possible for making cross regional comparisons, 
they must adequately reflect what they are in-
tended to measure. It is desirable that they in-
volve the most accurate statistic for measuring 
both the level and extent of change in the do-
main of interest.
It is also important that the chosen indicators 
receive wide support, so that they will not be 
changed regularly, just as it is critical that the 
chosen indicators are consistent over time and 
across places, as the usefulness of indicators is 
related directly to the ability to track trends 
over time and compare the well-being of regi-
ons. These requirements present significant 
challenges, e.g. for achieving consistency across 
regions, including at the local, regional and 
national levels. The need for consistency in in-
dicators places increased demands on the adop-
tion of common data protocols and metadata 
across the circumpolar countries and regions. 
 
A promising harvest of 
potatoes between the old 
wood houses in the Sàmi 
village of Lovozero, Kola 
Peninsula, Russia. 
Photo: Rasmus 
Ole Rasmussen
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4.0 Moving toward Implementing 
an Arctic Human Well-being 
Monitoring System
As discussed in Chapter 2, to advance beyond 
the AHDR, we need indicators that can be 
measured and compared at geographical levels 
of much smaller scale than the nine general 
regions, including  the local level and ideally 
the smallest social units possible (household, in-
dividual). But one obvious limitation is data 
availability, which puts practical constraints on 
how small the unit of comparison can be. As 
seen, for example, in the case of health, popula-
tion and income statistics, statistical agencies do 
not provide disaggregated data below certain 
minimum thresholds of population counts, for 
reasons of confidentiality. Analysis of small 
Arctic communities using government-collect-
ed data may present challenges related to artifi-
cially rounded or suppressed numbers. This 
may preclude a more in-depth analysis of small 
locales in the Arctic, even though these com-
munities are important and of interest to both 
policy making and research. At the same time, 
if a particular measure is collected by survey, if 
sample size is too small, the data for a chosen 
indicator becomes less reliable. 
The long-term monitoring of human develop-
ment in the Arctic would be greatly facilitated 
by the regular and frequent collection and re-
porting of relevant data, including those re-
quired for the proposed small set of ASI indi-
cators. The persistent challenge with Arctic 
data, including quality, accessibility, and con-
sistency, results in critical trade-offs in 
selecting the best indicator among a set of 
possible indicators. As has been demonstrated 
throughout this report, an ideal set of indicators 
is largely unattainable because the best meas-
ures may not be collected frequently enough, or 
not at all, to allow yearly comparisons. Our de-
sire for longer time series rather than single 
measurements may be compromised if the 
measure changes substantially from one year or 
period of years to the next. In devising all indi-
cators of human development in the Arctic we 
face important trade-offs. Such trade-off will of 
course always exist to some degree, simply be-
cause it is impossible to fully capture the com-
plex reality of some concepts and phenomenon 
in a single measure. Abstractions are always 
necessary when we attempt to move from com-
plex reality to some manageable level in terms 
of measurement and analysis. These trade-offs 
were highlighted in the case of selection of ASI 
indicators for health, culture and material well-
being, but naturally exist for all indicators. Until 
improvements in methods and extent of data 
collection, data quality and its availability are 
fully realized, compromises will need to be 
made to achieve good indicators that are 
obtainable at a reasonable cost in terms of both 
time and resources.
The ASI project was formulated to fill a criti-
cal gap in knowledge identified by the AHDR 
on the construction of social indicators to help 
facilitate monitoring of changes in human 
development. The AHDR identified domains 
of particular relevance to Arctic residents that 
are important to incorporate in measuring 
human development in the Arctic. Guided by 
the AHDR, the first phase of ASI identified a 
set of Arctic-specific indicators to monitor 
As a prelude to ASI-II, let us briefly consider the following working definition of relevant terms:
a.  National  data are collected by a national agency
b.  Comparable  data collected by a national agency are comparable to that collected elsewhere
c.  Publication  data are available in hard copy or electronic form from the collecting agency
d.  Spatial  data are available at the county level (e.g. census area, district)
e.  Period  data are available over time on at least a 5 year frequency
f.  Indigenous populations  populations represented among the permanent participants of the Arctic
  Council
g.  Special tabulation  data could be made available if the collecting agency made, or permitted, special
  tabulations
h.  Compilation  data could be compiled by researchers from existing information
i.  New data collection  data could be collected using no more than 10 minutes of interview time
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Arctic human development and quality of life 
in the Arctic. The next step, which constitutes 
the proposed ASI-II Implementation project 
(2009-2011), aims to implement the identified 
indicators, through testing, validating and refin-
ing the indicators across the Arctic, and then 
measuring and performing analyses of select 
cases, with the ultimate goal of moving toward 
the adoption by Arctic governments and the 
Arctic Council of the indicators for the purpose 
of long-term monitoring of human develop-
ment.  
Ideally, a chosen indicator fits one of the 
following combinations of criteria:
1. Data are collected by a national agency, are 
comparable, are published, are available at a 
county level, are collected at least every five 
years, and are available for indigenous 
populations.
2. Data can be made available with special 
tabulations and otherwise meet all criteria 
listed in #1.
3. Data can be compiled from existing informa-
tion and otherwise meet all criteria listed 
in #1.
4. New data could be collected that otherwise 
meet all criteria listed in #1.
For each indicator proposed in the six 
domains, limitations have been considered with 
respect to national limitations, publication lim-
itations, spatial limitations, period limitations, 
indigenous population limitations, special tabul-
ation limitations, compilation limitations, new 
data collection limitations
Based on this, indicators can be divided into 
three separate tiers: 
Tier 1: based on existing published data
Tier 2: data that would be produced by special 
tabulations from existing unpublished 
data
Tier 3: would require primary data collection
Preliminary categorization of chosen indica-
tors into tiers was presented in this report. 
This categorization, however, would need to
be expanded to include background details on 
all Arctic regions for a more comprehensive 
coverage and complete system of tiers. The 
more complete application of a tier system, with 
all indicators being categorized according to 
tiers based on analysis of data availability in 
all relevant regions, is a task for further research 
and is a component of the work on ASI 
Phase-II on the testing, validation, refinement 
A house in the village 
Sarfannguit, West Green-
land. Drying racks for 
drying fish and reindeer 
meat are situated outside 
the house. The settlement 
had 107 inhabitants 
(2009). 
Photo: Rasmus 
Ole Rasmussen
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and implementation of the ASI monitoring 
system.
5.0 Arctic Social Indicator Data 
Recommendations
We conclude this report with a series of recom-
mendations concerning data collection and the 
implementation of an Arctic Social Indicators 
monitoring system. 
At the outset of ASI, the stated intent was to 
identify a small set of indicators of human 
development relevant to the Arctic that could 
be monitored at a reasonable cost. The ASI 
team hoped that “reasonable cost” could be op-
erationally defined in terms of indicators that 
are based on existing information. The team 
also agreed that a good indicator should:
z have clear meaning relevant to one or more 
of the six domains of Arctic human develop-
ment (health and demography, material well-
being, education, cultural integrity, contact 
with nature, and fate control)
z be sensitive to change over time
z be available at least down to a regional level
z be applicable to, and reported separately for, 
indigenous and non-indigenous populations
Participants at the first ASI workshop were 
able to achieve consensus on using the six do-
mains of Arctic human development contained 
in the Arctic Human Development Report re-
commendations as the basis for organizing the 
work of ASI. At two subsequent workshops it 
became clear that within each of these domains, 
meeting the combined challenges posed by the 
criteria defining a “good indicator” require 
either sacrifice of one or more of the criteria, or 
a relaxation of the assumption that indicators 
can be based on existing information.
The individual domain chapters detail these 
challenges. Net migration, for example, while 
ostensibly based on the most basic data (popu-
lation, births, and deaths) is not uniformly avail-
able for all countries nor for indigenous and 
non-indigenous populations in some countries. 
Time series data on harvest and consumption of 
local resources, another recommended Arctic 
Social Indicator, are not available on a decadal 
time scale in North America, Russia, Norway, 
Sweden, or Finland. It is therefore not enough 
to recommend a set of Arctic Social Indicators. 
Recommendations regarding the steps neces-
sary to measure and monitor them are also 
required. The following recommendations 
should enable Arctic states to monitor the well 
being of their Arctic residents.
 
Arctic Social Indicator Monitoring 
Objectives
Recommendation 1. Design the Arctic Social 
Indicator monitoring system to meet the 
following objectives:
1. Data are available at a regional level;
2. Data are available separately for indigenous 
and non-indigenous populations;
3. Data are available on at least a five-year 
reporting period.
The operational definition of these objectives 
will, of practical necessity, differ across coun-
tries. A practical definition for a region in Alaska, 
for example, is the census area, and in Arctic 
Canada and Iceland it is the region, while in 
Greenland it is the municipality, in Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland the county, and in Russia 
the oblast or republic (see map generated from 
Hamilton AHDR/Arctic RIMS). Differentiating 
indigenous and non-indigenous populations is 
commonplace in North America, uncommon in 
Scandinavia, varying over time in Russia, and 
less important in Iceland. Scandinavian coun-
tries, Greenland, and Iceland base much of 
their social indicators on administrative data 
available annually while Canada collects such 
data every five years and the USA  have switch-
ed from decadal observations to an ongoing 
sample design that can probably support five 
year averages.
Depending on the indicator and the nation 
one of three levels of effort are required to meet 
these monitoring objectives: (See the indicator 
matrix in each Chapter for an assessment of the 
level of each recommended indicator). 
1. Data are collected by a national agency and 
published in hard copy or electronic form.
2. Data are collected by a national agency 
and require special tabulations to be made 
available.
3. Data require primary data collection.
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ASI Indicators Based on Existing 
Published Data
Recommendation 2. Encourage national sta-
tistical agencies to participate in develop-
ment of a metadatabase identifying ASI in-
dicators that are already monitored by a 
national agency and published in hard copy 
or electronic form. 
While it may seem like a trivial exercise to 
identify existing published sources of ASI indi-
cators, the experience of ASI team members is 
that the task is in fact quite challenging. Small 
differences in national statistical programs (e.g. 
the definition of an infant used in constructing 
infant mortality estimates) can affect the com-
parability of data across countries, or over time.
 
ASI Indicators Requiring Special 
Tabulations
Recommendation 3. Encourage establish-
ment of an international task force com-
posed of national statistical agency analysts 
and Arctic researchers to identify the special 
tabulations required to produce compara-
ble ASI indicators and to recommend 
approaches to produce these special tabula-
tions.
Special tabulations can assume three forms: 
(1) processing of publically available electronic 
files by Arctic researchers; (2) processing of 
confidential agency data files by arctic research-
ers who obtain special permission to do so; and, 
(3) processing of confidential agency files by 
agency personnel. In some cases it is possible 
for Arctic researchers to use published, publi-
cally available, electronic files to construct ASI 
variables. This process is not necessarily straight-
forward. Construction of comparable time-
series data often requires different rules in each 
time period. Geographic boundaries change 
over time, for example, as do variable defini-
tions. Processing of confidential agency files by 
Arctic researchers is currently possible as spe-
cial projects, usually confined to a single data 
set. Construction of time series ASI variables 
will require processing of multiple data sets 
over a longer time period than normally associ-
ated with a special project. Processing of confi-
dential agency data to generate ASI indicators 
by agency personnel represents a currently un-
budgeted agency expense. Task Force recom-
mendations can serve as a basis for agency 
budget requests.
ASI Indicators Requiring Primary 
Data Collection
Recommendation 4. Encourage the colla-
boration of ASI with researchers who are 
funded through national research councils 
to collect primary data 
In the case of indicators requiring primary 
data collection, ASI needs to collaborate with 
researchers who are funded through national 
research councils to collect such data. Such col-
laboration makes sense for both ASI and fund-
ed researchers. ASI benefits from having data 
required to test and validate measures, and 
funded researchers can build on the conceptual 
groundwork of ASI and the joint participation 
of project researchers and ASI in the testing 
and validation process. Also, it is important for 
the full implementation of an Arctic social indi-
cators system that a cost-effective approach to 
primary data collection can be demonstrated.
ASI Phase Two
Recommendation 5. Initiate ASI Phase Two 
with the objective of monitoring the six 
identified domains of human development 
in the Arctic
ASI has made significant progress toward the 
development of an Arctic social indicator 
system, having identified a small set of indi-
cators to monitor Arctic human development. 
The next logical step in monitoring of human 
development is to test, validate and refine the 
indicators across the Arctic, with the goal of 
having Arctic governments adopt the indicators 
for the monitoring of human development. This 
step constitutes ASI phace two.  
Relationship between Monitoring 
Networks 
Recommendation 6.  Reduce duplication of 
effort by promoting collaboration among 
monitoring projects in the Arctic, notably 
but not confined to, Arctic Observing Net-
works, (AON), Sustaining Arctic Observing 
Networks (SAON), and Arctic Social Indi-
cators (ASI).
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 The ASI project team endorses and supports 
the SAON recommendations and further re-
commends collaboration among and coordin-
ation of, the monitoring activities and projects 
focused on the Arctic. Monitoring social indi-
cators should form a major part of monitoring 
activities along with biophysical indicators of 
ecosystem health. 
The ultimate goal of the Arctic Social Indicators 
project is to assist Arctic governments and com-
munities to promote human development and the 
highest possible quality of life in Arctic commu-
nities. We hope and believe that the Arctic Social 
Indicators presented in this report will enable 
Arctic States and communities to measure, mon-
itor, and take actions to promote the well-being 
of all Arctic peoples.
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